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## Near East/South Asia Report

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## NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

## CONTENTS

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

## ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

- Turkish Paper Discusses Kurdish-Armenian 'Cooperation' in Iran  
(MARMARA, 11 Oct 84) ..... 1

## ARAB AFRICA

## ALGERIA

- Bendjedid's Reaction to Libyan-Moroccan Unity Analyzed  
(Patrick Seele; AL-MAJALLAH, No 242, 29 Sep-7 Oct 84) ... 2

## EGYPT

- Interview With Founder of New Future Party  
(Faraj Fudah Interview; AKHIR SA'AH, No 2603, 12 Sep 84) 6

## LIBYA

- Agreement With France on Chad Elucidated  
(Adnan Nasrawayn; AL-HAWADITH, No 1456, 28 Sep 84) ..... 13
- Interview With Dr 'Ali 'Abd al-Salam al-Turayki  
(Turayki Interview; AL-TADAMUN, No 79, 13 Oct 84) ..... 17

## MOROCCO

- Sources of Foreign Exchange Examined  
(LA VIE INDUSTRIELLE ET AGRICOLE, 30 Sep 84) ..... 20

## SUDAN

Numayri's Motives for Announcement of Changes Questioned (AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, No 25, 17 Oct 84) .....	26
---	----

## TUNISIA

Profile of PSD Director Hedi Baccouche (Moncef Ben M'Rad; REALITIES, No 49, 12 Oct 84) .....	28
---	----

## ARAB EAST/ISRAEL

### JORDAN

Labor Ministry Recommends Planning of Educational Needs (AL-DUSTUR, 3 Sep 84) .....	32
Central Bank Issues Report (AL-DUSTUR, 4 Sep 84) .....	34

### LEBANON

Lebanon's Economic Situation Spelled Out (Victor Qasir Interview; AL-MUSTAQBAL, No 396, 22 Sep 84) .....	39
Karami Says Treasury in Danger of Bankruptcy (AL-MUSTAQBAL, No 393, 1 Sep 84) .....	42
Phalange Elections Mark New Era (AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, No 385, 23 Sep 84) ....	44
Israel Reportedly Stealing River Water (AL-FURSAN, No 211, 20 Aug 84) .....	46
Briefs Abolition of Army Sectarianism .....	49

### SAUDI ARABIA

Riyadh Police Chief Interviewed (Muhammad ibn-'Ayish al-Mutayri Interview; AL-JAZIRAH, 25 Sep 84) .....	50
Briefs Expected Deficit Decrease .....	56

## SOUTH ASIA

### AFGHANISTAN

Afghan Editor Describes Paper's Propaganda, Educational Role (Sadik Kavun Tufani; ZA RUBEZHOM, No 23, 14-20 Sep 84) .....	57
Chemical Gas Reportedly Used Against Mujahidin in Ghazni (KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 21 Oct 84) .....	61
Paper Calls Pakistan 'Source of Tension' (BAKHITAR, 14 Nov 84) .....	64
Kabul Reportedly Tries To Introduce Soviet Passport System (NEW STRAITS TIMES, 15 Oct 84) .....	65
Citizens To Register for Internal Passport System (KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 15 Oct 84) .....	66
No End to Conflict Expected (KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 16 Oct 84) .....	67
Mujahidin Reportedly Kill 12, Capture 312 Soldiers (TEHRAN TIMES, 1 Nov 84) .....	68
Briefs	
Soviet Helicopters Downed	69
Soviet Presence Condemned	69

### INDIA

Papers Report, Comment on Italian Minister's Visit (THE STATESMAN, 6 Oct 84; THE HINDU, 6 Oct 84) .....	70
5 Oct Press Conference Analyst's Comment, by G. K. Reddy	
India, Norway To Cooperate in Computer Industry (THE STATESMAN, 5 Oct 84) .....	73
Analyst Comments on New Zealand Leader's Visit (G. K. Reddy; THE HINDU, 5 Oct 84) .....	74
Proposals of ILO Team on Population Control Described (THE STATESMAN, 5 Oct 84) .....	76
All States But Assam Reported Ready for Elections (THE STATESMAN, 6 Oct 84) .....	78
No Relaxation on Curbs on Foreigners in Sikkim (THE STATESMAN, 9 Oct 84) .....	79

Researcher Discovers Additional Nomadic Tribes (THE STATESMAN, 6 Oct 84) .....	80
---	----

## IRAN

Foreign Ministry Condemns Lebanese-Israeli Negotiations (IRNA, 9 Nov 84) .....	83
Official on Anniversary of Abrogation of U.S., USSR Accords (IRNA, 10 Nov 84) .....	84
NVOI: Iran's Rulers Serve U.S. Imperialism (National Voice of Iran, 8 Nov 84) .....	86
Tehran Criticizes U.S.-Egyptian Exercises (Tehran International Service, 9 Nov 84) .....	88
NVOI Condemns Iran's 'Anti-Afghan' Policy (National Voice of Iran, 27 Oct 84) .....	91
Article Examines Turkey's Dilemma With Kurds (Editorial, S. Moadab; KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 20 Oct 84) ...	93
Hashemi-Rafsanjani Discusses Oil Prices (Hashemi-Rafsanjani; Tehran International Service, 9 Nov 84)	95
India, Iran Considering Trade Expansion in New Contract (BURS, 10 Sep 84) .....	97
Special Report on Internal Affairs, War, Opposition, Succession (As'ad Haydar; AL-MUSTAQBAL, No 395, 15 Sep 84) .....	100
Clandestine Radio Reports on Tabriz, Mashhad Explosions (Free Voice of Iran, 11 Nov 84) .....	109
Opposition Paper: Theft of Reconstruction Funds ([London] KEYHAN, 25 Oct 84).....	110
Power Struggle Within Regime Assessed by Iranian Academic (F. Farnik; AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, No 26, 15 Oct 84)	111
Briefs	
Large Sums Spent on Arms	115
Embezzlement, Other Crimes Committed	115
Suppression of Workers	115
USSR Envoy's Speech	116
Trespassers To Be Sentenced	116

PAKISTAN

Political Aspirants, Views Regarding Elections Reviewed (Hafiz Abdul Khaliq's; JASARAT, 10 Oct 84) .....	117
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TURKISH PAPER DISCUSSES KURDISH-ARMENIAN 'COOPERATION' IN IRAN

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 11 Oct 84 pp 1,4

[Text] From Tehran Murad Bardakji writes in the MILLIYET: After Paris, Tehran is the second city where the Kurds are engaged in intense cooperation with the Armenians. So far, nothing has been brought to light in the case of the Armenians arrested after the recent attack on Turkish diplomats and this, too, is interpreted as a pro-Armenian stand by the Government. Many Kurdish leaders from Iraq now in Iran declare that they find the Armenian demands just and they cooperate with them.

Iranian authorities show no reaction to the anti-Turkish pronouncements of Bishop Ardak Manugian, Prelate of the Armenians in Iran, that are frequently published in the Iranian press. Recently, the Tehran paper AZADEGAN published an interview with Bishop Manugian who said "Armenian lands are occupied by Turkey. We will keep alive the memory of those martyred during the 1915 Genocide. We cannot bring back the dead but we can liberate our lands."

Then the correspondent asked a "loaded" question:—"The Turks killed the Armenians only because they were Christians. How do you account for the fact that the West is arming Turkey today?" Bishop Ardak answered, "A great responsibility lies on Turkey's neighbors, in this matter."

Iran incites the Kurds of Iraq and the five organizations working towards an independent Kurdistan. The Kurdish leader Nasir Pervari who lives exiled in Iran, said that he supports the Armenian demands and that the States of Armenia, Pontus and Kurdistan should be reestablished on Turkish soil. This is the first proof of Armenian and Kurdish cooperation about which there has been much talk. According to diplomatic circles, the Iranian Government, by closing its eyes on such cooperation, is playing a dangerous game, all for the sake of future interests. It is stressed also that this pro-Armenian stand of the Iranian government is a reward to the Armenians in return for the help given to Khomeyni in the days of the revolution. It is said the "the Armenians are successfully conducting themselves in a manner favorable to the government by sending troops to the front while declaring that the Islamic government is showing great comprehension in its dealings with the minorities."

12364

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## BENDJEDID'S REACTION TO LIBYAN-MOROCCAN UNITY ANALYZED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 242, 29 Sep-5 Oct 84 pp 8-9

/Article by Patrick Seele: "Algeria: A Bridge to the Extremist and the Moderate Camps"/

/Text/ The Algerians call President Chadli Bendjedid "the wise man," for since he assumed the presidency in 1979, over 5 years ago, he has been characterized by moderation, prudence, and lack of interest in ostentation. In contrast to his predecessor Ben Bella, who was fond of show, and Boumediene of the iron fist, Chadli Bendjedid--the soldier and the statesman--governs Algeria without egotism or harshness. His image, with his white hair, is that of a father. As a man of action and a realist Chadli Bendjedid has redirected Algerian energies from foreign political ambitions to necessary and humdrum matters relating to the creation of more jobs and housing for the 22 million Algerians.

Nevertheless the Arab west, and especially Algeria, has been shaken recently by developments represented by the unity agreement between Morocco and Libya. Before this agreement was signed Algeria was the principal power in the region, and this position was reinforced by Algeria's alliance with Tunisia and Mauritania. This step has now put Morocco on a par with Algeria, a situation that the Algerians regard as a cause for concern and a threat to them.

Chadli Bendjedid must face this challenge. He is subject to strong domestic pressure to give up the quiet, domestically-oriented policy that he has been following for 5 years so that he can confront this Moroccan action.

I predict that we shall see a strong Algerian reaction in three interrelated fields:

Algeria probably will increase its military aid to the Polisario front in the western Sahara, and Polisario now will rely mainly on Algerian support after having been deprived of Libyan assistance. The withdrawal of aid to the front means recognition of the victory of King Hasan, which is something that Algiers will not accept.

Neither Morocco nor Algeria wishes to get involved in a war with the other and neither one could support the burden of such a war. Nevertheless, the unity agreement between Morocco and Libya has resulted in acute tension between Algeria and Morocco and it could escalate into armed conflict.

The second field in which Algeria probably will become active is that of the OAU. It has been decided to hold a summit conference of the Organization in Addis Ababa next November. Once again there will be a dispute over the participation of the delegation from the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (Polisario). It is expected that Algeria, which supports Polisario, will win a diplomatic victory in the Addis Ababa conference. Nevertheless, Morocco is making continual military gains in the western Sahara, and this is slowly transforming the "Saharan Republic" into nothing but a mirage.

The third field of new Algerian activity may be more important than military aid to Polisario or diplomatic moves within the framework of the OAU. This field is represented in a more effective and vigorous Algerian policy in the Arab and the regional fields.

#### New Allies

President Chadli Bendjedid has been obliged to look for allies outside of the states of North Africa to counter the Moroccan challenge, change the balance of power in the Arab west, and restore the importance of Algeria in the region. This has become evident in the repeated telephone conversations that President Chadli Bendjedid has had with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, in his urgent dispatch of Foreign Minister Taleb Ibrahim to Damascus, and in his receiving Iranian President 'Ali Khamene'i.

We are witnessing the revival in a strengthened form of the old Steadfastness and Confrontation Front with the appearance of Algeria and Syria as two principal partners in a new regional alliance.

The importance of these developments is not expressed merely in terms of the significance of the developments themselves. It is due also to the fact that they reflect as well a change in the orientation of Algerian foreign policy and a shift of Algerian resources away from supporting the domestic economy to exercising influence abroad. It reflects also a change in the political style of President Bendjedid, which is marked by calm and moderation.

What arouses astonishment is that this prominent Arab leader, who last February was elected president for a second 5-year term, still represents an unknown personality to many people. Who, then, is Chadli Bendjedid?

#### A Military Personality

He owes his attainment of the presidency to his membership in the military, just like a number of recent Arab presidents, among them Husni Mubarak, Hafiz al-Asad, and Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi. The decisive state in his life before he became president of the republic was the 15 years (from 1964 to 1979) that he spend as commandant of the military district of Oran, which made him the sole leader in western Algeria. This command was important from both the strategic and the economic standpoints, for the Oran district is near the Moroccan frontier and includes the vital Arzew petrochemical industry complex. The years that Chadli Bendjedid spent as military commandant of western Algeria were the basis on which he built his ascent to the supreme authority.

Chadli Bendjedid now is 55 years old. He was born of wealthy parents in 1929 in the village of Siba'ah near Annaba in northeastern Algeria. When the revolt against the French began in 1955 Chadli Bendjedid joined it and spent part of the period of the war of independence in the mountains of eastern Algeria, which he knows very well. He spent the other part across the border in Tunisia, where Colonel Boumediene had established his headquarters. Chadli Bendjedid became the righthand man of Boumediene and as such took part in the revolution that led to the fall of Ben Bella and Boumediene's assumption of power in 1965.

During the long rule of Boumediene, Chadli Bendjedid was a sincere supporter of his. It was when he became president that he quietly began to change many of Boumediene's policies. For example, Chadli Bendjedid eased the restrictions imposed on the economy and gave greater scope to the private sector. (He himself is a shareholder in one of the largest hotels in Oran.) Chadli Bendjedid shifted the emphasis in the economic field from heavy industry to the improvement of living conditions, and thus life in Algeria became brighter after long years of austerity. Among this other accomplishments was the achievement of conciliation between the two main components of the Algerian population: the Arabs and the Berbers. He mollified the Berbers when, in the National Liberation Front conference last January, he said that the roots of the history of Algeria go back into the Berber past long before the Arab conquest.

Chadli Bendjedid also was behind the improvement of relations with France. He was the first Algerian president to make an official visit to Paris, the former imperial capital. With regard to his relations with the two great powers, he remained faithful to the political, military, and economic ties that his predecessor Boumediene had established with Moscow. But he also began a dialogue with the United States and began to buy arms from Western European countries.

In Arab affairs Chadli Bendjedid tried not to be partial to any one side and played the mediator's role between the rival Palestinian groups, between Syria and Iraq, and between Iraq and Iran, but this phase now has begun to draw to its close. Present circumstances are compelling the Algerian president to abandon the role of neutral arbitrator in regional disputes and become a prominent member of one of the rival factions.

#### Common Concern

Among the important developments was the fact that making the telephone call to President Hafiz al-Asad was one of the first things that President Chadli Bendjedid did after he heard the news of the Moroccan-Libyan unity. There is a basis for agreement between the Algerian and the Syrian presidents, for both of them are interested in breaking up the union between Morocco and Libya. The agreement was ratified when President al-Asad visited Algiers at the end of last August. Algeria, on its part, promised to help Syria in its struggle with Yasir 'Arafat in exchange for Syrian aid in limiting the Libyan rapprochement with Morocco. 'Arafat had been working for some months for the holding of a meeting of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers, while Syria was working to postpone the meeting either sine die or until Yasir 'Arafat was removed as chairman of the executive committee of the organization.

The Algerian-Syrian agreement produced some concrete results. The Palestinian National Council meeting was canceled and Yasir 'Arafat was put on the defensive. Libya now has recognized also that too-close a rapprochement with Morocco would jeopardize the support of the states that are friendly to it: Syria, South Yemen, and Iran.

But how firm is this new Syrian-Algerian alliance? There are many concerns that Presidents Hafiz al-Asad and Chadli Bendjedid have in common. But there also are important points of difference between them. The Algerian and the Syrian presidents are of about the same age. Also, the power of each of them rests on the twofold base composed of the army and the party. Both reached the apex of power after a fierce political struggle during the troubled 1960's, when Chadli Bendjedid helped Boumedine oust Ben Bella and Hafiz al-Asad won out over his rival Salah Jadid. The year 1965 was a decisive one for both of them. Chadli Bendjedid, who was quite strong in western Algeria, became a member of the Command Council of the Algerian Revolution in that year, while Hafiz al-Asad became commander of the Syrian air force.

Nevertheless, the position of Hafiz al-Asad is exposed to dangers far greater than those threatening the position of Chadli Bendjedid. President al-Asad is obliged to fight on many fronts and against a collection of enemies much more dangerous than Morocco: against Israel and the United States in Lebanon, against Iraqi President Saddam Husayn, and against Yasir 'Arafat. As a result President al-Asad has come to depend on Soviet assistance to a much greater extent than has President Bendjedid. In other words, it can be said that Algeria's neutrality is greater than that of Syria. It is no accident that in Algiers there is a street bearing the name of Che Guevara and another bearing the name of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the American president during the war.

The positions and interests of Hafiz al-Asad and Chadli Bendjedid in the region of the Middle East are by no means identical. Chadli Bendjedid has no personal dispute with Saddam Husayn or Yasir 'Arafat, and he maintains good relations with Husni Mubarak on the basis of respect.

Nevertheless, Algeria needs allies at the present time, at least in order to acquire greater weight in its fight to regain its position in the Arab west. Chadli Bendjedid, the quiet architect of Algerian affairs for the past 5 years, has become obliged to follow a more forward, a stronger, and a more radical line and it will be unfortunate if in the process Algeria loses its readiness to help other countries resolve their disputes.

12541

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## INTERVIEW WITH FOUNDER OF NEW FUTURE PARTY

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic No 2603, 12 Sep 84 pp 12-13

/Interview with Dr Faraj Fudah by 'Usamah 'Ajaj in Cairo: "Dialogue with Dr Faraj Fudah: 'The New Future Party is not a Breakaway From the Wafd; No Left and No Right, We Reject the Wafd-Brotherhood Alliance; We have Faith in the Parties Committee; Why Do We Sanction Camp David?'" ; date not specified/

/Text/ What is the story of the new Future Party? Is it a party that broke away from the Wafd Party? And what is its program and its position on the Wafd-Brotherhood alliance? How does it view the Brotherhood as a political group. What is new in the bylaws of the new party which is awaiting the Parties Committee decision.

Talk in the political street revolves around the Future Party which has completed all its papers for presentation to the Parties Committee during this current September. AKHIR SA'AH's interview with Dr Faraj Fudah, the party's founders' representative, unveils the reasons for its creation and his viewpoint on all economic, political and party issues.

Dr Faraj Fudah emphasizes in his interview that the Future Party did not emanate from the cloak of the Wafd Party and that the relations between the two parties will be just like that with any other party regarding the country's issues.

In further explaining the new party in form and content, he said: "We do not disagree with the Muslim Brotherhood, but we reject the mixing of religious and political cards. We believe that the government should allow them to form a party because recognition will compel them to draw up detailed programs to discuss public issues, thus revealing their true size without claims of controlling the political street."

Dr Faraj Fudah said that the Parties Committee will not object to the new party "because we have declared our commitment to the Egyptian constitution and we consider the Camp David treaty an Egyptian global commitment out of total conviction, and let the rejectionists offer an acceptable objective alternative, especially since Camp David is the first treaty that commits Israel to geographic boundaries.

In the interview, Dr Faraj confirmed what he had already emphasized, that the Future Party does not represent the right or left, but rather the future of the Egyptian street.

/Question/ We believe the natural opening for any dialogue with a group forming a new party can be summed up in "Why this party?" And does not the Future Party help to compound the phenomenon of political disintegration in the party arena?

/Answer/ We believe that there are important and varied objective reasons behind our desire to form the Future Party. One of these reasons is that the political dialogue that has been going on in Egypt for several years belongs to the past. It is among the Wafd, the Muslim Brotherhood, Young Egypt /Misr al-Fatat/, Sadatism and Nasirism, hence it reflects the past and not the future. Moreover, it is far removed from the concerns of present generations who see in this past a history with assets and liabilities. It is also a struggle conducted in the fashion of settlement of accounts, hitting below the belt and waving slogans such as treason and agency. That is why the Future Party, which does not burden itself with such experiences, becomes a necessity for it adds to the political arena a new time dimension, the dimension of the future through the givens of the present.

There are other reasons behind the need for the Future Party. We believe the existing parties lack democracy from within on the pretext of balances or because of their origin or their leadership role. We shall add something when we call for democracy while at the same time exercising it within the party. We also believe that the majority of the political street has not given its vote to anyone yet. Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish the middle-of-the-road party in Egypt because the parties adopt either leftist or rightist points of departure, and although they do not recognize these categorizations, it is nonetheless an existing fact. Consequently, there is room for the existence of the Future Party. There is a new important reason to be added to the importance of having the Future Party. The party's role is not to go after the masses' emotions. Rather, its principle role is represented in a courageous intellectual leadership of clear and defined positions. The experience of the recent elections proved quite the opposite, such as parties outbidding for religious slogans and others, the opposition parties particularly, for the Camp David issue is their desire to invent a so-called national cause. This confirms that the parties play the mass emotion chord or even try to arouse such emotions without going beyond that to the intellectual leadership of the masses, which is their principle role. Add to that important and urgent issues that have not been given adequate attention by the existing parties, such as the cause of Egyptian expatriates abroad who number between 2 and 4 million, the cause of children in Egypt, the cause of environmental protection and that of the Nile Valley which must be at the forefront of all other causes as the most serious Egyptian issue. All of these issues received ample attention in the Future Party's program.

No Right, No Left

/Question/ If the Future Party is totally oriented toward the future, what is the party's vision of the Egyptian political experience throughout this century?

/Answer/ We believe that Egypt has passed through several stages. The first stage began at the beginning of this century and up to 1918, during which it had a number of options such as the form of government: was it an Egyptian state or part of the Muslim caliphate; the choice between the idea of democracy and that of a just autocrat; the choice between a civilian rule and a religious rule; and the choice between national independence and subjection. With the outbreak of the 1919 revolution, another stage began, lasting another 18 years, up to the start of the 1936 treaty, with emphasis on national independence alone after settling all other issues with the outbreak of the 1919 revolution. With the 1936 treaty, the national independence issue took a back seat and another issue, that of democracy, emerged, dominating with its struggles the political life for another 18 years up to 1954 when the issue of democracy was settled to the disadvantage of democracy and the issue of social justice came to the forefront from that date until 1971, after 17 years, and throughout the Nasirist era. From 1971 to present, Egyptian society went back to the stage of basic options whereby issues may be summed up in a debate over a civilian or religious state in Egypt and whether it is an independent state or part of the concept of a democratic Muslim caliphate after the western fashion or a consultative government not binding on the ruler who assumes the role of imam.

/Question/ Will the Future Party fall in the snare of intellectual fuzziness, especially since the intellectual sources of its membership are unclear? And how can it be categorized between the right or left parties.

/Answer/ The program included a solution to this problem and pointed out that we look upon preconceived intellectual dogmas as intellectual and political adolescence because there are some problems that can be solved by a method some may consider rightist and other problems that can be solved by opposite methods. Ultimately, categorization is not our responsibility, but rather falls to others.

Let us consider the issue of free education, for instance. We believe, through the party's program, that although education in Egypt is free, educational costs have nonetheless soared, particularly that free education is not there to serve society. There are two agricultural and trade cooperation institutes in Egypt that turn out 5,000 students annually, while the country has no more than 4,000 cooperatives. If society is not in need of these specializations, why not make them at actual cost. The same thing goes for medical colleges. Health specialists have stated that we turn out an excess of doctors, so it would be natural and logical for medical students to pay their actual expenses. In exchange for that, industrial training in technical and vocational institutes would become free and a monthly stipend would be paid to students as long as there is a need for such specializations, with a general rule that talented and needy students are exempted from expenses in all cases.

As compared to and regarding the housing issue, we believe it is the state's right to appropriate land in the cities' cordon in compensation for it as agricultural land. And, in order not to make millions by chance or through dubious decisions, it must divide this land for sale at its actual price for the construction of low and middle income housing in accordance with prepared models, provided that the state would lease it out on the basis of its priorities and needs, while helping the owners build by granting them easy term loans. The principle of expropriation may be interpreted as leftist, but it is required, however.

At the political decision level, we believe that the required 50 percent rate of farmers and laborers has outlived its purpose because it is against any sectarian, factional or racial division in parliament and we must admit that the revolution's role in realizing social justice and eliminating class distinction may bring about the situation where the continuation of this rate becomes an impediment to democracy and not a guarantee.

/Question/ But where does the party look for popularity and public support and to whom does it turn?

/Answer/ We turn basically to the majority that has not yet cast its vote and is predominantly from the new generation whose consciousness has not yet been influenced by anyone. We derive our popularity from all the enlightened persons who see Egypt of the future as a contributor to man's civilization rather than a detractor.

/Question/ What caught my attention to your talk about the need to have the Future Party is the defense and practice of democracy within the party. How will this be realized and what is now in the party's bylaws /regarding this/?

/Answer/ I think the most important thing the party did in drawing up its bylaws is the introduction of a system we call "the wise men's council" composed of 15 political, cultural and public personalities who hitherto have refused to take part in partisan political action.

They will not be required to be members of the Future Party inasmuch as the wise men's council will exercise its role as a higher advisory council and its chairman will have the right to attend the politburo meetings without voting and is on the board of directors of the Future Party's newspaper which is under formation!

/Question/ Have you had a dialogue with public personalities to join the wise men's council and with what result?

/Answer/ We have not reached a final decision regarding the wise men's council membership. However, there are ongoing dialogues with Dr Husayn Amin and Dr Yunan Labib Rizq and we had a dialogue, which has been broken off, with Maj Gen Muhammad Najib. We are waiting for the return of Mustafa Mar'i from abroad and we are going to offer Najib Mahfuz and Yusuf Idriss membership in the council.

/Question/ What else is new in the party's bylaws?

/Answer/ We included in the bylaws an article that stipulates that party politburo members, including the party chief, may hold their position for 2 years only and may not return to the same position before spending an equal period outside the position. The party's organizational levels have been set at only three: the general conference that includes all members; the leadership council that includes the party chiefs in the governorates, the shadow ministers and members of parliament and the politburo which consists of six members who are the director, deputy director, secretary general, two assistant secretaries

and the treasurer. The politburo and the leadership council together have the right to depose by a simple majority the party chief if he fails to meet his obligations and this same right is guaranteed to the general conference which convenes with 50 percent of its membership and within 24 hours one-fifth of the members if the 50 percent rate is not achieved.

The stipulation to depose the chief is not contained in the bylaws of any other party and my information indicates that a certain opposition party is suffering from the absence of such a stipulation in its bylaws to get rid of its chief who has committed many excesses and has been questioned about financial violations related to a company of which he is the board chairman.

/Question/ But why not give us some prominent names who have joined the Future Party.

/Answer/ We admit that we do not have prominent names or influential public personalities, but we don't see any disgrace in that after the professional pursuit of politics killed the desire for public service. However, we have a member in the Shura Council and another in the People's Assembly whose joining raises a legal problem which we are studying since he entered the assembly on a different party slate and a change in his status means loss of his membership. We also have some university professors.

/Question/ We cannot deny that you came to political life from under the cloak of the Wafd Party, so how can the relationship between the Future Party and the Wafd Party be formulated?

/Answer/ I do not deny that personally I did come out of the Wafd's cloak. However, the Future Party came out of the cloak of the Egyptian street. The Future Party is not a Faraj Fudah, nor is it a splinter of the Wafd, but rather an entirely new party. Our relationship with the Wafd is the same as with the rest of the parties. We discuss national issues and we believe that a difference in opinion does no harm. My relationship with the Wafd is completely over and this is where I differ with Kamal Khalil who is founding the Conservative Wafdists Party. He believes that he broke away from the Wafd while I believe that it is a much greater issue than that.

/Question/ If the primary reason for your leaving the Wafd was the dispute over the issue of secularism, how can the party formulate its relationships with the enemies of secularism, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and the religious currents?

/Answer/ First off, I would like to emphasize that I did not leave the Wafd because of a dispute over the issue of secularism alone, but also because of the issue of democracy as well in that Fu'ad Saraj-al-Din did not present the alliance between the Brotherhood and the Wafd to any member of the higher body or the Wafd leadership, but concluded the deal all alone.

As for the issue of secularism, when it was raised, dozens of people volunteered to give it definitions which in many cases took it outside the framework of recognition of the revealed religions.

This is not what we had in mind, neither did we mention it in the program. We did mention what we thought was a text that expresses our view that the right of citizenship is the basis in the national and the partisan, and that the country's defense emanates from a belief that the enemy's bullets do not discriminate between citizens on the basis of their religious affiliations and that the constitution and the positive law alone regulate society's course and action.

In this call, we do not face an integral intellectual course. Those who call for mixing the political and religious cards in one basket for the purpose of transforming Egypt into a religious state ruled by the clergy have not hitherto offered a complete vision in the form of a clear and well-defined political program that discusses all the particulars, as happened in our party program. Their words are limited to mere general slogans that do not lend themselves to discussion.

Therefore, we believe that the government should allow the Muslim Brotherhood to form a party because they do exist and they have their organization, a guidance office, a master and a /female/ general master and they practice politics even within the People's Assembly through the Wafd's cloak. In addition, recognition will compel them to draw up reasonable detailed programs to discuss public issues which will make it possible to talk with them. When we talk about solving the tourism problem from an Islamic perspective, I can talk to them. But when the Brotherhood raises the slogan of "the Koran is our constitution and death for the sake of God is our dearest wish," it is difficult for us to hold a dialogue. Moreover, the official permission from them to form a party will put them in a dilemma because that is contrary to the principles of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. Furthermore, it will bring out their true limited size far from their claims of controlling the political street, particularly in small villages and the rural areas.

/Question/ The economic problem shall remain the core of any party's action, be it in opposition or in government. How does the Future Party view this problem and the ways to solve it?

/Answer/ The economic problem took up a great deal of our attention in drawing up the party program. The foundation of the party's economic program is based on what we call a bold confrontation of the political mines that exist in the world of economics. They are, in their essence, explosive charges that can easily be secured politically, such as subsidies, the public sector and fiscal policy. It is not reasonable for bread subsidies alone to reach the billion mark annually, especially since food is a supplemental commodity and the Egyptian people will not revolt if the price of bread is raised 2 or 3 piasters for good quality bread with the subsidy going directly in the form of money to limited-income families, the ones with fixed incomes. It is necessary to /politicize/ the decision. In other words, it must be presented to the people with all its aspects and must be tried for a set period of time, provided that a referendum on it is held following the trial period. The problem is not so much that of subsidy as it is a problem of trust. Egyptians must be convinced that subsidies will be redistributed in their entirety in the form of money.

The same thing goes for the public sector. If the total investments of this sector are 30 billion Egyptian pounds and the returns are 250 million pounds, and eight percent rate, and no investor risks his money in a project that yields a profit less than the interest paid by banks. For the public sector to realize such an interest, it means its income will go up to 3 billion Egyptian pounds, the highest income item in Egypt.

Therefore, we call for the conversion of some special sectors, such as hotels, into joint-stock companies, while fixing a maximum limit for shareholding, to be owned by Egyptians, without touching the heavy, strategic and successful industries. We also demand the freedom to deal in foreign currency to solve the problems of having four rates for the dollar in Egypt, provided that it is done through the four main Egyptian banks.

/Question/ Finally, do you think that the Parties Committee will approve the formation of the Future Party?

/Answer/ I think it will get immediate approval, without going to court.

/Question/ What is the reason for such confidence?

/Answer/ Because we have avoided the obstacles that prevent the formation of any party. We have declared our adherence to the Egyptian constitution and we demand the introduction of some amendments.

With regard to Camp David, our position is not incompatible since we consider it an Egyptian global commitment, and although we do have some observations, they are no different than what the Egyptian negotiator is after. This is out of deep conviction and not a way to overstep the parties law obstacle. Anyone who does not agree with us with regard to Camp David, let him put forth an objective and acceptable alternative, particularly since Camp David is the only treaty which commits Israel to geographic boundaries.

12502

CSO: 4504/472

AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE ON CHAD ELUCIDATED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1456, 28 Sep 84 p 43

/Article by 'Adnan Nasrawayn: "Oujda Agreement has Opened the Chad Road Between Paris and Tripoli" /

/Text / The Franco-Libyan agreement to withdraw from Chad beginning on 25 September of this year comes as a surprise to world political circles that were not informed as to the behind-the-scenes contacts that were going on between Paris and Tripoli.

The striking element in this surprise is not merely the agreement that was concluded. Rather, it was the initiative that led to this development affecting the situation of Chad. It came from Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi, who expressed a desire to discuss with French officials the means to be pursued by both parties to withdraw the Libyan and the French forces.

As soon as Paris became aware of this desire, Minister of External Relations Claude Cheysson was ready to go to Tripoli bearing a positive response to the Libyan president's initiative.

The Elysee Palace was eager to keep Cheysson's trip secret. On the evening of 16 September the French minister was aboard a special aircraft accompanied by one of his senior advisors. Colonel al-Qadhdhafi was awaiting him in his office, where there was a long session in which there took place a review of the Chad situation in the light of the presence of the French and the Libyan forces and of how they could be withdrawn in accordance with a time and field schedule.

Cheysson returned to Paris at 1 am of the following day to inform President Mitterrand of the broad lines of the Franco-Libyan agreement.

After his meeting with the French president Cheysson returned to Tripoli to put the finishing touches on the "joint decision" that was issued in an official communique in both Paris and Tripoli. It stated that the Jamahiriya and France had decided to begin at the first opportunity to withdraw from Chad the French armed forces and the Libyan elements supporting the Chadian National Unity government along with all their military equipment beginning on 25 September of this year.

This Franco-Libyan communique, even though its timing came as a surprise, is regarded as the fruit of concentrated diplomatic efforts that Paris carried out secretly with Colonel al-Qadhafi to convince him to withdraw Libyan support from Chad. The Franco-Libyan communique was also the result of numerous efforts and international mediations between Paris and Tripoli. First and foremost they were undertaken by King Hasan II at the request of President Mitterrand after the signing of the Moroccan-Libyan unity agreement at the beginning of September of this year. This was in addition to the role played by former Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, who was successful in reconciling the points of view of the two countries by virtue of his close personal relations with both President Mitterrand and Colonel al-Qadhafi.

All of these diplomatic efforts played a part in calming the atmosphere of Franco-Libyan relations that had gone through phases of severe tension, beginning in August 1983 when France, at the request of the Government of Chad, which is recognized by the OAU and is headed by President Hissein Habre, sent French military units supported by 3,000 fully-equipped men to resist what Paris described as "Libyan military intervention in Chad." Since that time the French forces have been confronting the Libyan forces supporting the Chadian opposition leader Goukouni Weddeye to keep them from crossing the red line laid down by France on the route to N'djamena, the capital.

But despite the difference in the French and the Libyan points of view the relations between the two countries never reached the point of a rupture of diplomatic relations. Despite the sharp diplomatic and military stand that it took toward Tripoli, Paris was eager to continue contacts with Libyan officials through secret diplomatic channels. President Mitterrand several times sent Roland Dumas, a politician who is close to him and who became an official spokesman of the French Government, to Tripoli to meet with the Libyan president and discuss with him the possibilities for reaching a middle-of-the-road solution satisfactory to all the parties concerned in the Chad crisis that would begin with the carryout of the French and the Libyan withdrawal from Chadian territory.

During his visit to Tripoli last February Minister Cheysson agreed with Colonel al-Qadhafi that the French and the Libyan forces would be withdrawn from Chad as soon as a middle-of-the-road political solution was reached by Hissein Habre and Goukouni Weddeye. But the Franco-Libyan dispute erupted anew when Francis Gutmman, the secretary general of the French Ministry of External Relations, visited Tripoli bringing Colonel al-Qadhafi a French plan calling for the withdrawal of the French and the Libyan forces for a distance of 50 km from the positions they were occupying. Paris had thought that this initial action would reflect the goodwill of the Libyan officials. However, the Libyan leader rejected the French proposal and on his part submitted a peace plan for Chad that called for the introduction of "a third man" to take over the responsibility from Hissein Habre and Goukouni Weddeye so as to make it possible to bring about a national reconciliation there.

In the middle of last April the former Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky mediated between Paris and Tripoli when he carried to President Mitterrand a special message from Colonel al-Qadhafi containing new proposals for the

immediate and simultaneous withdrawal of the two countries' forces without waiting for the achievement of a political solution to the dispute between the two parties in Chad. While the French were delaying their reply to these proposals the Libyan leader, in an interview given to the French paper LE MONDE last 12 April, stated the terms of his plan for withdrawal from Chad. He said: "If France has used the Libyan presence in Chad as an excuse for keeping its forces in that country, I state here that we are prepared to limit our presence so that the French Government and French public opinion will no longer find any justification for continuing to maintain French troops on Chadian territory."

Paris did not respond favorably to Colonel al-Qadhafi's invitation, but continued to look for a third party to mediate between it and Tripoli. As soon as the unity agreement between Morocco and Libya was signed Paris seized the opportunity, using as a basis the relationship of confidence between King Hasan II and Colonel al-Qadhafi. President Mitterrand visited Morocco privately at the beginning of this September, on which occasion he asked the Moroccan monarch to be the third party in order to guarantee the Franco-Libyan agreement for a simultaneous withdrawal from Chad. The mediation of the Moroccan monarch has led to the restoration of mutual trust between France and the Jamahiriya, which has resulted in an expansion of the agreement of 17 September of this year.

The question now posed by political observers revolves around the effect of the Franco-Libyan withdrawal from Chad on domestic developments in that country, the future of the national reconciliation between the contending Chadian parties, and the future of both Chadian President Hissein Habre and opposition leader Weddeye.

It appears that the French Government so far is determined to regard Habre as the legitimate president of Chad since he is the president who is recognized by the OAU.

Political circles in Paris are now talking about the existence of a political project going beyond the agreement. The object of this would be to effect joint action between Paris and Tripoli to achieve a peaceful settlement in Chad whereby France would work on Hissein Habre and Libya would work on Goukouni Weddeye to get the two parties to achieve a national reconciliation.

Paris diplomatic circles indicate that the French Government, after the French and the Libyan forces have been withdrawn from Chadian territory, would be inclined toward the OAU's solution to revive an old idea for which it worked in the past, which is to call upon the rival Chadian parties to sit down at the negotiating table to find a political solution to the crisis within the framework of the OAU. French circles say that Tripoli is inclined toward this African political solution to the Chad crisis because it would strengthen the Jamahiriya's diplomatic influence in OAU circles in its capacity as a party having some weight in influencing the course of the peaceful negotiations that could begin within the OAU framework, given Libya's concern for the position of Goukouni Weddeye and his supporters in any future political solution.

In any event it appears that an atmosphere of trust has returned to Franco-Libyan relations with the two countries' decision to withdraw from Chad. This

was confirmed by the official communique issued in Paris and Tripoli on this matter, which pointed to "the desire of the Jamahiriyah and the French Government to eliminate the obstacles that stand in the way of the development of relations between the two countries." Some French press reports have indicated that when Claude Cheysson met with Colonel al-Qadhafi in Tripoli for the second time he transmitted to him an official invitation to make an official visit to Paris. At the same time the Libyan leader, on the day after the signing of the Chad agreement, told the paper LE MONDE, "The last piece of advice that 'Abd-al-Nasir gave me before his death was that we should work to strengthen our relations with France."

12541

CSO: 4504/18

INTERVIEW WITH DR 'ALI 'ABD AL-SALAM AL-TURAYKI

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 79, 13 Oct 84 p 13

[Interview with Dr Turayki by Khalil Matar: "Morocco Is a Monarchy and Libya Is a People's Republic: the Conditions for Success of Unity Are Guaranteed"; New York, date not specified]

[Text] For more than one reason the spotlight is now shining on Dr 'Ali 'Abd al-Salam al-Turayki, secretary of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison, because Libyan-Moroccan unification, not yet 2 months old, was subjected to its first test when King Husayn launched his initiative toward the restoration of diplomatic relations with Egypt. While Morocco's stand was reflected in the call for an emergency summit meeting, Libya objected strongly to the Jordanian move, saying that any conference that might be held in this connection would be a cover for the move which threatens to split the Arab ranks.

AL-TADAMUN interviewed Dr Turayki in the private wing of the Waldorf Astoria Hotel where the Arab diplomatic delegations stay whenever the UN General Assembly is in session.

[Matar] What is the background of the Libyan-Moroccan unification and how do you see its future?

[al-Turayki] Moroccan unification came in response to Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's appeal to the Arab nation for a joint effort to confront the real enemy of Arab unity and King al-Hasan answered this appeal by proposing an agreement between Libya and Morocco. Within the framework of our request for complete Arab unity we consented to this agreement and are hoping for its success.

[Matar] How do you assess the possibility of the unification surviving in the light of the different systems existing in the two countries?

[al-Turayki] I should like to point out, first, that unification is in itself a revolution. It is a vast achievement. I believe it is not as easy as one might expect. It is a qualitative change in the region and is considered an important historical step. Some of the unification efforts witnessed by the Arab nation resulted from the blending of several systems and others from systems widely different from one another in concept and viewpoint. There was the attempt at unifying Damascus and Amman, another at unifying Cairo and

Damascus, and still another at unifying Cairo and Amman. Then we Libyans also made attempts at uniting the non-Arab regimes and countries. I believe they are all Arab efforts and they remain an important task on the way to achieving complete Arab unification regardless of the difficulties that confront us.

[Matar] What do you think can assure the survival of the Moroccan-Libyan unification that is feasible and sure in comparison with the other unification attempts made by Libya?

[al-Turayki] Any attempt may well fail or succeed. We believe the minimum agreed to must ensure the requirements of success.

[Matar] What is the minimum you have agreed to?

[al-Turayki] The minimum is preservation of the systems, ideologies, and forms of government. Hence, Morocco will remain a monarchy while Libya will remain a jamahiriyah. Simple agreement on this point is a minimum along with agreement on integration and unification. I don't believe there can be an amalgamating union in different social conditions if it is produced and brought to life quickly.

[Matar] What is your stand on the POLISARIO in the light of recent developments between you and Morocco?

[al-Turayki] We are always opposed to the creation of ministates in the Arab world and we are not enthusiastic about the creation of any small state. We affirm that it was right to help the POLISARIO, by arming it and entering into an alliance with it to fight the Spanish occupation. Since the struggle at one time was between Spain and the Arab forces in North Africa, our consistent view was to demand the unconditional withdrawal of Spain. We support the Saharan people's right to self-determination in accordance with the Addis Abbaba revolution. The Saharans chose the plebiscite. This plebiscite can be regarded as being in the interest of Morocco because the Saharan people support annexation to Morocco and I don't see anything new in this stand.

[Matar] How do you regard King Husayn's initiative in restoring diplomatic relations with Egypt?

[al-Turayki] We issued a statement on the matter in which we expressed our opposition to this move because we did not find any justification for it. It is an obvious departure from the Arab ranks and the resolutions of the Arab summit and also from the charter of the Arab League. We favor Egypt's return to the Arab ranks but are against "Camp David Egypt."

[Matar] Your ally Syria has not as yet welcomed the unification. Neither has Tunisia nor Algeria.

[al-Turayki, interrupting] Syria welcomes any action that promotes Arab unity. We are very well-informed about the Syrian position. We are in touch with our Syrian brethren. Our relations with them are excellent, unflawed.

There is complete coordination between us in all fields. Syria is familiar with everything that is going on and it understands the moves toward unification anywhere in the Arab world.

[Matar] What about the attitude of Tunisia and Morocco, especially since they were among the signers of the brothers agreement?

[al-Turayki] We welcomed the Tunisian-Algerian agreement and showed our readiness to join it. Regrettably, however, some of the parties abandoned this association. Our unification with Morocco is not directed against Algeria or Tunisia. It is not an axis in the Arab West. I believe our brothers in North Africa ought to embrace this unification and support and back it as a first step toward realization of the universal goal of a united Arab nation.

[Matar] It was decided to hold an Arab summit meeting 2 months from now. But after Jordan's initiative toward Egypt, Morocco called for an emergency meeting to discuss these changes in the Arab world. However, Syria rushed to abort Morocco's initiative and refused to attend the summit, claiming it will be a cover for King Husayn's initiative. What is Libya's attitude, first toward King Husayn's appeal and second toward the Syrian stand?

[al-Turayki] We do not agree to the holding of a conference that sanctifies a split in the Arab ranks and covers up the Jordanian move, which we regard as a breach in the united Arab ranks. However, if Arab meetings are held to unite the Arab nation, we will support them and play a significant part in them to repair the rift and unify stands on the common enemy who threatens the Arab nation from the Atlantic to the Gulf.

5214

CSO: 4504/47

## SOURCES OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE EXAMINED

Casablanca LA VIE INDUSTRIELLE ET AGRICOLE in French 30 Sep 84 pp 6-7

[Article: "Foreign Exchange: TME [Emigrant Moroccan Workers] Become the Primary Source for Morocco; the OCP [Moroccan Phosphates Office] and Tourism Lag Far Behind"]

[Text] In 1973 Morocco received 1,372,760 tourists who spent 535.6 million Moroccan dirhams in foreign exchange. In reality their expenditures were estimated at 1,005.2 million dirhams, or almost twice the declared figure. In 1983, 10 years later, Morocco received fewer tourists: 1,357,012. Effective tourist expenditures rose to 2,870.2 million dirhams, whereas, in fact, they really amounted to 3,250 million dirhams in foreign exchange.

Now let us look at the remittances of emigrant Moroccan workers in the course of the 2 years mentioned above. In 1973 these remittances amounted to 1,020.8 million dirhams (in foreign exchange, of course). This figure tripled in 1983, amounting to 6,515.4 million dirhams.

Now if we look at the operations of the Moroccan Phosphates Office for the same years, we note that exports of phosphates (16 million tons) brought in 872 million dirhams in 1973, declining in 1983 to 15.7 million tons worth 6,379.31 million dirhams. This amounts to less than the remittances of emigrant Moroccan workers and was more than twice as much as the receipts declared by the Ministry of Tourism.

If we ignore fish products and the sale of citrus fruits, these are the three principal Moroccan sources of foreign exchange. In this period just before the opening of the new legislative session and a few weeks before the publication of the state budget for the next fiscal year it is therefore useful to look more carefully into the way in which these sources of foreign exchange have developed. We should explain, since it is necessary to do so, the rising curve on the one side and the stagnation that has taken place on the other side. This is all the more necessary if the government keeps quiet when the sale of phosphate and remittances of emigrant Moroccan workers are concerned and if the government then makes a big noise about the overall returns on tourism.

## Consolation and Pride

We can never say often enough that Moroccan workers abroad, who reflect an honorable image of Morocco by their seriousness and their spirit of self-sacrifice, who from time to time contribute expensive medical equipment to the valiant Royal Armed Forces, who reject Algerian or Iranian efforts to subvert them, are perfect patriots. They are between the devil and the deep blue sea, mistreated by their employers, subjected to injustices, to unreasonable demands, to racism, and at times the victims of attacks if not of crimes, wherever they live. The few weeks they spend in Morocco each year are not always agreeable. At Sebta the Spaniards shake them down on their way to Morocco.

At Tetuan, Tangiers, Casablanca, Agadir, and Oujda the customs agents--Moroccan this time--turn them inside out and mistreat them. Their consolation and their pride reside in the fact that in Paris, Brussels, Rabat, Fez, or Marrakech King Hassan II receives them, listens to them, and takes action to assure them of dignity and protection.

Because of that and because they have an innate sense of patriotism and of filial devotion, throughout the year they suffer a great deal, physically and morally, economizing on everything to send home the maximum amount of money to their families. And now this effort they make provides the largest amount of foreign exchange for the country. We have shown the total amount of their remittances for 1973 and 1983. Let us see how this trend has developed: 1974, 1,557.2 million dirhams; 1975, 2,159.6 million; 1976, 2,418 million; 1977, 2,652 million; 1978, 3,176 million; 1979, 3,696.5 million; 1980, 4,147.6 million; 1981, 5,242 million; 1982, 5,114.5 million; 1983, 6,515.4 million.

It is worth noting that although foreign exchange receipts decreased in 1982 by 2.4 percent, compared with 1981, they increased substantially in 1983 by nearly 28 percent. This is not the only detail worth recalling.

In fact the substantial increase in remittances by Moroccan workers abroad coincided with a period of serious recession in Western Europe. This was a period marked by a financial crisis, by an increase in unemployment (more than 10 million unemployed in the countries of the European Economic Community), and by a decline in purchasing power affecting almost all of the working class. It is therefore clear that the Moroccan workers tightened their belts even further in order to send home the maximum amount possible. And, in principle, this tendency should continue to grow.

## The Case of the Moroccan Phosphates Office

The case of the OCP [Moroccan Phosphates Office] is more complex. (See our preceding issue.) First of all, the market was seriously affected. The Americans began a policy of massive applications of fertilizer, beginning in 1974. Morocco did not begin to export phosphoric acid fertilizer until 1975. At the same time the market for sulphur, which is imported in considerable quantities, increased more sharply than petroleum or paper. The OCP carried out a very large investment program. And to do this, it contracted very large loans. All of these considerations lead us to the conclusion that we cannot make any categorical judgments

about the policy followed up to this point by Prime Minister Mohamed Karim Lam-rani.

The fact remains that the evolution of OCP exports since 1970 has been very revealing. However, as we noted above, the receipts from these exports were not all deposited into state accounts. And for good reasons. The OCP has carried out a large scale expansion plan, has purchased sulphur at a very high price (more than 1 billion dirhams per year), has amortized its investments, has paid its debts, and has at the same time carried out a costly but necessary social policy. We set forth below detailed tables, recapitulating OCP exports since 1970:

Year	Phosphate		Other	TSP/MAP*
	In Millions of Tons	In Millions of Dirhams	Fertilizers In Millions of Tons	In Millions of Dirhams
1970	11.5	571.6	0.1	32.6
1971	11.9	588.1	0.3	71.7
1972	13.6	673.2	0.3	68.9
1973	16.1	788.1	0.3	83.9
1974	18.7	4,075.0	0.1	138.9
1975	13.1	3,430.4	0.1	105.6
1976	14.7	2,190.9	0.2	73.2
1977	15.8	2,111.1	0.2	108.9
1978	17.3	2,034.0	0.3	133.5
1979	17.9	2,213.6	0.2	120.3
1980	16.5	3,011.8	0.2	153.2
1981	15.6	3,826.6	0.3	287.8
1982	14.0	3,444.9	0.4	466.6
1983	14.0	3,331.3	0.8	920.4

\*Triple Super Phosphate/Mono Ammonium Phosphate

Year	Acid	Phosphorus
	In Millions of Tons	In Millions of Dirhams
1970	---	---
1971	---	---
1972	---	---
1973	---	---
1974	---	---
1975	---	---
1976	0.1	66.5
1977	0.3	223.7
1978	0.4	269.4
1979	0.4	503.7
1980	0.4	793.1
1981	0.5	1,341.6
1982	0.7	1,585.9
1983	0.9	2,127.6

	Total Exports of Phosphates and Derivatives in Millions of Tons	Total Exports of Phosphates and Derivatives in Millions of Dirhams
1970	11.6	604.2
1971	12.2	659.8
1972	13.9	742.1
1973	16.4	872.0
1974	18.8	4,213.9
1975	13.2	3,536.0
1976	15.0	2,330.6
1977	16.3	2,443.7
1978	18.0	2,436.9
1979	18.4	2,837.6
1980	17.1	3,958.1
1981	16.4	5,456.0
1982	15.1	5,497.4
1983	15.7	6,379.3

There remains tourism and its curious record. This sector has been called, in turn, "the key sector," "a priority area," and "a leading industry." Perhaps it is all three of these at the same time. However, we must admit that, despite our best wishes and in view of the official statistics, it has been far from being any one of these things.

First of all, we should make one essential point quite clear: as the Ministry of Finance correctly notes, let us not confuse tourists and emigrant workers. The Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism includes in its figures Moroccans resident abroad who come home for their vacations. This is a rather inappropriate practice and is rather deceptive, making it possible to increase the figures. However, no one is deceived.

In 1976 the government had announced officially that "since the flow of tourists had increased by 26 times over the previous 20 years, 1977 will be a record year. In fact, Morocco is expecting 2.7 million tourists in 1977." However, from 1 January to 31 December 1977 there were only 1,137,220 tourists in Morocco. This figure is far from the forecasts often made on the basis of rather curious assumptions. We should not assume that, since that time, there has been some improvement or a more realistic attitude. Far from it. In 1983 there were only about 200,000 more tourists than in 1977. This was a worse than mediocre performance. The following, significant table covers the period 1970-1983:

Table: Estimated and Net Receipts from Tourism and Total Numbers of Tourists, 1970-1983

Year	Net Receipts in Millions of Dirhams	Estimated Receipts in Millions of Dirhams	Numbers of Tourists
1970	314.5	682.0	852,370
1971	466.9	760.0	914,290
1972	486.3	893.3	1,191,030
1973	535.6	1,005.2	1,372,760
1974	768.0	10,025.0	1,185,380
1975	920.5	1,200.0	1,116,240
1976	944.3	1,210.0	1,013,500
1977	1,098.5	1,500.0	1,137,220
1978	1,250.1	1,650.0	1,181,270
1979	1,357.9	1,670.0	1,192,140
1980	1,552.9	1,785.0	1,189,740
1981	1,869.2	2,050.0	1,285,422
1982	2,138.6	2,480.0	1,376,835
1983	2,870.2	3,250.0	1,357,012

#### Extent of Foreign Exchange Black Marketing

It should be remarked that the above table contains net foreign exchange receipts; estimated receipts, showing what the state should have received in foreign exchange; and the total number of tourists.

Let's not discuss at length the difference between what should have been received from tourism and what was actually received. Certainly, the difference is considerable and provides a precise idea of the extent of black market trafficking in foreign exchange in Morocco. This is a real kind of gangrene which seems to be a definite part of our national outlook. This traffic apparently takes place with the approval and complicity of our administrative apparatus.

There is no system of control. On this point the supervisory ministry is seriously deficient at a time when Morocco has a great need for foreign exchange. We know, for example, that the hotels sell meal services [demi pensions] at one price in France and declare them in Morocco at another price. The difference remains in France. This system is fairly general. What control procedures have been set up by the supervisory ministry? Does the ministry receive copies of contracts between the hotels and tour operators which would give it the right to review and make decisions on the quality and price of the tourist product involved? In any case it is important here to know the position of the supervisory ministry and the steps it intends to take to deal with the dangers of a real hemorrhage in foreign exchange.

We are acquainted with the practice of compensation: travellers here obtain from their partners the sum of dirhams which they need, paying for them directly in France or elsewhere. Not to mention the merchants in the markets, receptionists

in the hotels, and professional traffickers who may be found everywhere in the country.

#### No Development Plan

In addition to all of these anomalies, we should add that for the past 3 or 4 years, if not for the past decade, the supervisory ministry has only handled routine matters, refusing to prepare a real plan for the development of the tourism sector, endlessly improvising, deliberately failing to analyse the experience of other countries, such as Yugoslavia, closing down its offices abroad and then reopening them without any explanation, and becoming involved in seriously damaging matters as was the case in Geneva. In short, this is a mess in which we may find all of the ingredients of anarchy. And don't let anyone come and tell us that this is a case of systematically running down the ministry. It is a bitter fact, the more so as the facts are there, overwhelming and beyond question. Our figures and studies do not include emigrant Moroccan workers because we reject high costs. An overseas Moroccan worker spends his vacations in Morocco to see his family and the country once again and not because he has been charmed by a tourist promotion advertisement in a European magazine to which, moreover, he has no access.

#### Conclusion

All of the foregoing brings us to the following conclusion: of the three sources of foreign exchange which are so necessary to Morocco, tourism remains the most disappointing, the least effective, and, paradoxically, the most promising market. However, for this market to become profitable to the true extent of its possibilities, everything being equal, we need first to find the right way to go about it. That is, we need to set down a policy and ensure its proper application. Now, where is that policy? A few weeks a major business entrepreneur told us the following: "I was called to a meeting with the minister, like most of my colleagues. The invitation reached me at 11:30 am, and the meeting was to take place at 4:00 pm on the same day. We all refused to go because we are organized people. It's the ministry which is not well organized." No further comment.

5170

CSO: 4519/14

## NUMAYRI'S MOTIVES FOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHANGES QUESTIONED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English No 25, 17 Oct 84 pp 7, 8

[Text] Sudan: No movement. President Jaffar Nimeiri's announcement at the end of last month that 'Sharia' courts would be lifted, that the judicial system would be radically revised and that southerners would be allowed to have a united southern administration again, if they wished, has so far come to nothing. The ending of the state of emergency was the only tangible measure. But even that in practice entails converting a de jure state of emergency into the de facto one prevailing before its official introduction in April.

The apparent objective of Nimeiri's announcement was to weaken further the Muslim Brotherhood, led by Hassan al-Turabi; to appease at a critical moment the criticism of important foreign allies, notably Egypt and the United States; and to undermine the cause of southern Sudanese guerrillas.

Four considerations are worth noting:

- 1) Nimeiri shows no sign of relinquishing his desire for what he perceives as an Islamic state. The newly-appointed chief justice, Fouad el Amin, is a longstanding member of the Sufi sect, whose local leader, Abu Groun, is particularly close to Nimeiri. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, the Sufi sect is politically unambitious, preferring Islamic semantics.
- 2) The appointment earlier of Mohamed Bahr el-Din as Nimeiri's chief adviser, signalled a return to a more 'pragmatic', corrupt style of government, in which the leading figures tend to come from the nominally communist "May Day" group of the late 1960s, upon whose back Nimeiri first took power. The appointment early this month of Abdul Gassim as minister of culture, confirms the trend. Gassim has always been regarded by many southerners as a conciliatory politician.
- 3) It is highly unlikely that Nimeiri will offer the south an opportunity to unite against him. The southern Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) is in a state of disarray and will probably degenerate further in the short-term. Nimeiri cannot subdue the south militarily, but he might believe that it can be contained enough to start exploitation of oil in the Bentiu region. An extreme scenario is that the Dinka-dominated SPLA will progressively

isolate itself from the rest of the south, thus enabling Nimeiri to work out a temporary political settlement with Equatoria. (In practice, the greater the factionalising of the SPLA, the more numerous the bands of uncontrolled guerrillas operating in the south, and hence the commensurately smaller chance of reaching any settlement.)

4) Nimeiri is determined, against the odds, to exploit Sudan's oil. The forming recently of a state oil company together with Adnan Kashoggi, the international tycoon, is presumably designed to put pressure on Chevron to start producing, even though there is no chance of it doing so in the present security situation.

The key problem to resolving the Sudanese crisis remains Nimeiri himself. His track-record of the past two years precludes serious negotiation with him now. A number of distinguished Sudanese diplomats, including the southerner, Bona Malwal (who has taken up a position at Columbia University in New York), are trying to conduct talks which eventually could lead to another government.

In the short-term there appears little hope that the SPLA can participate in discussions with northerners. Following the death of Benjamin Bol, the SPLA's London representative (AC Vol 25 No 19), the SPLA high command has kept a low profile. Earlier reports had indicated that Col. Carabino, who is officially second in command to Col. John Garang, had also assumed the chairmanship of the political and foreign affairs committee of the SPLA's political arm, the SPLM, a post that nominally still appears to belong to Joseph Oduho. The latter, who was particularly close to Benjamin Bol, has evidently had little success so far in ascertaining precisely why Bol died. Efforts have been made by the Ethiopians to keep Oduho quiet.

Bol's successor in London, Lt-Col. Stephen Madut, is a chronic schizophrenic and cannot be expected to represent properly the SPLM in London--a post which should provide the SPLA/SPLM's most important foreign link. His appointment, presumably, was either designed to ostracise Madut or to close down effectively the London office, perhaps because the SPLA high command, under pressure from its Ethiopian hosts, believed the London office under Bol had been too independent. In fact, because communications between London and southern Sudan (via Addis Ababa) have been consistently bad, there was no alternative to being relatively independent in London if the office there was to retain its credibility.

John Luc, a law graduate who was acting head of the London office while Bol was away, has been requested to return to Addis Ababa. At present, above all since no explanation of Bol's death has been forthcoming, politically active southern Sudanese in Britain are unlikely to return.

#### Correction

In AC Vol 25 No 19 we stated incorrectly that Col. Carabino had become chairman of the SPLM. Col. Garang remains chairman of both the SPLA and SPLM.

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PROFILE OF PSD DIRECTOR HEDI BACCOUCHE

Tunis REALITIES in French No 49, 12 Oct 84 pp 9-11

[Article by Moncef Ben M'Rad, Bourguiba Ben Rejeb and Taieb Zahar:  
"Hedi Baccouche Revealed"]

[Text] In some political circles, people are talking already about the "Baccouche effect." Who is this personality who plots, whom we often think of when the country is experiencing turbulence? When Mr Ahmed Ben Salah was seeking an intellectual man of action, he called upon Hedi Baccouche. When Mr Hedi Nouira wanted to rally the humanist intellectual fringes, he also appealed to Hedi Baccouche. When Mr Mohamed Mzali sought to give the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] a facelift, he called upon the individual always in reserve in the party.

His adversaries admit that he is not a schemer and that he owes his political longevity to his incorruptibility and his integrity. Yet they criticize his lack of experience in the political arena, despite his contacts.

Who is this eminence grise of prime ministers, who has seen so many others fall and still remains? What are his secrets and what do his friends and enemies think of him?

The Secret of His Longevity

His enemies criticize him for his pliability, his political gymnastics which enable him to play a continual leading role despite the fall of Ben Salah and Nouira. Hedi Baccouche remains calm in the face of this

criticism. He answers that he never served men, but the country and Bourguiba. "Although there were men who analyzed the situation and proposed different solutions, all loved the country." He worked with men who defended socialism, then with those who applied liberalism; this should not cause astonishment.

"Schools, dams and welfare projects did not end with Mr Nour's arrival." His rare enemies admit that he never broke with his former colleagues. He never said a single critical word about Messrs Ben Salah or Nour when everyone criticized them. He embodies what he calls "respect for Bourguiba's ethic based on humanism and pragmatism."

Thus he accepted accommodations to reality, as decided upon by Bourguiba. "Socialism and liberalism must not be perceived as they are in the West."

After 1956, it was necessary to "emphasize building the nation. Later, there was change but the application of a certain social justice was a permanent concern."

Yet how could he support the removal of the liberals, the hard liners and presidential candidates?

"In a party which is a broad front, it is normal that the minority must bend to the will of the majority. Politics is not forgiving. When a person loses, it is always the loser's fault. It is normal that some factions try to dominate others."

Baccouche-Sayah

When Mr Mohamed Mzali wanted to revitalize the PSD, he appealed to a legal expert known for his humanist convictions. Much of the public perceives antagonism between the personality and methods of Hedi Baccouche and those of Mohamed Sayah. They often contrast the liberal with the party man. Openness is on the agenda! For Hedi Baccouche, "each person has his style, his personality. Each person approaches men and problems in his fashion. Each person gives a personal political coloration to the party's collective objectives and evaluates the means according to the interests of the country and the party which is embodied by Bourguiba.

"Yet subjectivity must not deform the party's ideology. All party directors, not just Sayah, have used methods suited to their personalities. The most important thing is that, at the party and governmental level, we consider ourselves the country's servants. The only element which could decide this or that group is the effort to serve the community. "I favor openness, but who said that at present

Mohamed Sayah opposes it? A true follower of Bourguiba's cannot cut himself off from the nation's evolution. Bourguiba, who trained generations, considers that the person who listens to the people is the true party member. By definition, a Bourguibist is open; otherwise, he negates Bourguiba's philosophy." How does he view the changes within the PSD?

#### The Party and Democracy

Those removed and expelled from the PSD continually repeat that the PSD is very undemocratic. Everything is decided at the top. Elections of cells are often truncated, the candidates with the majority seek advantages or a stepping-stone and even the PSD congress--Monastir I--proved that democracy is seldom practiced.

Hedi Baccouche considers that irregularities exist in all parties throughout the world. The PSD is not the "parent of a nazi party or a bureaucratic communist party." "If there were mistakes in the past, the next elections will prove that the PSD acts in a democratic manner. As for the congress, competition is normal between different sensitivities. At certain times, certain factions, not to mention some people, seek to impose themselves in an undemocratic manner. I do not deny it but our strength is to admit our mistakes so that we can move forward. If someone tries to falsify the elections, that person is not a democrat. This ethical problem exists in the party and outside it.

The other Tunisian political parties also had their internal quarrels, their expulsions and their divisions."

#### The PSD and the Opposition

The opposition criticizes the PSD for its undemocratic practices. The municipalities and the National Assembly are closed to non-Destourians. Buying of votes, influence of authorities against candidates; in short, the opposition criticizes this symbiosis between the government and the party and criticizes it for paralyzing society. The memory of the last legislative elections is still fresh in peoples' minds.

For the party director: "It is true that the PSD is in a dominant situation. Bourguiba's party built modern Tunisia after liberating it. Yet the country has changed and we must adapt to new realities. Groups or individuals are no longer at ease in the PSD. That is a sign of society's evolution. Certain opponents believed that Bourguiba's PSD would be transformed by the elections into a minority party. They were mistaken. Even if the elections were held under ideal conditions, Bourguiba's party would be the big winner. Certain practices must be changed, a new atmosphere imposed so that some will accept that only

the majority governs. How can other parties and political factions be associated? This is a problem for today and tomorrow. We are not at the stage of talking about a national front although we are influenced by a certain concept of gathering together. The idea of involving positively those who do not think as we do and whose seek the country's interest should not be discarded. I do not agree with those who want a 99.99 percent vote. They do a disservice to the country's future. At a certain time, there was talk about an agreement with other parties so that there would be a certain number of opposition deputies; I think the idea still persists."

However, is this spirit not contradicted by the facts since the MDS [Movement of Socialist Democrats] buildings were attacked, for example? The opposition clearly accused party militia.

Hedi Baccouche thinks that "it is above all a problem of good citizenship. It is normal that party members defend their organization and answer detractors. However, when people use our structures for local rivalries and employ illegal, violent methods, this evil must be cured. It is a primary manifestation of violence which has no place in Tunisia. We must move on to the level of discussion and reason. That is an objective of Bourguiba's party."

How are Hedi Baccouche's relations with Tunisian political leaders?

With the Leaders

On the subject of Bourguiba, Hedi Baccouche deems "that he had the exceptional good fortune to know Bourguiba when he was very young. Even before his departure for Cairo, I discovered in him a passion for Tunisia. Later, as governor, I was always inspired by his generosity. He is a man who has confidence in others, is very pleasant in person and extremely cultivated. He is a great man. My relations with him are those of a party member with a leader. Sometimes, he became angry with me, but in a paternal manner. The present and future will recognize what Bourguiba has done for Tunisia."

He considers that Ahmed Ben Salah, for all his goodwill, was not successful in integrating the country in his plan of development and that Hedi Nouria is a patriot who felt the weight of history. Mr Nouria "loves intellectual reflection very much." Mr Mzali "is above all the guiding force of a staff to which I belong. There are hierarchial relations between us. I met him in 1950. I went to Monastir and he gave political-cultural conferences. His philosophic training never kept him from being a man of action. He is a patriot who fulfills himself in the movement and who is unfailingly faithful to Bourguiba. He is a man of principle and that says it all."

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LABOR MINISTRY RECOMMENDS PLANNING OF EDUCATIONAL NEEDS

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 3 Sep 84 p 2

[Article: "Ministry of Labor Study On Labor Force Calls For Creation of an Agency to Coordinate Institutions of Higher Education"]

[Text] Amman--A study prepared by the Ministry of Labor on the specialist, technical and administrative sectors of the labor force in Jordan has called for the creation of a governmental agency to coordinate among the institutions of higher education to achieve balance between the training provided by the educational system and its relevance to society's labor requirements in the future.

The study, which was prepared by Dr Taysir 'Abd-al-Jabir, the minister of labor, and Mr 'Ali Hilal of the ministry's office of research, asserted that the board of higher education could fulfill this function if given the necessary executive powers.

The study also called for the formation of a governmental committee on human resources, for regular annual studies to track the careers of graduates of institutions of higher education, and for publishing information needed to plan educational and labor goals.

The study recommended that a job classification manual be compiled for the labor force in which various levels of each job category are described precisely along with the minimum level of education required for entry positions in each field. It also recommended establishing material and intangible incentives according to the interest or lack of interest shown for required jobs throughout society.

The capacity of institutions of higher education in Jordan to absorb most high school graduates is increasing, and this is helping to dampen students' interest in studying abroad, since the cost of educating them in Jordan will be much less than the cost of financing their education abroad.

The study also recommended development of a precise plan for future distribution rates of those who are accepted at Jordanian universities in the various departments, on the basis of a study of the future needs

of Jordanian society for various fields of specialization. Reduced rates of departments whose graduates may have difficulty finding jobs in the future, particularly the department of literature and certain branches of other departments, must be considered. It recommended encouraging vocational high school education so that 40 percent of high school students are in vocational courses. It recommended expanding the introduction of new vocations, and a concentration on those which Jordanian society will require in the future. This will help these pioneering students enter the labor market with increased participation in the labor force instead of the human resources who are still in school at institutions of higher education. The rate of enrollment at these institutions is rising because of a perception of the way society views this level of education.

It has been shown that of all the college students accepted during the 1983-84 academic year 42.5 percent were in business. This percentage rose dramatically during the period from 1977-78 to 1982. At the same time the percentage of those entering the field of education has begun to drop rapidly. During the 1977-78 academic year it had been 98 percent. The rate fell to 44 percent in the 1980-81 academic year, and to 32 percent during the 1981-82 academic year. Furthermore, only 5 percent were enrolled in the medical field. This indicates a need to introduce material incentives for fields known to have difficulty in attracting students, in particular the fields of education and paramedical studies.

The report also recommended a plan for acceptance in the first form of general and vocational high school. On the basis of this plan students will be divided among the various general and vocational courses of study according to the need of society. This will be coordinated by agencies responsible for human resource planning. These agencies will make a decision to apply this plan on the basis of students' performance on the general examination in the third form of junior high school.

It has been noticed that there is a high drop out rate in high school, particularly in the vocational courses. This will upset any plan for distributing students among the various vocational courses in high school. Therefore solutions for reducing or eliminating this problem must be found after it has been carefully studied. The scope of the problem must be monitored on an annual basis so that developments can be included in the annual educational statistical report issued by the Ministry of Education.

According to the study, in 1988 an estimated 6,700 students are expected to graduate from vocational high schools, while 26,650 are expected to graduate from general high schools. In the same year 10,900 students are expected to graduate from government and private colleges, 3,562 students are expected to graduate from the University of Jordan, and 4,000 male and female students are expected to graduate from Yarmuk University. Also according to the study 1,050 male and female Jordanian students are expected to graduate from Arab and foreign educational institutions in 1988.

CENTRAL BANK ISSUES REPORT

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 4 Sep 84 p 9

[Article: "Central Bank Issues Report: Jordan Is Prepared To Enter a New Phase of Stable Economic Growth"]

[Text] Amman--The Jordanian economy is a developing economy and is relatively small. Thus it is more readily affected by changes in international economic conditions and particularly their repercussions in the Arab world.

Since the early 1980's Jordan and the Arab world have been affected by the international recession. Several ways in which this has hit Jordan hardest are declining Jordanian exports, the declining rate of growth of checks sent home by Jordanians working abroad, and reduced Arab assistance.

In view of these circumstances the real growth rate of the Jordanian economy has perforce declined. However, the process of adjusting to the new circumstances by Jordanian economic institutions has spared the rate of real growth of the GNP, and has been more than sufficient to offset the rate of population growth. These rates of growth have been accompanied by a declining rate of inflation, which was 7.7 percent in 1981, 7.4 percent in 1982 and 5.0 percent in 1983.

A New Phase

The Jordanian Central Bank Report said that in view of the fact that Jordan has almost completed its process of adjustment to the new economic conditions that have prevailed since the early 1980's, and in view of its connection with signs of economic recovery in the world, there is hope that Jordan may be ready to enter a new phase of steady economic growth.

The report indicates that the Jordanian economy achieved a 9.7 percent rate of growth during the past year despite international conditions. Although this rate is lower than that for preceding years in most economic sectors, in certain specific areas, such as industrial output and agriculture, a tangible improvement was noted. Farm sector revenues

grew by 18.3 percent to 99.1 million dinars. There was also growth in the industry and mining sectors. These two sectors grew by 11.5 percent during the last year, and by 10.6 percent the year before. This is attributed to full utilization of production capacity in the potash and fertilizer factories, in addition to increased production of phosphates and cement.

### Monetary Policy

The report discusses the monetary policy of the Jordanian Central Bank, which has focused on supporting the liquidity of the banking system and encouraging local investment in order to strengthen the rates of economic growth that have already been achieved, and to halt the effects of the deflationary tendency which has prevailed during the last 2 years, while at the same time not interfering with the goal of monetary stability, and combatting inflation. Commercial banks have been urged to offer loans to the primary production sectors through bank consortiums and bond underwriting for public corporations.

Bank funds invested in these loans and bonds rose to 117.47 million dinars by the end of 1983, and exceeded that figure during the first half of this year.

In order to encourage financing activity in local investments, the Central Bank lowered the cost of money to borrowers last year and this year. It decided to lower the ceiling on interest rates for credit facilities offered by commercial banks to residents, and to lower interest rates on loans made to encourage national exports.

In the interest of supporting the liquidity of the commercial banks and enabling them to offer the needed credit, the central bank also reduced compulsory reserve requirements by 1 percentage point so that they are now 10 percent on checking accounts and 7 percent on savings accounts and time deposits. It also imposed a ceiling on interest rates paid on savings accounts at commercial banks between 6 and 8 percent, depending on the length of time of the deposit.

### Exchange Rate of the Dinar

In accordance with the regulations of article 4 of the law which governs it, the central bank is trying to maintain monetary stability in the kingdom and to guarantee the convertibility of the Jordanian dinar into foreign currencies. In its desire to achieve this end the central bank has embraced policies which will lead to relative stability in the exchange rate of the Jordanian dinar. Within this framework the policy of linking the exchange rate of the dinar with special drawing rights has continued.

As a result of the policy of linkage with special drawing rights the exchange rate of the Jordanian dinar has, on the average, fluctuated less with respect to the primary currencies than it would have if the dinar were linked with only a single primary currency. Also as a result

of this policy the exchange rate of the Jordanian dinar increases with respect to currencies whose exchange rates are decreasing, and decreases with respect to currencies whose exchange rates are increasing in world currency markets.

The exchange rate of the Jordanian dinar rose by different amounts with respect to most of the principal currencies. Among these currencies are the pound sterling, German mark, Swiss franc, French franc and Italian lira. At the same time the exchange rate of the Jordanian dinar fell with respect to the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen, the two principal currencies whose exchange rates remained high with respect to other currencies in world money markets during 1983 and early 1984.

### Foreign Trade

The report discussed at length Jordan's foreign trade during the past year. It reported that the foreign trade sector usually occupies an important and fundamental place in economically insignificant countries because the economies of these countries depend to a great extent on foreign markets for both imports and exports. Tables highlight the importance of the foreign trade sector with respect to the other economic sectors which constitute the Jordanian economy. Despite this importance the activity of the foreign trade sector decreased in absolute and relative terms in 1983 in comparison with 1982 and the last few years. This distinct decline is due to the sudden drying up of the market for Jordanian exports and the drop in local demand for foreign goods. Both of these factors are due in general to Jordan's continuing susceptibility to the effects of the international and local recession on one hand, and a dropping off in local activity on the other hand. The drop in exports is the first drop in national exports since 1971, and the drop in imports is the first such drop since 1970.

In 1983 national exports fell to 160.09 million dinars, or 13.7 percent less than 1982. This caused an 8.7 percent decline in the GNP at current prices compared with 10.9 percent, and caused a 17.1 percent decline in the per capita GNP from that of 1982. In 1983 the value of reexports dropped to 50.50 million dinars, 36.0 percent below 1982. This resulted in a 2.7 percent decrease in the GNP compared with 4.7 percent, and a 38.5 percent decrease in the per capita GNP from 1982 levels. The decrease in export activity is due to several causes. Among the most important are the following:

Decreased demand in neighboring Arab countries, especially the oil exporting countries, for Jordanian agricultural and manufactured exports. This decline is due to lower oil revenues and increased competition from other countries, such as Turkey, for Jordanian agricultural exports in the markets of these countries. (Statistical appendix, table 42).

The value of phosphate exports fell 9.7 percent because of lower world demand for phosphate due to the economic stagnation. This

decreased demand in turn caused phosphate prices in 1983 to fall 13.1 percent below 1982 prices, while the quantity exported rose by only 4.0 percent.

Jordanian exports to Iraq were clearly affected by its war with Iran. These exports fell 60.9 percent to only 26.01 million dinars during 1983.

The 36.0 percent decrease in the value of reexports back to their normal level, 50.50 million dinars, during 1983 is due to the same general causes for the decline of exports and to certain exceptional non-recurring reexport activities in 1982.

In 1983 the value of imports fell to 1,103.31 million dinars, which is 3.4 percent below 1982 levels. This caused a 59.7 percent decrease in the GNP, at current prices, compared with 67.4 percent, and a 7.2 percent in the per capita GNP as well.

The goal of the 1981-1985 5-year development plan was to increase export revenues to 360.0 million dinars in 1983. At the same time the value of imports was expected to increase in 1983 to 1,146.0 million dinars. On the basis of this the plan estimated a higher deficit in the 1983 balance of trade of about 786.0 million dinars. That was at 1980 prices, when the plan estimated that the rate by which the trade deficit was increasing would gradually decrease during the years of the plan. There was hope that these goals could be achieved through the plan's attempt to change the structure of the national economy for the benefit of the commercial production sectors, with annual growth at a rate of about 14.9 percent.

Statements relating to Jordan's actual foreign trade indicate that export revenues during the third year of the plan amounted to 210.6 million dinars at current prices and 173.3 million dinars at 1980 prices. This is 48.2 percent below the plan's expectations. The reason for this is that revenues for phosphate and fertilizer exports were below the plan's expectations because of the drop in the prices of these commodities and the international recession during 1982 and 1983. Another reason is that revenues from exports of manufactured goods and other consumer goods were down because of difficulties in marketing abroad. Exports of agricultural produce achieved approximately the goals set for them.

The value of imports in 1983 fell to 1,103.6 million dinars at current prices and 908.1 million dinars at 1980 prices. This is 20.8 percent below the plan's estimates.

In view of the big drop in the value of imports, and despite the equally big drop in exports below the plan's expectations, the 1983 balance of trade deficit was better than the plan's expectations. It amounted to 734.8 million dinars at fixed prices, a drop of 51.2 million dinars or 6.5 percent.

The report went on to discuss the role of the central bank in maintaining the sound operation of the Jordanian banking system, preserving the assets of depositors, shareholders and clients, and analyzing the annual budgets and monthly and quarterly statements of the commercial banks to confirm the financial health of these banks, and to confirm to what extent they are applying the directives of the central bank with regard to monetary policy.

It also discussed the role of the central bank in determining interest rates offered by commercial banks, increasing credit, monitoring revenues and general expenses of the central government, monitoring financial legislation and foreign loan agreements and their progress, as well as trading in government bonds, corporate bonds and treasury notes.

The central bank helped to prepare reports about Israeli measures in the occupied Arab land and the balance of payments of the occupied territories. It also prepared studies on the benefits of closer Arab monetary cooperation in the direct financing of trade among the Arab countries, coordinating exchange rates among them and encouraging trade among them.

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LEBANON'S ECONOMIC SITUATION SPELLED OUT

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 396, 22 Sep 84 pp 53-54

[Interview with Victor Qasir, minister of economy and industry by 'Imad Jawdiyah: "Lebanese Economy Betting on Security Factor"; in Beirut, date not specified]

[Text] President Amin al-Jumayyil's and Rashid Karami's choice of the chief of the Beirut Businessmen's Association, Victor Qasir, as minister of economy and industry in the national unity government formed 4 months ago was a "masterful stroke," according to all the various political circles in the country. The man is known for his long economic experience and at the same time is the head of a large and vital sector that plays an active role in the national economy. Moreover, to entrust a man like Victor Qasir with two important ministries in such difficult circumstances as Lebanon is experiencing means that, first, the regime and the government are affording the economic dossier, with all its sectors (commerce, industry and agriculture), the necessary attention, and, second, they are concentrating on consolidating relations and cooperation between the public and private sectors for the sake of boosting the national economy and supporting its march anew after the paralysis that befell it due to the 10-year events in Lebanon.

AL-MUSTAQBAL met with Minister Qasir at his office in the Ministry of Industry to learn about the reality of the Lebanese economy today and the plans underway for its revitalization.

[Question] Before talking about the concerns of the Ministries of Economy and Industry, we would like to ask you about your first experience in the cabinet.

[Answer] So far, I cannot give a final answer to this question because my experience in the cabinet is no more than just a little over 3 months. But I can say, however, that my appointment to the ministries of Economy and Industry means that the regime is devoting great attention to the economic and industrial situation. So I ask God to help me do my job well and not disappoint those who put their trust in me.

[Question] As soon as you assumed your ministerial duties, you hastened to form a work team made up of prominent economic personalities in the

country to help you. Is this step a prelude to the march of cooperation between the public and private sectors?

[Answer] We all know that the Lebanese economy, with all its various sectors, is going through some very difficult times because the war has exhausted and paralyzed it. That is why I have to think about cooperation with all those who are experienced in the economic fields in order to coordinate our efforts and work with them to promote the national economy and save it from collapse. The work team is composed of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in each of Beirut, Zahlah, Tripoli and Sidon, the industrialists' association, the businessmen's association, the banks' association and the general labor union. Its task is to study the conditions of the economic sectors, discuss their problems and find necessary solutions for them. This step will no doubt open the way for further cooperation between the private sector and the ministry. We are concerned with the development of such a relationship because it is bound to have a part in moving the wheel of our national economy forward and restore its conditions to its past vitality. I believe that today we are all enlisted to do our national duty to save our economy from the claws of the war that has burdened it.

[Question] How, then, do you evaluate the reality of the Lebanese economy today?

[Answer] The truth is that economic conditions in the country remain unstable. The security situation in most Lebanese regions is contributing to the worsening of economic conditions. In the north, you are confronted with the Tripoli incidents; in the mountain, the military situation is still the same; and in the south, the Israeli occupation is destroying everything. Were it not for the Lebanese people's tenacity, patience and their determination to go on and stand up against the events, the national economy, which is still built on successful personal initiative, would have collapsed. What we aspire to and hope for now is the enforcement of the security plans in the mountain and the north and the opening of all the various roads because stability helps to a large extent to restore normal life to the economic sectors.

[Question] What is your estimation of the public and the private sector losses during the 10 years of war?

[Answer] According to my estimations, losses in both sectors amount to 200 billion Lebanese pounds. Lebanon needs a long time to rehabilitate its economy and this requires in the first order total security and stability.

[Question] Industrial leaders in the country expressed their apprehension over your appointment to the Ministry of Industry because they felt you will not devote your full attention to industry since you were head of the businessmen's association.

[Answer] [Interrupting] I did in fact have this feeling, but I informed the brothers in the industrialist's association, when they came to congratulate me, that now I am for them above all else and that I will devote as much attention to the conditions and problems of Lebanese industry as to the other economic sectors. We at the ministry are preparing an "industrial survey" project for the various industrial sectors in the country to learn about their situations and to help support them in recovering from their afflictions.

[Question] The industrialists and businessmen are facing the problem of accumulated debts to the banks. How is this problem being solved? Why has not the government so far agreed to give them the loans they have requested to get things moving in their establishments?

[Answer] Concerning the subject of accumulated debts, we have done everything we can to urge the banks not to call in their loans because the circumstances of the industrialists and businessmen must be taken into account. As for the loans they are requesting from the government, the government cannot meet their demands because the public treasury is suffering from a 26 billion pound deficit. What we are betting on now is the security factor because domestic stability is the only thing capable of getting the production wheel going again and helping the industrialists and businessmen to get back on tract with force.

[Question] Industrial leaders in the south submitted a memorandum to the Ministry of Industry asking for support and special assistance because they are suffering a stifling economic crisis under Israeli occupation. What steps will you take to help them?

[Answer] We feel with the southern industrial leaders and sense their problems and we stand by their side because their situation under the Israeli occupation is difficult indeed. We have taken their memorandum into consideration and have commissioned the head of the banks' association, Antoine Shadir, to draw up a plan with the Central Bank for this purpose to see how we can help them.

[Question] Finally, the policy of subsidies followed by the ministries of Economy and Industry with regard to fuel and wheat adds to the burdens of the state treasury. Is there any intention to stop these subsidies?

[Answer] There is no contemplation whatsoever to stop the policy of subsidy for fuel and wheat because these two commodities are a vital artery in the life of the people. This year's loss in these two commodities has reached 900 million Lebanese pounds (700 million for fuel and 200 million for wheat) and if the dollar keeps going up, we are afraid the loss too will go up this year.

KARAMI SAYS TREASURY IN DANGER OF BANKRUPTCY

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 393, 1 Sep 84 pp 61-62

[Article: "Either Facilities Will Be Regained, or There Will Be Bankruptcy"]

[Text] Prime Minister Rashid Karami announced that the Lebanese state will be headed towards bankruptcy if the government does not reclaim public facilities, especially the ports.

In an interview with the monthly magazine AL-IQTISAD WA-AL-A'MAL, he said that the treasury is in a difficult position and is suffering from low income because there are factions which have seized facilities which previously used to bring tremendous funds into the treasury, but Prime Minister Karami said that the treasury situation is still within limits that do not constitute a grave danger to the overall financial situation of the country. But that does not mean that the situation can go on as it is at the present, because that would mean bankruptcy.

Prime Minister Karami revealed that "it is not the policy of his government to give new banking licenses." He mentioned that there is a great number of banks in Lebanon, "and we don't feel the need for more. I don't think it is our policy to expand in this arena; on the contrary, the present direction could be towards not giving new licenses as much as possible."

On the banking situation in general, Prime Minister Karami said that it is in good shape in spite of what had happened, but he stressed that "there is still strong control over the banks, and the authorities have the power to halt infractions in order for it to be possible to prevent banking disasters."

Prime Minister Karami linked any solutions to economic and social problems, and any operation to reshape the larger institutions, to an improvement in the security situation and to the degree to which the state extends its control over the country.

On this subject he said that by the same extent that the security plan progresses, the state will be able to control the facilities and improve the financial situation of the state. On the situation of the Intra Investment Company, he said that the general situation in the country made it impossible to allow the health of establishments to be preserved, and that the Intra Company, like others, was exposed to many pressures and an unhealthy climate.

Prime Minister Karami clearly pointed out the state's determination to make radical changes during the stage of rebuilding the establishments, and he said the new policy and direction of the regime must be accompanied by radical changes in the administration and the institutions, and there must be systems with a high degree of efficiency and with high moral standards, "and we are not afraid of change and will work for what must be."

Finally, he touched upon the subject of Arab aid, saying that it was not a secret that the Arab countries had expressed their satisfaction with the steps taken on the security front, and they were those which had previously stopped sending aid because of the continuing armed conflicts and destruction.

Prime Minister Karami rejected the ideas that the Gulf war had affected the ability of Arab nations to aid Lebanon. He said, "Even though the Gulf war is painful, destructive, exhausts capabilities and burns up great resources Arab capabilities are great, and our brothers will not be miserly towards us with what we need, especially after the calamities and sorrows that have afflicted us."

12547

CSO: 4404/4

PHALANGE ELECTIONS MARK NEW ERA

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 385, 23 Sep 84  
pp 15-16

[Article: "Succession Elections and Shift From Era to Another, The Phalange: Phase of True Challenge Begun"]

[Text] On the 14th of September 2 years ago, the Phalange Party plunged into a bitter experience with the absence of the late president, Bashir al-Jumayyil, and won its bet. On the 13th of September 2 years later, it won another bet following the absence of Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil.

On the eve of Bashir al-Jumayyil's assassination, the party pulled itself together and called the politburo to an emergency session in which Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil was promptly nominated for the presidency, and he assumed power a few days hence.

Only 2 days after the death of the party founder, Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, the politburo convened in Bikfayya where it discussed the post Pierre al-Jumayyil phase and entrusted Dr Elie Karamah with running the party until a date for the election of the party's second leader had been set.

So, within a few days, the party named Mr Joseph al-Hashim an alternate member in the government and set the 13th of September as the date for the elections in which Dr Elie Karamah was elected party chief and Dr George Sa'dah deputy chief.

If anything, these steps demonstrate a dynamism known only to mature and high-class parties and, consequently, constitute a certain proof that the school founded by Pierre al-Jumayyil was a serious one in the history of Lebanese political parties. Few other parties that have lost their founders have risen quickly enough to close the gap, but have broken up and disintegrated or have become very weak.

These two steps put a stop to rumors and confirmed that Bashir al-Jumayyil left behind in the Lebanese Forces a current and a thrust that turned into an effective and vital institution and a mathematical card not be sneezed at, while Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil left the Phalange Party a stock of

patriotism, loyalty and values which stood out clearly through discipline and self-denial, two attributes characterizing the politburo members who took an oath to adhere to Pierre al-Jumayyil's march away from any peripheral struggles.

On Thursday, the party's politburo convened with its electoral body in an emergency meeting to choose a successor to Pierre al-Jumayyil for a 3-year term in pursuance of Article 19 of the by-laws which stipulates the following: "Should the position of leader definitely become vacant (resignation or death), a new chief shall be elected by decision of the politburo and by the invitation of the party's secretary general within 60 days from the day the position was vacated, in accordance with Article 5 of the election statute defining the term and the conditions of electing a chief and deputy chief."

Phalange sources consider the next phase, following the election of a chief, to be important to the party, which has begun to battle the great vacuum left by Shaykh Pierre in the face of the hard choices in particular.

AL-AMAL's editor-in-chief, Joseph Abu Khalil, said that with the absence of Shaykh Pierre, "a national, political and partisan experience based on the genius of a person, not just on a text or a written constitution, comes to an end. Perhaps this is the reason why people here and abroad are wondering what next after Pierre al-Jumayyil with regard to Lebanon's destiny as a whole, of course, but also with regard to a national movement that has always played a first-class role in the national progress."

He also said: "He made it clear that the Phalange's leadership must, first and foremost, be a collective one. This was the formula Shaykh Pierre originated and practiced so well when in the early fifties he ceded his absolute powers as a founder and a supreme leader to a politburo to decide the Phalange's positions and general policies, but without allowing himself to get lost in the formalities and negativism of collective leadership."

Phalange sources stated that the electoral process was no surprise, but rather part of the party's by-laws. However, the surprise will be in the following:

First, the party's new management.

Second, the party's official position via a communique to be issued outlining all party, internal, Arab and regional points.

On the party level, the source revealed that the party will reorganize its internal institutions that deal with strategic studies in order to create a new method whereby the institution can work as a group and an organization, whereas in the past the party relied on Shaykh Pierre's experience and wisdom. The source believes that the phase of true challenge with regard to the party has already begun.

## ISRAEL REPORTEDLY STEALING RIVER WATER

Damascus AL-FURSAN in Arabic No 211, 20 Aug 84 pp 6-7

[Excerpt: "Israel Is Stealing the Waters of Southern Lebanon with the Aim of Changing the Geography"]

[Excerpt] Israel's ambitions towards Lebanese waters, especially the rivers of the south and in particular the Litani river, have started to become obvious, whether through the signs or through the goals; and during the election campaign, they were betting on these ambitions.

The Litani, the Hasbani, the Awali, and the Wazzani are the rivers of the crisis, and the ruling Likud bloc and the opposition Labour party consider these rivers to be settlements in what they call Green Israel. Israel prevented the completion of the Litani project in order to control the water basin of the region, and the issue has many serious ramifications that are discussed in the following article:

### The Tunnel

The deputy head of the Chamber of Deputies, Munir Abu Fadil, said that information reaching him reported that Israel had dug a large tunnel to draw the waters of the Litani to the occupied territories. He was sure that Israel had completed the tunnel and pumping stations, and perhaps preliminary testing had begun. The aim is to bring water up to about 3 million people who will be brought in from around the world. Abu Fadil noted that in the past the Israelis had drawn water from the Wazzani river.

The deputy head of the Chamber drew a map of the water piracy, noting that along the tunnel are pumping stations that propel the water in the first stage to Marj 'Amir, and from there to the tunnel extending from the borders of Gaza and Bi'r al-Saba' to Eilat on the Red Sea. The moment the project is completed the belt of settlements for 2 million Jews will be achievable. Abu Fadil suggested that the government submit a strong protest to the international Security Council that meets permanently, and he called upon the Arab League to get involved in the matter, obtaining from it information which reported that Israel had completed the implementation of a network for distributing water in the Negev Desert to strengthen the settlement policy. The Negev

Desert's allotment is estimated to be 800,000 cubic meters a day, used for agriculture, irrigation, and drinking. Abu Fadil says that he was behind the letter that the Karami government sent to the Secretary General of the United Nations in May explaining the dangers of the Litani appropriations.

#### Water Basin of the Region

I told a French officer in the United Nations forces that Raymond Iddih, who was living in Paris, gave assurances based on Western information that Israeli plans for the Litani are about to be implemented in the field, and he replied that studies show something else and he pointed out that Lebanon is the water basin of the region and that it is swimming in a sea of sweet water. An official in De Cuellar's office went to his file cabinet and pulled out a hydrology map of Lebanon and said:

"Abundant rain falls on Lebanon averaging 928 mm annually; in other words, the total average amount falling on its surface in 9.7 billion cubic meters a year, which is divided between the two rivers, the 'Asi headed towards Syria with 415 million cubic meters, and the Hasbani headed towards Israel with 140 million cubic meters, and half the drainage of the Kabir river, or 95 million cubic meters."

The security official added that 4.025 billion cubic meters are surface runoff in river beds and other points for water, and 600 million cubic meters percolate into the ground, and 5.075 billion cubic meters elaborate. These amounts prove that Lebanon is not rich in water, but that it covers its own needs. It only has 650 million cubic meters generally speaking, and the level which it can use is 3375 distributed between December and May in the amount of 2557 million cubic meters...and between June and November in the amount of 18 million cubic meters.

We have many questions, which we took to Iskandar Ziyadah, director of the Litani authority, and he said: "The basic project as formulated by the experts envisions the building of dams, reservoirs and tunnels between al-Qir'awn, Marj Bisri, Samhar, and al-Zarariyya, which will irrigate the coast and mountains in the south. The one irrigation project that has been completed is the Thura al-Qasimiyya canal which extends as far as al-Ma'-shuqa. As far as the two dams of al-Khardala and Mayfadun are concerned, their implementation has been frozen in the face of government failure and its disastrous vacillation. The thirsty town of Jazzin got the attention of the national treasury to support the south, and it decided to draw water from the Anan reservoir to eight neighbouring towns, which are: Anan, Maharabiyya, Fatahah, Baysur, Kfar Jarrah, Mazra'a, al-Mat-hanah, and Hadariyyah. The amount drawn to these towns was not more than 21 inches, while the total amount of water in the reservoir is estimated to be about 2 million cubic meters.

#### Gaps

Father Salim Ghazzal, director of Dar al-'Inaya in Sidon, has no doubt--since "deserted property teaches men to steal"--that Israel might covet our water because it is thirsty...however, our successive governments have not done

anything to confront Israel's appetite for water. He recalled how some towns in the Jazzin district had applied for water to be brought to the homes when the authorities decided upon the Litani project, but what happened was that the towns that relied on the support of certain politicians got water while the rest remained without. These are the gaps which Israel sneaks through to pump our water into its interior, after assuring international establishments that this resource was going to waste because of circumstance and neglect. "Political feudalism within the state and under its skin aided in the evaporation of some of our water," which, had it been used, could have changed the agricultural structure for the inhabitant of the south, taking him from tobacco growing to planned, seasonal agriculture.

David Ben-Gurion spoke about the place where the sun comes from and the place where water comes from. What is certain in this context is that the plans for diverting the Litani became one of Israel's strategic secrets, and it is no longer a secret that Lake Tiberius was tagged to receive the waters of the Litani and the Hasbani, in addition to the Galilee region, for which a green future is planned, as the Minister of Energy Yuval Ne'eman says.

However, the four rivers of South Lebanon could just be a part of Israel's hydrological bets. There is a unique project, as Eliyahu Ben-Eliezer describes it, which involves connecting the Dead Sea by means of a canal or tunnel 10 kilometers long, alongside of which will be mechanized pumping stations. According to the schedule of repayments, the project will cost 1.4 billion dollars, including the interest on the "loan of the century" as the Jewish monthly magazine ("Arsh") calls it.

It is said that the originator of the two seas canal, as the Israelis call it, is the physicist and thermodynamics expert Fitzer Berger. At first glance the project seems to be a stroke of madness, and it centers around populating the Negev Desert, using the difference between the levels of the two seas, for it is known that the level of the Mediterranean by 402 meters [as published], something that will make it easy to set up an energy producing installation near Masada.

There are fixed ideas in the Jewish mind which are not hidden by the dust of forming a government, as Joseph Rostow, one of those in the forefront of the study of international changes, says, pointing out that Israel will not repudiate its basic ideals regardless of the colors of those governing it, and he pointed out that the Israeli flag consists of a white field bordered by two blue bands between which floats the Star of David. The two bands signify the Nile and Euphrates rivers, which Israel might get to, even if it takes generations! Therefore the Jews cast down their swords and remember that Jewish necessity for preserving their psychological and demographic separateness. Jean Rostow [as published] does not hide the fact that ideas are much more dangerous than chemical weapons, repeating what Nahum Goldman said: Fighting on other people's land using other people as well. But he advised Israel to be realistic and to act like a small nation because it only possesses the capabilities of a small nation, and Noam Chomski believes "that it is not possible to change the face of history with loudspeakers, but changing the geography is a way of controlling water, especially when it is going to waste, as in South Lebanon!"

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## BRIEFS

ABOLITION OF ARMY SECTARIANISM--The Lebanese Army command is studying a plan aimed at reorganizing army units on new bases that eliminate the existing formula based on brigades. The purpose, as is well known, is to abolish the sectarian quality that colored all or some of the army brigades following the recent events that generated a state of sectarian separation. Intimate officials say that President Amin al-Jumayyil has declared that "the principle of eliminating the sectarian formula from army units and brigades is one of the most prominent basic issues on which Syria insists, calling for the prompt creation of a new formula for the reorganization of Lebanese Army units to include a blend of elements from all the various Lebanese sects with a view to giving them a national character." This was the decisive agreement reached during the Damascus summit between Lebanese President Amin al-Jumayyil and Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad. This plan was supposed to have been put into force with the ratification of the security plan for the mountain because implementation of this plan without a change in the army's present situation deprives it of its intended purpose. [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 396, 22 Sep 84 p 14] 12502

CSO: 4404/29

RIYADH POLICE CHIEF INTERVIEWED

Riyadh AL-JAZIRAH in Arabic 25 Sep 84 p 11

[Interview with Muhammad ibn-'Ayish al-Mutayri, Riyadh chief of police, by Mutlaq al-'Asaf; date and place not specified]

[Text] The Riyadh Province police chief Major General Muhammad ibn-'Ayish al-Mutayri praised the public's cooperation with the police and the citizen's role in the security of society. He also praised the positive role of the fraternal Arabs residing in the capital.

In this regard, he stated that the extent of this cooperation increases in proportion with the increased awareness of the citizen.

In an interview conducted by AL-JAZIRAH, ibn-'Ayish also dealt with the security map of the province. He gave an explanation of the police departments, precincts and stations scattered throughout the capital, and their functions.

The Riyadh Province police chief said that one of the most significant steps of his administration is the intensive effort to provide a quality workforce with a mid-level education to replace the normal force. He announced that one of the police projects for this year is to open three new precincts in the city of Riyadh, two stations outside the capital, and 16 stations in Riyadh city, since the study concerning these is almost finished. Following is the text of the interview.

New Steps in Operations and Patrols

[Question] What are the new plans scheduled for the Riyadh province police activities, and what are the new projects for the expansion of the departments?

[Answer] The new developments and plans witnessed by the Riyadh province police are:

First in the operations area: 1) Establishment of a criminal museum, 2) Establishment of a criminal information center, and 3) Establishment of a police library.

precinct, Hutat Bani Tamim police station, al-Hariq police station, al-Dalam police station, al-Salil police station, al-Humr police station, al-Quway'iyah police precinct, al-Rayn police station, al-Khasirah police station, al-Darma' police precinct, al-Mazahimiyah police station, al-Ghatghat police station, Shaqra' police precinct, Marrat police station, Sajir police station, al-Dawadimi police precinct, al-Bajadiyah police station, Nafi police station, 'Afif police station, al-Zalafi police station, al-Ghat police station, al-Artawiyah police station, Hutat Sudayr police station, al-Majma'ah police precinct, Ramah police station, al-Hayir police station, Thadiq police station, Harimla' police station, al-'Uyaynah and al-Jubaylah police station, and al-'Imariyah police station. The patrol units attached to the precincts outside the city are as follows: al-Kharj patrol unit, Hutat Bani Tamim patrol unit, al-Aflaj patrol unit, Wadi Dawasir patrol unit, Hutat Sudayr patrol unit, al-Majma'ah patrol unit, al-Ghat patrol unit, al-Artawiyah patrol unit, Darma' patrol unit, Shaqra' patrol unit, Sajir patrol unit, al-Dawadimi patrol unit, 'Afif patrol unit, and al-Quway'iyah patrol unit.

In addition, temporary patrol units have been established on the al-Hajij road and they are as follows: the patrol units at the Najran, Khamis Mushayt, al-Hada intersection and at the al-Ruwaydah and al-Zalafi intersection.

There is also a move to establish some new precincts, stations and posts both inside and outside the city of Riyadh in view of the great expansion in all parts of Riyadh city in particular, the tremendous growth in all of the province's villages and cities, and the need in these villages and cities for security services.

#### Citizen's Role

[Question] What is the extent of security cooperation between security officers and the public?

[Answer] The citizen's cooperation with the security authorities is something tangible and I can tell you that the extent of this cooperation is multiplying at a rate commensurate with the increased awareness of the citizen, his sense of responsibility for the security of his country, and his effective role in this. There is also a very large proportion of our brothers, the residents--especially the Arab residents--who carry out positive cooperative activities. The Ministry of Interior, represented by the public security apparatus, presents material and moral inducements to every citizen and resident that plays a role that is positive and in the interest of security in the broad sense of the word. On police day in 1402/1403 A.H. and 1403/1404 A.H. the Riyadh Province police presented certificates and medals to some of our fraternal residents and citizens who were of tangible assistance to the security authorities in the province. This is perhaps the best example of the Ministry of Interior's regard for the effective participation of both citizens and residents who have fulfilled their human and fraternal duty. Many of them have received valuable rewards for their cooperation with us in serving the citizens of this fine country.

Second, in the work force, we are raising the educational level of all Riyadh policemen so that the lowest level of education of any individual in the Riyadh police will be a junior high school education.

Third, in the communications area, the jurisdiction of the Riyadh police is covered with short range and long range wireless communication.

Fourth, a number of security centers have been created, and these are divided into two parts. Inside the city of Riyadh work is being done to study the map of Riyadh city with attention being paid to new developments and the neighborhoods with a high proportion of problems. Then we will establish departments, precincts or stations in accordance with the needs of the public interest and the level of financial and personnel assistance the Ministry of Finance can provide.

Fifth, by way of patrols, the Riyadh Province police is constantly reviewing the statistics reported by its internal departments and those provided by outside agencies. Through these statistics we are apprised of certain things in certain areas, and from this patrols are strengthened in certain areas if they are inside the city of Riyadh, or patrols created outside the city of Riyadh.

#### Police Role in Society's Security

[Question] How do you view the role of the Riyadh police in the citizen's life, and how many police precincts are there that carry out this role?

[Answer] The role of the police in the citizen's life is very important and it is not easy to describe this role with words. However, this role, as felt by every citizen and resident, can be described as providing security and peace of mind to all citizens and residents, and fighting all elements that threaten the citizen's security, dignity and money. Although this is the mission of the security officer in a secure country, the citizen bears the responsibility for the success of this mission by cooperating with the security apparatus and informing the police immediately of any crime, incident or behavior that disrupts security or violates the religious values of traditions that thrive in our Muslim country.

In the city of Riyadh, the following precincts provide services to the citizen: al-Mulazz police precinct, al-Sulaymaniyah and al-'Ulya police precinct, al-Mu'adhdhar police precinct, al-Dayrah police precinct, al-Suwaydi and Shabra police precinct, Manfuhah police precinct, al-Batha' police precinct, al-Nasim police precinct, King Khalid International Airport police precinct, and al-Dir'iyah police precinct. In addition, several stations and posts are linked to these precincts. There is also the criminal investigations department, central investigations department, the patrol, rescue, security force and special occasion command, and the diplomatic quarter police.

Outside the city of Riyadh security services are provided by the following precincts and stations: al-Aflaj police precinct. Wadi al-Dawasir police

[Question] What are the new precincts that have been established recently?

[Answer] Based on the statistics and our studies of the building expansion of the city of Riyadh, we have opened three precincts and two patrol units. They are: al-'Ulya and al-Sulaymaniyah police precinct, King Khalid International Airport police precinct, al-Suwaydi and Shabra police precinct, the patrol unit in Hutat Sudayr, and the patrol unit in Hutat Bani Tamim.

A study is near completion concerning opening three more precincts in Riyadh city and two outside of the city, in addition to 16 stations in the city. Studies are continuing throughout the year to develop the activities of the police, improve the security services provided, and maintain the comprehensive awakening that the kingdom is experiencing in all fields.

#### Police Powers

[Question] Do the police precincts have the authority to settle urgent cases and solve problems?

If decentralization were the measure of organized work, then through the absence of centralization, the administrative province of Riyadh is considered unique. In Riyadh, there have not been activities or powers exercised centrally for a long time. The powers endowed in His Royal Highness the governor of the province regarding the interests and affairs of the citizen and the resolution of their various cases have been endowed by His Highness' generosity in those who work with him, each according to his area of specialization.

This reality is felt extensively by the public and the positive, praiseworthy effects of this have always been considered exemplary, and discussions of cases outside the borders of Riyadh Province draw inspiration from this practice. The police precincts do not submit any case to the courts unless they are incapable of finding an appropriate solution to it. In addition, the precincts always try to submit to the governor's office a draft of conclusions and opinions that will assist in making the appropriate decision. This is because His Royal Highness the Governor of Riyadh Province Prince Salman bin 'Abd-al-'Aziz's directives are always that the interests of the citizen must be considered first.

#### Police Officials' Concerns

[Question] What are the problems that the Riyadh police face?

[Answer] There are no problems in the broad sense, but there are some obstacles for the Riyadh Province police, as there are for any institution that has the responsibility of facing the public, a responsibility that has certain sensitivities and that requires special kind of men that have acquired a specialized education and are able, with their educational capabilities, to fulfill their duties toward the public.

This is one of the difficulties that limits the desired effectiveness of service. If the public security apparatus were capable of providing quality security officers trained in all the specialties of security work so that they could achieve the desired quality of service, then this would be one thing, but the other side of the coin is:

- The absence of good housing for the present security officers.
- The absence of good government buildings for the police branches.
- The absence of clubs for body building and mental development.

Although the Ministry of Interior is trying hard to provide everything that would help to improve performance, there are other priorities that must come first. The responsibility of the ministry is a great and comprehensive one. Therefore, the things that should be requested must be the most important and most comprehensive. In my view, the most important things to be achieved are: 1) quality education in all areas of specialization, 2) appropriate facilities, 3) comfortable housing, 4) a good communications system, and 5) recreational and educational facilities.

#### Providing Educated Workforce

[Question] What preparations are being made by the Riyadh police for the present and [the future] with the beginning of the new year?

[Answer] One of the most important, serious steps is the intensive effort to provide a quality workforce with a mid-level education. This is a serious effort to introduce this quality to replace the usual [workforce of those who are] unqualified educationally. Actually, the Riyadh Province police began these steps 7 years ago with the personal support of His Royal Highness Prince Salman bin 'Abd-al-'Aziz and the honest and sincere concern of His Royal Highness Prince Nayif bin 'Abd-al-'Aziz. The Riyadh Province police have achieved numbers that warrant optimism, especially because the public security apparatus took these steps and crowds of graduates have begun to spread through all the police directorates in the kingdom.

#### More Accidents Today for These Reasons

[Question] What is the ratio of cases now to cases in previous years?

[Answer] In all cases and [types of] accidents, there are more today than there were in past years, and this is clearly a result of the huge increase in the population. Foreign residents and the differences in social classes and customs, the building expansion, and the increase in agricultural, trade and industrial activity all undoubtedly create some problems and cases that require the intervention of the authorities. However, these problems, praise God, have not reached a critical stage. They are very normal problems that do not represent any danger or unusual phenomenon.

## Mayor's Role is Fundamental

[Question] What is the role of the local mayor and the extent of his participation with police officers?

[Answer] Of course, the mayor plays a fundamental role in dealing with some marital, legal and other social issues. In addition, he has direct supervision of the night patrols and he issues burial orders for natural deaths. He also has some of the most important security duties, such as keeping the names of all the residents in the neighborhood. Therefore, the mayor's office is one of the important centers of information for the police department or any other security apparatus. This is the case if there is a qualified mayor who is capable of conducting these responsibilities and is given the wherewithal to carry out these responsibilities.

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## BRIEFS

**EXPECTED DEFICIT DECREASE**--The Saudi minister of finance and national economy has stated that most of the huge projects will be completed by the end of this year and expenditures will change. Therefore, the deficit in the Saudi general budget is expected to shrink. Aba-al-Khayl expects that Saudi revenues will soon reach the surplus stage once again because of the invigoration expected in the economic cycle and the resultant increase in demand for oil. Another reason is the end of the era of a high level of spending on huge infrastructure projects, which is estimated to have consumed about 70 percent of total spending during the past boom period. The minister pointed out that the private sector, which has grown 100 percent in the past 5 years, must play the primary role in the future. The state's three lending institutions, which have revenues of 15 billion riyals, will be able to provide 300 billion riyals during the next decade, not to mention that provided by commercial banks. [Text] [London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1454, 14 Sep 84 p 50] 12608

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## AFGHANISTAN

### AFGHAN EDITOR DESCRIBES PAPER'S PROPAGANDA, EDUCATIONAL ROLE

Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian No 23, 14-20 Sep 84 p 17

[Article by Sadik Kavun Tufani, editor-in-chief of KHAKIKATE INKILABE SAUR: "A Newspaper of the Revolution, the Party and the People"]

[Text] The printed organ of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Central Committee, the newspaper KHAKIKATE INKILABE SAUR [Truth of the April Revolution], enjoys the respect and love of the workers, peasants, the intelligentsia and of all the Afghan working people who are now successfully building a free life and who are decisively defending the gains of the April revolution. Tens of thousands of copies of KHAKIKATE INKILABE SAUR are distributed throughout the country every day.

Sadik Kavun Tufani is the editor-in-chief of KHAKIKATE INKILABE SAUR, the organ of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Central Committee.

More than six years have passed since the victory of the saur (April) revolution. In these years fundamental changes have taken place in the political, economic and public life of Afghan society. The people of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), who have thrown off the past, have made significant steps under the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the vanguard of the working class and of all the working people of the country, in the work of consolidating and expanding the great gains of the April revolution, and they are fighting in an ever more decisive and persistent manner for the construction of a new society in which there is no exploitation of one person by another.

## The Tasks Are Set, the Goals Are Clear

The years which have passed since the April revolution provide evidence of an intense and relentless class struggle; they have been characterized by class demarcation.

Despite the constantly expanding undeclared war, which has been unleashed by the reaction, by Chinese great-power hegemonism and by world imperialism--especially criminal American imperialism--against our revolution, against our homeland and against our people, the workers of Afghanistan are defending the revolution heroically; they are providing a decisive rebuff to the enemies' intrigues.

In accordance with the historic 16 August 1980 decision of the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee, the newspaper KHAKIKATE INKILABE SAUR as an organ of the PDPA first came out in September 1980.

Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee, and chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA, in his greeting on the occasion of KHAKIKATE INKILABE SAUR's first issue talked about the tasks of this newspaper. They amount not only to propagandizing and explaining the ideology of the working class and its world view, the theses, positions and scientifically grounded policies of the PDPA, the patriotic, progressive plans and programs of the government and the basic principles (provisional constitution) of the DRA; they also include mobilizing the broad popular masses to support the goals of the party and the government and to implement the high ideals of the defense of the revolution and the homeland, the freedom and independence of the country, democracy, peace, progress and social justice, happiness and prosperity.

At the beginning we encountered a multitude of difficulties and problems because the firm foundations of revolutionary journalism, which could have contributed to the strengthening of the paper, had not been laid. The number of staff members barely reached 10; there was no system for planning and distributing work and there were not enough printing presses. But thanks to the comprehensive and continuous concern of the party's Central Committee and of B. Karmal personally, and to their constructive and creative instructions, the work involved in the production of the newspaper improved.

It should be noted that the contribution of Mahmud Baryalay, candidate member of the Politburo, secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and first editor-in-chief of KHAKIKATE INKILABE SAUR, deserves particular recognition for his work in improving the operations of the editorial department. M. Baryalay organized the work of the newspaper skilfully.

Thanks to the constant concern of the PDPA Central Committee, the untiring work of the newspaper staff and the creative utilization of comradely recommendations from colleagues on the newspaper PRAVDA, KHAKIKATE INKILABE SAUR gradually achieved significant success in the establishment of a plan system, in the distribution of work and in the organization of numerous departments. The newspaper began to acquire its own personality.

Able staff members were accepted into the editorial department, and a network of urban and provincial correspondents was established. Free-lance workers are being recruited and close attention is being given to personnel training.

Our experienced comrades maintain constant contact with their younger colleagues; they talk with the authors of articles and news reports; they point out existing inadequacies and correct them; they advise with the aim of preparing quality materials which meet the requirements of present-day journalism. All this has led to significant achievements within a short period of time. We strive to have our news reports written in language accessible not only to members of the party but also to the broad popular masses.

Our newspaper has published the first documents, the party decisions and the reports of Comrade B. Karmal and other leading members of the party. Important party and government documents, decrees and decisions are explained in editorials, news reports, analytical materials and commentaries. We strive to link the newspaper's subjects and stories closely to current domestic and international events and to carefully fulfill information, political and organizational functions.

Given the imperialist undeclared war against our country, an important aspect of the newspaper's work is to expose the counterrevolutionary bands and the crimes which they commit, the activities of the intelligence organs of the imperialist world--especially the U.S. spy agency, the CIA--and its plans against our country.

KHAKIKATE INKILABE SAUR attempts to show the scale of the material and military assistance to the anti-Afghan counterrevolutionary elements, which is extended by world imperialism, headed by the USA and its stooges. By publishing the true facts and eye-witness testimony, we uncover the true face of the so-called fighters for Islam, who use imperialist mass propaganda media to lead public opinion astray. We lift the veil on "Islam American style," which leads to bloodshed and destruction in Afghanistan.

From the very beginning KHAKIKATE INKILABE SAUR has carried out a broad range of political and propaganda activities. Its pages contain examinations of various socio-political questions of a

timely nature, including the revolutionary struggle of the Afghan people, the participation of the working people in the revolutionary development of society and the defense of the revolution's gains.

#### Principal Attention Is Devoted to the Working Person

For the first time in the history of our country's press the paper is acquainting readers with the working person, with the worker, the peasant, the defender of the revolution and with women, production shock workers and fighters.

In every issue our paper also carries articles on party life; once a week there is a whole page headed "Party Life", and "Experience and Problems." The materials which are published on this page discuss new party experience and provide information on debates related to various political-ideological issues, problems of revolutionary theory, party construction and party life.

We also tell our readers about the most important world events, and we carry commentaries, articles and photographs; we provide comparative data on the two social systems--socialism and capitalism; we show the source of the threat to peace and we explain which countries put obstacles in the path of disarmament, fan the arms race and oppose the peace-loving efforts of the socialist states. The paper exposes the intrigues and plans of those who incite imperialist wars.

Letters from readers have a special place in the paper. Our readers share with us their difficulties and problems, they make suggestions and they criticize. With the help of party and state organs, we extend assistance and solve many of the problems raised in these letters.

We constantly write about the great historical friendship between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, about the significance of internationalism and the fraternal Afghan-Soviet friendship, and about the Soviet Union's assistance to Afghanistan.

It should be noted that we take into account the interests and tastes of various readers. We print discussions of issues related to women's and youth organizations, to the arts and literature, to the cinema and music, as well as sports.

The newspaper is printed in the Pushtu and Dari languages and has a weekday circulation of 70,000.

Of course, we still have many difficulties. There are not enough skilled journalists, and the printing base is weak. But the leading personnel and all the other staff members of KHAKIKATE INKILABE SAUR are firmly convinced that they are fulfilling the tasks entrusted to them. One can say with pride that our newspaper today is a school for the development of party personnel.

**CHEMICAL GAS REPORTEDLY USED AGAINST MUJAHIDIN IN GHAZNI**

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 21 Oct 84 p 5

[Text] The invading Soviet forces have used chemical gas in village Qila Khawaja near Ghazni City as a result of which a Mujahid Commander and 12 other Mujahideen have lost their lives while many others feel unconscious under the impact of gas.

According to Agency Afghan Press sources, the Soviet-Karmal troops encircled the village Qila Khawaja on September 4, to track down the Commander Mohammad Tahir and his 12 companions. The Mujahideen Commander and his comrades were ambushed in a Subterranean canal with the help of foot prints of the Mujahideen and filled the underground canal with chemical gas.

It was reported that Commander Mohammad Tahir and 12 other Mujahideen were martyred on the spot with the gas.

The urban guerrilla Mujahideen attacked the Qandahar cantonment as a result of which several Soviet-Karmal troops were killed while a tank was destroyed during an operation near Trin Kot the capital of Uruzgan Province.

The Agency Afghan Press sources have reported from Qandahar that a group of Mujahideen equipped with mortar guns and rocket launchers conducted night attack on Qandahar cantonment on September 8. Two barracks in the cantonment were extensively damaged with rocket fires and shelling whereas several troops in the barrack were eliminated on the spot. The Mujahideen moved to their safe places after the operation without any losses.

The report from Uruzgan Province indicates that the Mujahideen stormed a military convoy near provincial headquarter Trin Kot on September 11 where the convoy lost a tank and 15 Soviet-Karmal troops were killed. The Mujahideen did not suffer any losses during the attack, however, a farmer, his wife and daughter were martyred in the shelling by the Soviet-Karmal troops, in Dani area.

It was learnt that the Mujahideen waylaid the same military convey at Charjou area but the Soviet-Karmal troops were able to break the Mujahideen siege and moved toward Trin Kot.

### Grid Station Blasted in Kabul

The Afghan Freedom Fighters blasted the grid station Hoot Khel area of Kabul city as a result of which the major portion of Kabul suffered power break down for six days.

In the meanwhile, the Mujahideen wiped out two security posts on Kabul-Gardez Highway in the subdivision of Chahar Asiyab. As many as 16 Karmal troops in the posts were killed while the Mujahideen seized a sizeable quantity of arms.

According to another report 12 unarmed citizens mostly women and children were martyred by the Soviet bombardment in the area of Qargha Dam.

### Major Operation by Soviet-Karmal Troops in Wardak

The Afghan Mujahideen destroyed 12 military vehicles during a series of clashes with Soviet-Karmal troops in Wardak Province where a Soviet aircraft and two helicopter gunships were shot down. Hundreds of unarmed civilians were stated to be martyred in the course of bombardment by Soviet planes and helicopters, the number of casualties was stated 546 by Moscow Radio.

According to Agency Afghan Press sources, the Soviet-Karmal troops launched major operation against the Mujahideen in Wardak Province on September 4. The invaders attacked the Mujahideen's center in Maidan area, where the Mujahideen forced the military troops to retreat back after stiff resistance of five days. The report says that rescue Soviet planes and helicopter gunships constantly bombed the area as a result of which hundreds of civilians mostly women and children were martyred. The Moscow Radio while quoting Radio Kabul said that 546 civilians were killed in the operation. The Mujahideen shot down a Soviet MiG and two helicopters which crashed near Narkh town.

The bombardment also caused severe damage to the crops and fruit gardens, while 80 houses were turned into rubbles. As many as 25 Mujahideen were martyred and 58 others were injured during the clashes. The Mujahideen destroyed 12 military vehicles and seized a dashka anti-aircraft gun, two machine guns and a large quantity of various kinds of arms.

The Afghan Freedom Fighters foiled an attempt to break the seize on the border cantonment Zazi in Paktia Province during which Mujahideen Commander Mohammad Gul was martyred and his 18 comrades were injured.

The Agency Afghan Press sources have reported from Gardez that the besieged Soviet-Karmal troops in Zazi Cantonment shelled the Mujahideen positions to break the seige. The Mujahideen by rocket fires frustrated the Soviet-Karmal attack. However, the losses in this connection could not be ascertained.

### Soviet-Karmal Offensive Repulsed in Panghman and Qandahar

The Afghan Mujahideen frustrated a Soviet-Karmal offensive on their hideouts in Paghman valley near to the capital Kabul during which a Soviet MiG was shot down.

The Agency Afghan Press sources have reported from Kabul that Soviet-Karmal contingents attacked the Mujahideen strongholds in Peshai Pass on September 11.

The Mujahideen halted the invaders in the way where the Soviet-Karmal troops were forced to retreat back after the constant resistance by the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen also shot down a Soviet MiG which crashed near by. According to the reports the Mujahideen encircled the Soviet-Karmal troops again in Qargha-i-Hind area and destroyed a long range BM-21 gun, one tank and three armored cars with rocket launcher fires. The Mujahideen sources in the Karmal forces have confirmed the killing of 60 Soviet-Karmal troops during the operation while 28 Mujahideen were martyred. The exact number of unarmed civilians martyred during the bombardment could not be known.

CSO: 4600/78

AFGHANISTAN

PAPER CALLS PAKISTAN 'SOURCE OF TENSION'

LD140755 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0430 GMT 14 Nov 84

[Text] [No dateline as received]--"Pakistan Is a Source of Tension" is the heading of a commentary by Nahid Merdan in daily HAQIGAT-E-ENQELAB-E-SAUR.

The commentary reads in part:

The military regime of Pakistan is out to intensify tensions in South and Southwest Asia. It has been staging provocations against India and is striving to aggravate the internal situation there after the assassination of Mrs Indira Gandhi.

Over 1,500 extremists sikhs patronized by the Western espionage networks and Pakistani militarists recently held a meeting in Lahore the center of Pakistani Punjab where they raised slogans dividing India and establishing the so-called "Khalistan state".

The recent terrorist activity by the bandits in the soil of Pakistan under the direct supervision of CIA poses serious threats against the freedom, independence and territorial integrity of India. This activity entails the danger of another division in the Indian sub-continent.

The dangers created by the policies of Pakistani militarists consistently increases in our region and first of all threaten India and Afghanistan. Pakistan has been increasingly converted into a powerful military base of the U.S. imperialism in the region. The work for the buildup of the U.S. military bases in the soil of Pakistan continues intensively.

The existence of camps for the training of mercenaries in the territory of Pakistan aimed at the intensification and continuation of the undeclared war against Afghanistan and India are major cause in destabilizing the conditions in the region.

The recent gatherings of extremist Sikhs in Pakistan in which the creation of the so-called "Khalistan Government in Exile" was discussed did not leave any doubt that the recent events in the region and India are directed by the specific Western organisations.

CSO: 4600/79

## KABUL REPORTEDLY TRIES TO INTRODUCE SOVIET PASSPORT SYSTEM

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 15 Oct 84 p 13

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Sun. — Afghan authorities, plagued by a rising tide of urban guerilla attacks, appear to be trying to introduce a Soviet-style internal passport system, Afghan exiles said today.

Travellers from Kabul and the eastern city of Jalalabad say Communist Party security officials there are urging residents to register for new identity cards, the Peshawar-based exiles said.

The drive is coupled with new orders for all citizens to seek official permission for travel outside their cities and to register out-of-town guests, they said. Offenders are threatened with stiff fines.

The drive started last month as Muslim freedom fighters mounted increasingly effective attacks on Kabul itself. The exiles said it appeared aimed at snapping the link between the rural resistance and what they saw as a growing number of urban guerillas.

"It's a sort of internal passport system like in Russia," one said. "It helps locate people and keep them from moving around too freely."

Despite the five-year war and the presence of about 115,000 Soviet troops, many Afghans still travel in brightly-painted buses through war zones and out to the Pakistani cities of Peshawar and Quetta.

## Foreign diplomats

Passengers include resistance sympathisers with enough identity cards to slip through Government and rebel roadblocks. Exiles say they carry news and orders between rebel groups or to and from guerilla headquarters in Pakistan.

The travellers said official media such as Radio Kabul have not yet announced the new identity card drive. But party workers are canvassing neighbourhoods, sometimes with loudspeakers, to get residents out to register.

The drive has not made much impact yet in Kabul, where the population has jumped from 800,000 to around two million as internal refugees choked its hillside slums, they said.

Officials last month further restricted the movements of foreign diplomats within the capital, compressing the limits of the two or three central neighbourhoods they can walk in.

Kabul, long considered the safest city in war-torn Afghanistan, has been rocked by bombings and rocket attacks since early September.

One blast at Kabul Airport killed 28 people and injured about 300, Western diplomats in Islamabad said.

Travellers flying into New Delhi last week said about fifty 57-mm rockets now slam into Kabul every week. Bomb blasts and grenade attacks against Communist civilian and military targets occur nightly.

The guerilla attacks and toughened security measures to counter them have prompted some embassies and international agencies to consider evacuating women and children, the air travellers said. —  
Reuter

CSO: 4600/75

CITIZENS TO REGISTER FOR INTERNAL PASSPORT SYSTEM

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 15 Oct 84 p 4

[Text]

**ISLAMABAD, Oct. 14 (Dispatches) —** Afghan authorities, plagued by a rising tide of urban guerrilla attacks, appear to be trying to introduce a Soviet-style internal passport system, Afghan exiles said today.

Travellers from Kabul and the eastern city of Jalalabad say Communist Party security officials there are urging residents to register for new identity cards, the Peshawar-based exiles told reporters.

The drive is coupled with new orders for all citizens to seek official permission for travel outside their cities and to register out-of-town guests, they said. Offenders are threatened with stiff fines.

The drive started last month as Muslim Mujahideen mounted increasingly effective attacks on Kabul itself. The exiles said it appeared aimed at snapping the link between the rural resistance and what they saw as a growing number of urban guerrillas.

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people and keep them from moving around too freely."

Despite the five-year war and the presence of about 115,000 Soviet troops, many Afghans still travel in brightly-painted buses through war zones and out to the Pakistani cities of Peshawar and Quetta.

Passengers include resistance sympathizers with enough identity cards to slip through government and Mujahideen roadblocks. Exiles say they carry news and orders between insurgent groups or to and from guerrilla headquarters in Pakistan.

The travellers said official media such as Radio Kabul have not yet announced the new identity card drive. But party workers are canvassing neighborhoods, sometimes with loudspeakers, to get residents out to register.

The drive has not made much impact yet in Kabul, where the population has jumped from 800,000 to around two million as internal refugees choked its hillside slums, they said.

## NO END TO CONFLICT EXPECTED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 16 Oct 84 p 1

[Text]

**BELGRADE, Oct. 15 (IRNA)** — Military and political observers watching developments in Soviet occupied Afghanistan, for the past five years are of the opinion that the war in Afghanistan will continue.

Some analysts believe that the struggle of the Afghan Muslim Mujahideen against the government and Soviet forces is one of the bloodiest guerrilla warfares to take place in the past few decades. Although no exact figure of the casualties is available, estimates indicate that both sides have suffered great losses, both in terms of manpower and military equipment.

The Soviet and Afghan forces fear that they have to keep on employing new tactics against the Mujahideen who enjoy the support of the people and can far better adapt themselves to the situation. The Soviet and Afghan

government forces have failed in wiping out the Mujahideen and, therefore, it is not known when the armed struggle in Afghanistan will come to an end.

The Soviet and government forces have realized that they could force the Mujahideen to retreat from their positions, however, they could not smash them.

According to some estimates at present, about 85,000-130,000 Soviet soldiers, more than 4,000 Soviet tanks and vehicles, and more than 300 helicopters and fighters are stationed in Afghanistan. In addition, some 25,000 soldiers of the Afghan government are aiding the Soviet forces, however, they do not enjoy a proper combat ability.

On the other hand, the Mujahideen are numbered between 90,000-120,000 with minimal ammunition, mostly seized from enemy depots.

The Afghan Mujahideen are said to be using portable rockets, which they have received from abroad. This points to other elements' involvement in the Afghanistan crisis which makes the problem more complicated.

#### **Mujahideen Attack Convoy**

Meanwhile, Muslim Afghan guerrillas attacked a large convoy of Soviet and government forces travelling from the city of Ghazni to Pakti Province.

Reliable sources here said that two Soviets were killed and 50 government soldiers captured in the attack.

The sources said three Soviet tanks were destroyed and five armored personnel carriers captured by the Mujahideen.

Meanwhile, reports from Afghanistan indicate that the people of the capital are concerned about the shortage of fuel as winter nears.

CSO: 4600/68

**MUJAHIDIN REPORTEDLY KILL 12, CAPTURE 312 SOLDIERS**

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 1 Nov 84 p 1

[Text]

ZAHEDAN (IRNA)— Afghan Moslem Mujahideen executed twelve Soviet and government soldiers after they captured 312 of them in an attack on four military bases in the Badqis Province, reliable sources said here.

The deputy of the intelligence organization in the province was reported to be among those executed.

In the twelve-day operation, the Mujahideen also captured over 380 weapons and five vehicles, the sources said.

Meanwhile reports reaching here said another group of Mujahideen guerillas attacked forces in the same province last week and surrounded them. The siege is still going on.

An AP report from New Delhi said yesterday troops of the Soviet-installed Babrak Karmal regime captured an unspecified number of anti-government guerillas Tuesday during two clashes in northern Afghanistan, quoting a Kabul Radio report.

The state-run radio said the clashes occurred in the Faryab and Baghlan provinces on the West Asian nation's border with the Soviet Union.

The pushtu-language newscast, monitored here, reported that Afghan soldiers also seized a large quantity of arms and ammunition, including assault weapons and rocket launchers.

The radio recently had reported numerous clashes between soldiers and the country's Moslem Mujahideen in Afghanistan's northern frontier.

CSO: 4600/74

## BRIEFS

**SOVIET HELICOPTERS DOWNED--NEW DELHI, Oct. 29 (IRNA)--**Two Soviet helicopters crashed after being hit by the fire of Afghan Mujahideen fighters at Dar al Aman, 12 kms from Kabul. Reliable sources here said Soviet forces killed 35 civilians in retaliation for the attack. Meanwhile, the number of Soviet forces guarding the capital has increased and all roads leading to the city are in their control. Sources said people cooperate with the resistance forces despite the heavy presence of the Soviets. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 30 Oct 84 p 1]

**SOVIET PRESENCE CONDEMNED--ROME, Oct. 27 (Reuter)--**Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi has condemned the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, saying that to keep silent about it amounts to an act of complicity. "We recognize that indifference, silence and forgetfulness about what is happening in Afghanistan amount to an act of complicity in a serious violation of the international order," Craxi said today in a message to a meeting in Rome entitled "Five Years of Resistance Against the Soviet Invasion." "For that reason we reaffirm the strongest condemnation of the Soviet occupation and stress our moral and political solidarity with the people of Afghanistan, who are fighting to establish their legitimate rights to self-determination," Craxi said. "That act of armed invasion," he said, "has caused struggles and enormous sufferings, but has not dimmed the Afghan people's desire for independence." [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 28 Oct 84 p 1]

CSO: 4600/78

PAPERS REPORT, COMMENT ON ITALIAN MINISTER'S VISIT

5 Oct Press Conference

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 6 Oct 84 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Oct. 5.--The Italian Defence Minister, Senator Giovanni Spadolini, said today that his country was ready to provide spare parts to India for the Tarapur atomoc power station, reports UNI.

Addressing a Press conference here, he said Italy could provide 12 different parts which had been denied to India by the USA and some European countries.

However, the Indian Government had made no formal request to his Government in this regard, he said.

Our Special Representative adds: He told reporters that India had evinced keen interest in the acquisition and production of the HF-70 Howitzer gun being manufactured jointly by Italy, Britain and West Germany.

After his talks with Mrs Gandhi and the Defence Minister, Mr S. B. Chavan, he said the 155 mm calibre gun could shoot a range of 30 km and was very mobile. It was anti-tank and anti-concrete.

The details of the gun were provided by the Italian Secretary-General of Defence, General Giuseppe Piovano, Senator Spadolini said Japan and Saudi Arabia had already acquired the gun.

The Italian Defence Minister said that India had asked for information about a fighter aircraft being manufactured by Italy, Britain, France, Spain and West Germany. The total requirement was for 1,000 aircraft. The doors were open for India for co-production.

Replying to a question on the light transport aircraft being offered to India, he said that there was no discussion on it as New Delhi's requirements were not those "we can offer".

He said that the outline of a ministerial agreement on defence collaboration would cover material as well as electronic systems for defence. It could include radar and radio. The actual memorandum would be signed in a month.

The Italian Defence Minister met the Prime Minister yesterday and had talks with the Defence Minister, Mr Chavan, today. The talks with Mrs Gandhi covered the international situation, reduction of nuclear weapons and the Iran-Iraq conflict.

Though he replied questions on the 155 mm gun and the European fighter aircraft, he made it clear that he was "a messenger of peace and not a merchant of armament". He had told Mrs Gandhi about the role European collaborators could play in defence.

Asked about Italy's stand on the positioning of nuclear armaments in Europe, the Italian Defence Minister said his country along with Britain and West Germany had worked for re-establishing the regional balance which had been violated by the Soviet Union in 1978-79. "Our decision is political and not military" he clarified.

#### Analyst's Comment

Madras THE HINDU in English 6 Oct 84 p 1

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text] New Delhi, Oct. 5. As India steps up its defence purchases to replace some of the obsolescent equipment with the latest weapons systems, there is a fierce scramble between the arms exporting countries, both in the West and the East to sell sophisticated weaponry and collaborate in indigenous manufacture under licence.

The latest Western country to enter the Indian arms market is Italy which has come forward with some highly attractive offers in competition with well established suppliers like Britain and France.

Apart from Britain, France and West Germany, the other Western countries competing for the supply of different types of equipment for the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force are Austria, Italy and Sweden. Though the U. S. has opted out by insisting on totally unacceptable conditions, it continues to sell some minor, but crucial electronic items and spare parts.

USSR, major supplier: The bulk of the defence equipment is still acquired from the Soviet Union, which remains India's principal supplier, meeting most of its requirements. But the other socialist countries like Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and even Bulgaria have also entered the Indian arms market.

Balancing operation: For political reasons, consistent with its policy of non-alignment, India has been trying to diversify its arms purchases without diluting its primary reliance on the Soviet Union. It is in pursuance of this policy that India went in for the Jaguar strike aircraft and Seaking helicopters from Britain, Mirage-2000s and 155 mm field guns from France, submarines from West Germany and other equipment from West Europe, when the U. S. was not prepared to cooperate in this balancing operation.

Clinching pending deals: The Defence Minister of Italy, Mr. Giovanni Spadolini, is now on a visit to India to discuss the prospects for greater cooperation in the defence sphere. He has come to clinch, if possible, a number of pending deals for the supply of some highly sophisticated equipment.

The Bulgarian Defence Minister is expected in Delhi later this month with similar offers of collaboration to supplement the well-established Indo-Soviet defence co-operation. The intention is not to compete with the Soviet Union even in a small way, but help widen the scope of India's defence supply relationship with the socialist countries with a token participation.

**Focus on Delhi:** The modernisation programmes of the Indian Armed Forces have transformed Delhi into one of the major arms trading centres in the world with many powerful lobbies at work to secure big supply contracts. The embassies of the countries concerned exert all possible political influence to help their arms manufacturers sell their equipment.

**Complex exercise:** The Defence and Finance Ministries have acquired a certain amount of expertise over the years in negotiating these arms transactions, but they are still relatively new to this highly complex business of securing the best possible terms. Almost every deal is treated as a package proposition involving a memorandum of understanding, a letter of intent, a pricing formula and procedure for payment, before an agreement can be finalised after working out the technical details, delivery schedules and collaboration arrangements for progressive manufacture.

**Bitter experience:** In most of these defence deals, India has come out rather badly because of the inordinate delays involved in finalising these transactions, leading, in turn, to price escalation. The country has also landed itself in this process with second generation equipment rather than the very latest one in many cases.

Another odious feature of these defence deals is the increasing involvement of pressure groups with political connections in influencing decisions. There is no single agency at the Centre with the necessary over-riding authority to ensure that what is being acquired is the best possible equipment available and that the right price is being paid for it.

**Chavan-Spadolini talks**

**PTI reports:**

The question of technology transfer by Italy in certain areas of India's defence production figures during the discussions here today between the Defence Minister, Mr. S. B. Chavan, and Mr. Giovanni Spadolini.

The talks were officially described as "wide-ranging" in which defence cooperation between the two countries was reviewed.

"Agreement was reached to explore areas where technology and research and development collaboration could be profitably introduced", a Defence Ministry press release said.

**Service chiefs present:** The three service chiefs--General A. S. Vaidya (Army), Admiral O. S. Dawson (Navy) and Air Chief Marshal L. M. Khatre (Air Force)--the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, Dr. V. Arunachalam and other senior officials of the Ministry of Defence were present during the discussion.

CSO: 4600/1049

INDIA, NORWAY TO COOPERATE IN COMPUTER INDUSTRY

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 5 Oct 84 p 13

[Text] Oslo, Oct. 4.—India and Norway have signed a memorandum of understanding for large-scale collaboration in the fast growing computer industry and other related areas, reports PTI.

The memorandum was signed here on Tuesday by the Union Deputy Minister for Electronics, Dr S. Sanjivi Rao, and his Norwegian counterpart, Mr Arne Synnes.

The memorandum identified specific areas of cooperation such as development, production and marketing of computers, development of software, computer-aided design and manufacture, computer applications in offshore activities, seismic analysis and joint ventures for export.

The memorandum also stipulated that concrete proposals should be drawn up within six months, during which a Norwegian delegation is expected to visit India.

Noting that the complementary characters of the two countries—Norway's expertise in high technology and India's highly trained manpower—should together produce mutually beneficial results, the memorandum visualized exports of Indian manufactured computer software as a major development.

Norwegian computer companies, like Nors Data, Norske Veritas and Computas, which have made the country a leader in the so-called information revolution, should in pursuance of the memorandum play a more active role in India than hitherto.

A suggestion from the Indian side that an Indo-Norwegian Joint Economic Commission with special working groups on electronics, shipping, energy and oil technology be set up, has been received with interest by the Norwegians, it is learnt.

Moreover Indo-Norwegian trade relations are expected to get a boost when the Norwegian Prime Minister, in response to an invitation extended by Mrs Indira Gandhi during her visit to this country last year, pays a visit to India.

CSO: 4600/1047

ANALYST COMMENTS ON NEW ZEALAND LEADER'S VISIT

Madras THE HINDU in English 5 Oct 84 p 1

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text] The Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. David Lange, who is on a brief visit to Delhi on his way back from London, announced today the appointment of the Everest hero, Sr Edmund Hillary, as the next High Commissioner of his country to India with concurrent accreditation to Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan.

It signified not only the appointment of New Zealand's "best known and widely respected citizen", as Mr. Lange put it, but also the resumption of diplomatic representation in India by New Zealand which closed down its mission two years ago as an economy measure.

As New Zealand's youngest Prime Minister of this century, the 42-year-old Mr. Lange, who was voted to power in July after defeating the doughty Mr. Robert Muldoon, exuded the Kiwi spirit in full measure as he met Mrs. Indira Gandhi for a tour d'horizon of the international scene with particular reference to the South Pacific area, where he has run into controversy over his country's obligations as a member of the ANZUS to let U. S. nuclear warships visit its ports.

After a long spell of conservative rule, Australia and New Zealand now have Labour governments, although they do not seem to agree on their ANZUS obligation. Nevertheless, the very fact that the Prime Ministers of the two countries, Mr. Bob Hawke and Mr. Lange, are committed to early independence of the remaining colonies in the South Pacific area has a powerful impact in the region.

The New Zealand Prime Minister, like his Australian counterpart, is also attaching considerable importance to the establishment of closer political and economic links with India, without prejudice to their membership of the Western alliance which means total dependence on the U. S. and no longer Britain for their defence, because of their growing realisation of its importance in the non-aligned world. The two have indicated in their own way the desire of Australia and New Zealand for a better understanding between the developed and developing countries to open the way for a more equitable economic relationship between them.

New Zealand initiative: During his talks with Mrs. Gandhi, Mr. Lange explained his initiative for setting up a 11-nation South Pacific ministerial forum to urge France to grant independence to New Caledonia soon.

This is the first time that a white country has taken the initiative in spearheading the campaign for a colony despite the French bid to delay the grant of independence. The new Prime Minister of New Zealand is clearly casting himself in a leadership role in the Polynesian region, something which Australia has not attempted even during the high noon of Mr. Gough Whitlam's rule.

**Pioneering role:** At the lunch she gave in honour of Mr. Lange, Mrs. Gandhi spoke eloquently of New Zealand's pioneering role in going for a welfare state and granting franchise to its women. She also recalled the great contribution to human progress made by many eminent New Zealanders like Lord Rutherford who elucidated the structure of atoms, David Low whose cartoons did much to strengthen the resolve to fight the tyranny of fascism, and Sir Edmund Hillary who kindled the spirit of adventure with his conquest of Everest.

The two Prime Ministers also exchanged views on current international tensions, the efforts of the two superpowers to halt the precipitous drift towards a nuclear confrontation, the role of the non-aligned community in strengthening peace, the future of Antarctica and the need for a North-South dialogue. But in restating their respective positions on Kampuchea, they stressed that countries like India and New Zealand could, consistent with their commitments and perceptions, cooperate fully in many areas to promote international cooperation.

A political maverick who revels in exuding good-natured curiosity, Mr. Lange, accompanied by his wife and members of his staff, spent the evening, watching the Dusserah festivities at Ram Lika grounds along with Mrs. Gandhi, who explained to him the significance of the Ramayana as the giant effigy of Ravana was set on fire. And he certainly provided a refreshing touch of informality to the stuffy atmosphere of a Prime Ministerial visit.

**PTI reports:**

**Protocol set aside:** The visiting Italian Defence Minister, Mr. Giovanni Spadolini, was also visibly impressed by the celebrations. The remarkable finale evoked so much interest in Mr. Lange and Mr. Spadolini that they, setting aside protocol, repeatedly enquired of Mrs. Gandhi the significance of the grand spectacle.

The two dignitaries walked up to the mike and greeted the thousands of people who had gathered there.

CSO: 4600/1048

## PROPOSALS OF ILO TEAM ON POPULATION CONTROL DESCRIBED

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 5 Oct 84 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, Oct. 4.--An International Labour Organization-sponsored study has suggested that the Government of India initiate a retirement insurance scheme for workers to snap the link between parents' fears regarding insecurity in old age and the size of the family.

The study has also suggested the introduction of a suitable provision in the Maternity Benefits Act to give bonus of six weeks' average wages to each married woman in the fertile age group (15-45) every three years during which she remains free from pregnancy, provided she had no more than two children.

Entitled "An appraisal of the compatibility of Indian labour legislation with national policy for population moderation", the study had been initiated by the ILO Labour and Population team for Asia and the Pacific in consultation with the Secretary in the Union Ministry of Labour. Its purpose was to identify the possible interaction of labour laws with population growth in general and, in particular, with marriage and fertility behaviour.

The Union Labour Ministry and the ILO have convened a tripartite seminar here on October 27 on "compatibility of labour laws with national population policy"--to consider the various recommendations made by the ILO team's study.

The study has suggested examination of the feasibility of restricting medical benefits under the Employees' State Insurance Act to the insured's spouse, two dependent children and dependent parents. Optional coverage of additional dependent children might be permitted with additional contributions, the amount to be related to the number of additional children covered.

It has also commended for the Indian Government's consideration a review of the minimum age for employment prescribed under the various labour legislative enactments.

To help such a review, the ILO team has pointed out that the Government might find it useful to institute a study of the impact of the enforcement of current legal provisions on the subject.

The study has suggested that the Government seek the advice of legal experts to determine whether any change is necessary in the concerned labour enactments in view of the passage of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1978.

Another recommendation of the ILO team is that monetary payments available to the workers--like bonus, gratuity, provident fund--could be used as incentives for encouraging the small family norm. The payments made to the beneficiaries who have not exceeded the two-child norm could be appropriately increased.

The Government, it has been suggested, could also examine whether, it is feasible and legally permissible to adopt such practices in the case of all or some of the benefits concerned.

The team has recommended that the Government set up a working group to formulate a scheme for the collection of data necessary for the effective formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of national population programme, utilizing the relevant provisions of existing labour legislation.

CSO: 4600/1047

## ALL STATES BUT ASSAM REPORTED READY FOR ELECTIONS

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 6 Oct 84 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Oct. 5--All the States and Union Territories, barring Assam, have informed the Election Commission that they are prepared to hold the coming parliamentary elections, reports UNI.

The Deputy Commissioner, Mr V. Ramakrishnan, said today that in Assam, preparatory work on revising the electoral rolls would begin after the festival holidays in the State. The Chief Electoral Officer, who was here recently, had been asked to start printing electoral cards and posting personnel, he said.

The Chief Electoral Officer had told Mr Ramakrishnan that it would take about six months to complete an intensive revision of the Assam rolls.

Mr Ramakrishnan said Punjab had not indicated as yet whether it would be possible to hold elections in the State. At the last conference of Chief Electoral Officers, the Punjab CEC had said that if the situation continued to improve, it would be possible to hold the poll. The State's electoral rolls had already been revised.

Mr Ramakrishnan said that if parliamentary elections were held as scheduled and the new Lok Sabha constituted before January 20, the process should start in early December and the poll should be held in January.

Some States were in informal touch with the Home Ministry for the development of Central forces during the elections, he added.

## Arrangements

Mr Ramakrishnan said that after their conference last July, the State Chief Electoral Officers started making arrangements for polling stations and polling material, including ballot boxes and ballot papers.

Arrangements were being made also to hold Assembly elections in Goa, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur, along with the Lok Sabha poll. The terms of the Goa and Arunachal Pradesh Assemblies expire in January. The tenure of the Mainpur Assembly ends in February.

The Centre had not informed the commission whether President's rule would continue in Sikkim and Pondicherry or Assembly elections would be held there, Mr Ramakrishnan said.

CSO: 4600/1049

## NO RELAXATION ON CURBS ON FOREIGNERS IN SIKKIM

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 9 Oct 84 p 7

[Text] New Delhi, Oct. 8.--The Home Ministry has ruled out relaxation in the restrictions on the entry of foreigners into the sensitive areas of Sikkim reports UNI.

In its submissions before a parliamentary committee, a senior Home Ministry official has stated that defence personnel are deployed in a particular formation in these border areas.

"It will not be in the interest of our security if foreigners are allowed access to such areas and, thereby, secure information about the actual deployment of our military personnel", he said.

It is in the country's interest to prevent leakage of information concerning vulnerable points, bridges, concentration of troops, and the general state of preparedness, the official said.

It is not only the border areas of Jammu and Kashmir which have been declared protected areas. There are a number of places in Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Mizoram which fall under the same category. The entire north-eastern region is protected because of defence installations and the danger that people are simple and therefore vulnerable to exploitation.

The wanted desired to know whether a ban on the entry of foreign tourists would not deprive the State Government of revenue from tourism as made out in several representations.

The Home Ministry official pointed out that the number of foreigners who visited Sikkim after securing entry permits was around 4,000 to 5,000 a year during the last three years.

The committee felt that in the interest of security, there was sufficient "justification" for continuing restrictions on the entry of foreigners and regulating their movements.

The committee recommended to the Government that it consider the proposal submitted by certain travel agents to permit groups of organized tourists sponsored by them to visit tourist centres.

CSO: 4600/1056

## RESEARCHER DISCOVERS ADDITIONAL NOMADIC TRIBES

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 6 Oct 84 p 7

[Text] Bombay, Oct. 5.--They have no place to stay and nowhere to go. They have no land of their own--neither a village to make a claim on, nor a hut for a shelter. They move about in small caravans, carrying their belongings on their backs in the company of their cattle, pigs, donkeys and dogs, trying to eke out a sub-human living.

This is the plight of one of the most degraded and neglected sections of the people who fall far below the customary poverty line and who are seldom accounted for in the census and who rarely figure on the voting lists. They belong to the numerous nomadic tribes, a relic of the ancient times when they were called upon to act as communication lines and traders between the nascent agricultural settlements at the dawn of civilization.

It is only now that the enormity of the problems of the nomadic tribes is being felt in Maharashtra. The credit for this awakening goes to a young man, Taxman Mane, who belongs to one of the nomadic tribes, Kaikadi, characterized by the authorities as a "criminal", tribe. Over the last two years, Man travelled about 75,000 km through the interior of Maharashtra to make a survey of the nomadic tribes. Nobody has made such an extensive survey of these elusive people.

What Mane has uncovered is shocking and also revealing of the innumerable self-supporting compartments in which the Indian is hopelessly divided. The compartments are so independent of each other that a majority of the people are totally ignorant of even the existence of a vast number of people belonging to these tribes.

## Many Not Listed

The State Government list specifies that there are 42 nomadic tribes in Maharashtra. During his two-year extensive study, Mane could uncover 11 more tribes totally different from those listed. He says there are many more yet to be accounted for. The biggest hurdle in absorbing them in the mainstream of progress and civilization is their mobility and their utter pauperization.

The tribes are so tightly closed to outsiders that not even Mane, a nomad by birth, could inspire confidence among them to reveal their secrets, their social systems, their rituals and the proceedings of their caste courts (Jat Panchayat) which hand out sentences for offences ranging from adultery to murder.

Mane is among the very few educated youths among the nomads. Education for him had been a trial and he could pursue it only because of the surprising tenacity and grit shown by his parents. His community moved about with a caravan of donkeys, never staying at one place for more than a few months. He studied reluctantly in many schools. But he made it to graduation, stayed at one place, came in touch with several social-minded organizations and became acutely aware of the position of his community and others like it.

It was at this stage that Mane was inspired to write his autobiography. Published by Granthali, a readers' movement devoted to bringing out the neglected lives in the mainstream of Marathi literature, the autobiography, Upra, made a sensation. It threw all the norms of Marathi literature and language to the winds and vividly brought out the rugged pauperized sub-human life of the nomads. Besides winning many accolades, the autobiography fetched a handsome scholarship for Mane from the Ford Foundation. The scholarship enabled Mane to spend two years to study the nomadic tribes.

Mane had to trudge through jungle and hills, risk his person, resort to camouflage to establish rapport with the people of various tribes. To inspire confidence and to show that he himself belonged to a nomadic tribe, he had to eat with them, drink with them and sometimes had to play on their musical instruments to prove his credibility. In spite of these labours, Mane could only glimpse the outward manifestations of the independent and island-like "cultures" of these societies.

According to Mane, the condition of the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes are far better than those of the nomadic tribes. The scheduled tribes are far better than those of the nomadic tribes. The scheduled castes have a place in the village system. The tribes have their own jungles, huts and land. Both these sections are now organized and they are being educated. The nomadic tribes have no place in the village system and even in the social system. It is only now that a handful of youths are being educated. It is no wonder that most of the welfare schemes have bypassed them.

Most nomadic tribes are held tightly under the grip of their powerful caste-courts. The caste courts sustain them, dominate them and exploit them. The women live in perpetual terror of the courts. A single story, narrated by Mane in his recent book, gives an agonising glimpse into the sub-human lives of some of these unfortunate men and women.

#### Baby for Sale

It is the story of a woman of the Pardhi tribe, labelled a criminal tribe. Her name is Kadtusi, meaning bullet. (Pardhis do not have proper names. They are called bullets, pistols, rifles, daggers and so on). When she was three years old, her father sold her to another man at Rs. 50. He was her first husband, whom she bore four children.

After some time, the husband sold Kadtushi to another man, but kept the daughters with him as he could make money by selling them. She was sold to five men in succession. The last husband absconded and Kadtushi was accused of incest with her elder son by the caste court. The court asked her to prepare bread in human urine and sentenced her to a fine of Rs 75,000. Now several generations of Parvati and her sons would continue to pay the fine to the caste court.

Even now, many caste courts sentence erring women to pick up a coin from a cauldron of boiling oil to prove their innocence. Needless to say, men go scot-free for the same offences.

These castes also live in perpetual terror of the police and the authorities. Since many of the tribes are stamped as criminal, they are the first target of police brutality whenever a theft or an offence is registered in a nearby village.

#### The Closed Door

Man has brought out the plight of these unfortunate people in a new book titled Bandh Darwaza (the closed door), based on two years of research.

He has set up an institution called the Bharatiya Bhatke Vimukta Vikas Ani Samshodhan Samstha (institution for development and research of Indian nomadic tribes).

Mane has been organizing conference and gatherings of nomadic tribes at various places in the State. The response is tremendous. A group of young workers, from among the tribes, is emerging to support them.

CSO: 4600/1049

FOREIGN MINISTRY CONDEMNS LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS

LD091718 Tehran IRNA in English 1620 GMT 9 Nov 84

[Text] Tehran, Nov 9 (IRNA)--Iran's Foreign Ministry has inveighed against the idea of a negotiated withdrawal of the Zionist forces from Southern Lebanon. The ministry has said that negotiation with the Zionist government by Lebanese officials would be tantamount to yielding to the dictates of a common enemy against the interests of the Muslim Peoples.

Speaking to IRNA on Thursday a ministry spokesman condemned any such negotiations as an opportunity to which the Zionist government looked forward for "legitimizing a regime whose encroachment upon the rights of the Muslim masses has long since become a matter of routine and whose occupation of Muslims' lands has long since been its principal goal."

He said the best and the most effective weapons whereby foreign troops can be ousted from Lebanon is to wage an armed resistance against them.

He addressed himself to the Lebanese people calling on them to be vigilant and neutralize this "dangerous plot" which he said was aimed at ruining the lofty achievements of the Lebanese people.

CSO: 4600/80

OFFICIAL ON ANNIVERSARY OF ABROGATION OF U.S., USSR ACCORDS

LD101947 Tehran IRNA In English 1850 GMT 10 Nov 84

[Text] Tehran, Nov 10, IRNA--Saturday, November 10th marks the fifth anniversary of a unilateral abrogation by the Islamic Republic of former friendship agreements with Moscow and Washington. The decision then adopted by Iran's "Revolution Council" was a first major post-revolution measure typifying a first serious move by Iran for furthering a foreign policy dictum independent of both the superpowers and their satellites. IRNA's reporter interviewed Mojtaba Mir-Mehdi a deputy minister of foreign affairs in charge of protocols and parliamentary affairs on the occasion here today. Following are excerpts from his talks on the anniversary day.

"Iran's practical non-alignment with the superpowers is a source of great pride for the Islamic Republic. Our country would certainly rank the first and foremost in the order of non-aligned nations if one were to give a fair definition of 'non-alignment'...

"On November 10, 1979, Iran's 'Revolution Council' decided to abrogate Iran's agreements with both the superpowers. The decision set the cornerstone of Iran's foreign policy dictum independent of the two superpowers.

"Major agreements abrogated in the wake of the decision were a military agreement of March 5, 1959, which in practice also involved the United States with the CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation). Before that the Islamic government had repealed another act giving immunity to U.S. advisors in Iran and another one authorizing the employment of U.S. Army officers and its personnel in Iran...

"Another agreement abrogated by the decision of the Revolution Council was a so-called friendship agreement between the United States and Iran though in the face of her unabashed age-old enmity with Iran the attributive 'friendship' sounds much of a monstrosity...

"Following the seizure of the U.S. den of spies in Tehran (on November 4, 1979) and rupture of diplomatic relations between Tehran and Washington the friendship agreement of 1955 sounded as something virtually unwanted and unjustified. The agreement was abrogated and rightly so because the United States had frozen Iran's assets in American banks. The agreement has since been null and void...

"The Revolution Council also abrogated on the same day a similar agreement with the Soviets which recognized the right of a military intervention in Iran by the Soviet Government. Therefore, that part of the agreement between Iran and the Soviet Union, namely chapters five and six of the 1921 agreement were repealed...Chapter five of the agreement recognised certain limitations for the operation of the Iranian forces within the Iranian territory...The spirit of the two chapters were found to be against the Charter of the United Nations and were deemed unnecessary with respect to changing circumstances."

CSO: 4600/81

NVOI: IRAN'S RULERS SERVE U.S. IMPERIALISM

TA082043 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 8 Nov 84

[Unattributed commentary: "Whom Do the Islamic Rulers Serve?"]

[Text] Dear compatriots: The new crime by U.S. imperialism in Brazil has aroused the wrath and hatred of world public opinion and of all noble persons. The report of the massacre of more than 7,000 Indian natives near the Amazon River has caused serious concern throughout the world over the fate of mankind. However, Iran's Islamic government reacted to this dreadful crime by further disseminating unbelievable lies about the Soviet Union, our next-door neighbor and the friend and backer of our people and revolution. It claimed that the Soviet Union is using chemical weapons in Afghanistan.

In short, rulers and mouthpieces of the Islamic regime have exerted and continue to exert their utmost effort to divert the attention of the Iranian people from this dreadful crime by U.S. imperialism, and at the same time to accuse the Soviet Union--which constantly is struggling to prohibit, limit, and destroy all stocks of chemical weapons--of employing chemical weapons. The Iranian people, however, cannot be deceived so easily. Our people clearly recall that as a result of the use of chemical weapons by the criminal U.S. imperialism in Indochina, millions of innocent people as well as the prospect of a future generation were killed, thousands of acres of jungles were destroyed, and several small and large rivers were poisoned. U.S. chemical weapons have also been used and are being used against the people of (?Namibia), El Salvador and Afghanistan who are struggling for their freedom and independence.

The massacre of two tribes of native Indians in Brazil, and the poisoning of the environment around the Amazon River, are part of the crimes and atrocities U.S. imperialism has committed throughout the world. According to precise figures, the United States currently possesses more than 150,000 tons of nuclear weapons [as he...], which it is using against defenseless people. Why are rulers of the Islamic regime and Iran's mass media blind and deaf to these facts? They continue to escalate unbridled propaganda and unbelievable lies against the Soviet Union, because propaganda against the Soviet Union and anti-Sovietism are part of the general program of international imperialism, headed by America, and part of the plot of America and Britain against our people and revolution. The Islamic rulers act

according to the instructions of Brzezinski, adviser to former U.S. President Carter, who said: The necessary condition for a rapprochement between Iran's Islamic regime and America is the escalation of anti-Soviet propaganda and anti-Sovietism by the Islamic rulers.

At present, the Iranian people can see that the Islamic rulers' slogan of "Neither East nor West," has been transformed into friendship with and open adherence to U.S. and British imperialism, and unbridled hostility and enmity toward the Soviet Union and other friends and supporters of our toilers and revolution.

A well known adage says: First tell me who your friends are, then I can tell you who you are. The Iranian people recognize the true revolutionaries and patriots. The people have come to know the Islamic government's leaders. For this reason, they are continuing their struggle to perpetuate the revolution and save the homeland from the bloody clutches of its domestic and foreign enemies.

CSO: 4640/109

# TEHRAN CRITICIZES U.S.-EGYPTIAN EXERCISES

GF090730 Tehran International Service in Arabic 0400 GMT 9 Nov 84

["A Pause With the Events" program]

[Text] The joint air and naval exercises between the Egyptian regime and the criminal United States in the Eastern Mediterranean have ended. The 3-day maneuvers, called the Sea Breeze exercises, were the first in which units of the U.S. 6th Fleet and Egyptian forces held joint air exercises at sea to train on repulsing air and sea attacks.

The presence of U.S. vessels in Egyptian waters is not new. U.S. ships numerous have violated Egypt's territorial waters--ever since the Egyptian regime began to betray the Muslim world and the Arabs and the traitor Al-Sadat sought to shackle Egypt's freedom and independence to the traitorous Camp David accords. Nevertheless, this is the first time in which the U.S. 6th Fleet took part in wide-scale air and naval exercises with the Egyptian forces. In view of the political and military developments in the Middle East and North Africa the joint military exercises between the Egyptian regime and U.S. imperialism arouse the anxiety of Muslim peoples and progressive circles in the area. The United States is using Egypt as a safe and reliable base to confront the revolutionary Islamic movement in this strategic part of the world. The preparation of the ground for the return of the Mubarak regime to the Arab world with the help of pawns such as Shah Husayn of Jordan and the criminal Saddam is part of this wide-scale plot.

The strengthening of the Egyptian regime's military power and supplying the Egyptian army with sophisticated weapons and equipment and increasing the fighting ability of the Egyptian forces are all taking place in circumstances in which Egypt is returning to the Arab political arena and the threat of the expansion of the Camp David policy is greater than at any other time in the past.

It is quite clear that the strengthening of the Egyptian regime's military power and the fall of more reactionary Arab regimes into the Camp David quagmire does not displease the Zionist occupiers--on the contrary, they approve of it. There is a fact that cannot be ignored: An increase in the knowledge of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force of the situation in the region

serves the aggressor Zionist forces. Obtaining reliable information on-site about the Egyptian coast and the maneuvering capability of the Egyptian army is one of the most important results of the Egyptian-U.S. joint exercises--a result that is incorporated in the plans for Zionist aggression. The exchange of military and secret information between the United States and Zionist entity is well-known to all. It should not be forgotten that the U.S. 6th Fleet is not thinking of occupying the Egyptian coast for a short time and only for the duration of the Mubarak administration. As the most important Muslim country, Egypt has become a principal source of anxiety for the United States. The ruling authorities in Egypt, which believe that their survival is closely linked with the strengthening of their ties with the United States and the Zionist entity, want to be fully prepared to suppress Islamic and revolutionary movements--not only in Egypt but throughout the region.

The structure of the forces participating in the Sea Breeze exercises and the presence of aircraft equipped with FSB radar and the intention of the United States to supply Egypt with four of these aircraft as part of its military aid to the Egyptian regime all indicate that the danger of these joint air and sea exercises is much greater than previously expected. Some diplomatic sources believe that the exercises serve as a warning to Libya. While such a conclusion may be based on some facts, it is clear that the threat of such Egyptian-U.S. joint military exercises is not directed against Libya alone, for all the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, with the exception of the Zionist entity, are threatened by such exercises.

It is the revolutionary Islamic movement, which opposes the reactionary policies that are linked with the international oppressors, that really worries the United States. Hence, the suppression of the revolutionary Islamic movement is a priority for the criminal United States. The supportive reaction of the Zionist entity to supplying the Mubarak regime with modern weapons and equipment confirms this theory. The Egyptian regime has gained some experience in suppressing revolutionary Islamic movements in Egypt and Sudan. Undoubtedly, the international oppressors and world Zionism will charge the Egyptian regime with the task of suppressing Islamic and similar revolutionary movements throughout the countries of North Africa and the Middle East. Hence the need to strengthen the military might of the Mubarak regime in order to expedite the implementation of this important task. Moreover, the aim of the joint military exercises is also to prepare for joint action in critical circumstances when the Egyptian regime is not able to carry out on its own the tasks assigned to it.

The ground and sea exercises held in the past had to a certain extent given the Egyptian regime such an ability, and consequently preparations were made for the Sea Breeze exercises in order to increase the capability of the Egyptian forces at sea and in the air. During the joint exercises in the U.S. 6th Fleet would acquaint itself with the preparedness of the Egyptian naval force and test in the field the geographical conditions in the area.

All these matters are of importance. The Egyptian defense minister has frankly said that the interests which the Egyptian forces will be achieving in these exercises cannot be assessed. There is no doubt that U.S. military officials view similarly the benefits of the Sea Breeze joint exercises. The Muslim Egyptian people and other Muslims in North Africa and the Middle East are the only party that do not see any interests being served by these exercises. Indeed, they feel the threat. The joint sea and air exercises between U.S. imperialism and the reactionary Egyptian regime serve the interests of the Zionist entity and reactionary regimes in the area, and are a direct threat to the Muslim peoples of the region, and indicate that the covetous United States is seeking to gain political and military acceptance for the Camp David plots in the Muslim and Arab worlds. But will the Muslim peoples of the area allow this? The joint experience of Carter, Al-Sadat, and Begin has proved the country, and there is no evidence to prevent Reagan, Husni Mubarak, and Shimon Perez from gaining a similar experience.

CSO: 4604/12

## NVOI CONDEMNS IRAN'S 'ANTI-AFGHAN' POLICY

TA291450 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian. 0000 27 Oct 84

[Unattributed commentary: "The Islamic Regime Supports Counterrevolutionary Terrorists"]

[Text] Dear compatriots: Revolutionary changes--the implementation of a land reform program and the turning over of land to toiling peasants, the workers' and toilers' achievement of their indisputable rights, and the establishment of freedom, democracy, and social justice in Afghanistan, as well as support and backing by all toiling people for the democratic and revolutionary Afghan government--have caused the wrath and anger of the imperialists and the region's reaction, including Iran's antipeople Islamic rulers.

Amid all this, the hostility of the leaders of Iran's Islamic regime toward the revolution of Afghanistan and its democratic government is particularly significant. Rulers of the Islamic Republic, who have assumed the role of the executors of world-devouring America's Satanic plan with regard to Afghanistan, are acting more impudently than others against the liberated Afghan people. In addition to inadmissible overt intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan, and in addition to widespread support for the foes of the Afghan nation, Iran's Islamic regime is also actively taking part in the dispatch of counterrevolutionary terrorists, the so-called mujahideen. The bloody hands of the leaders of Iran's Islamic regime are visible in all terrorist acts, in the massacre of innocent Muslim people, in setting fire to peasants' plantations, in the blowing up of schools, hospitals, mosques, and in the assassination of revolutionary patriotic Afghan citizens. Terrorism has been transformed into an inseparable part of the Islamic Government's policy, and is being carried out in adherence to the imperialism's general policy of terrorism.

Some time ago a group of terrorists who planted a bomb at a major international airport causing the deaths of scores of innocent people were brought to trial in Kabul's revolution court. The verdict of the court, which was endorsed by the entire Afghan people, caused annoyance and hostility to the regime's leaders and the Islamic Republic's broadcasting network. Iran's Islamic regime, whose leaders profess to rule in the name of Allah and the Koran, chose to support individuals who in return for money and weapons from America, had murdered men, women, and children.

For example, in a report on the trial of these monsters, Tehran radio called them so-called Islamic revolutionaries, thus once more exposing itself as a supporter of professional killers, of U.S. mercenaries, and of the agents of expelled Afghan feudalists and khans. Our country's political circles assess this deed by the Islamic Government and by the Islamic regime's propaganda organization as a natural phenomenon for this regime, because one cannot expect otherwise from a regime that has trampled on all the revolutionary gains of the Iranian nation and which is taking steps toward cooperation and association with U.S. imperialism.

Iran's Islamic regime, which has imposed medieval reaction and tyranny on the Iranian people, can under no circumstances reconcile itself with the deep and revolutionary changes that have been and continue to be implemented in democratic Afghanistan to the benefit of toiling Muslim people, and which serve as an example to our homeland's people. The Islamic regime is betraying the Iranian revolution and violating the gains of the revolution thus preventing the achievement of goals and aspirations, and is leading the country to an era of medieval barbarism. The Islamic regime cannot tolerate the reforms and revolutionary measures being implemented in Afghanistan for the prosperity of toiling Muslim people. Therefore, whether within the country or abroad, they have adopted a policy of terror and repression, and are giving all-out support to the terrorists.

It is no accident that Iran's Islamic regime is striving to establish friendly and cordial relations with Pakistan's American regime and with Turkey's coupist regime, a NATO member. The Iranian regime is a partner in the crimes, conspiracies, interventions, and assassinations of U.S. imperialism against the people and democratic government of Afghanistan. The only difference between the acts of U.S. imperialism and those of the Islamic regime's leaders against democratic Afghanistan is that the Islamic regime carries out its plots in an Islamic wrapping. The Iranian people condemn the anti-Afghan and terrorist policy by Iran's Islamic rulers against democratic Afghanistan.

CSO: 4640/106

# ARTICLE EXAMINES TURKEY'S DILEMMA WITH KURDS

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 20 Oct 84 p 2

[Editorial by S. Moadab]

[Text] Ankara is angry with Baghdad again. Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal expressed this unhappiness in terms of "Iraqi inability to control its borders". Following the reports that at least 17 Turkish soldiers have been killed by the Kurdish workers party (PKK) guerrillas in the remote eastern province of Hakkari, Turkish Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglou, along with Deputy Chief of Staff General Wejded Oztorun flew to Baghdad last Sunday to talk to Saddam Hussein. Immediately after this Ankara newspapers reported that Turkish troops have crossed the borders into northern Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish guerrillas. The Turkish Premier who was speaking in parliament about this report denied that Turkish forces are inside Iraq. A Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman in Ankara, Yahim Eralp said, "At the present the operation in eastern Turkey is continuing within the Turkish territory."

Whether we can believe the authorities in Ankara in a question of time, especially when we notice that Turkey's operation of last May into Iraq was acknowledged only weeks later. To the extent that we dislike seeing the forces of the southeastern flank of NATO next to our borders, Turkey wishes to move into Iraq and very close to the rich oil wells of Kirkuk and Soleimanieh. Baghdad at present is not in a position to defend its northern borders. In addition to this failure, reports reaching us reveal that talks between Baathist leaders and Jalal Talebani are stalemated. Talebani has left Baghdad for his redoubts in the mountains. Talebani goes back to the mountains while Turkish forces have arrested at least 1,415 Kurdish guerrillas in the last two months.

The latest move by Ankara indicates that despite agreements signed with Baghdad in 1978, and 1980 allowing Turkish troops to pursue Kurds inside Iraq, this policy has not benefitted Turkey. Diplomatic sources are skeptical of the objectives of the Turkish forces in their cross border operations into Iraq. Turkey is one of the most faithful members of NATO. This loyalty is not only because of its close relations with the West, it is also due to its historical fear, if not hatred, of Moscow.

Figures also show that Turkey has at least \$16b in foreign debts. At least \$2b is added to this figure each year for oil imports. Finally, if one has had an

opportunity to have a private talk with Turkish authorities, one can see how much claim Turkey has to the Iraqi oil fields in the Kurdish region of Iraq. These claims are several decades old and reach back to the time of the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire as a consequence of the First World War. If all these facts are put together and we take into consideration the fact that Baghdad does not control its northern borders with Turkey we cannot be very happy to hear the Turkish Prime Minister talk of "utmost seriousness and determination."

One may be diplomatically polite and close his eyes to the foreign policy of Ankara seasoned with military operations inside another country's territory. But what if this unlucky country, which is the target of forces of a NATO member country, is Iraq? Maybe Turkey is not to be blamed because the central government in Baghdad is not able to control its borders. But one can definitely not criticize the Islamic Republic if Ankara expects Tehran to send flowers to the Turkish generals for their new assault on Iraq and Tehran refuses.

Fortunately ties between Tehran and Ankara are cordial. This cordiality may seem strange to some people who do not understand how an anti-American capital can have good relations with an extremely pro-American city like Ankara. Luckily independence in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic permits Tehran to strengthen ties with Turkey due to its conviction that good relations with its neighbors is a must. Both countries have reasons to be satisfied with these ties.

Being aware of the importance of ties with Tehran the Turks have been sensitive any time there has been the possibility of a misunderstanding. In relation to the new Turkish venture in northern Iraq, or in eastern Turkey, respecting good mutual relations, one can be critical of Turkish intentions in its second military operation into Iraq in 17 months. Being a revolutionary country, which is a prime target for western conspiracies, the Islamic Republic of Iran is naturally apprehensive when it sees NATO forces moving next door. This anxiety must be expressed in strong diplomatic terms for Ankara by the Iranian authorities.

A lesson we can draw from this new Turkish military initiative is that Baghdad is getting progressively weaker. How can one foresee the future of a falling tyrant like Saddam Hussein who now needs foreign forces to come and control the borders of Iraq? Whether Turkish forces are fighting eastern Turkey or northern Iraq, politicians in Ankara must know that their closeness to northern Iraq has a limit beyond which they will be in the neighborhood of a revolutionary country. This must be taken into account.

CSO: 4600/67

# HASHEMI-RAFSANJANI DISCUSSES OIL PRICES

GF091508 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1100 GMT 9 Nov 84

[Friday Arabic sermon by Iranian Majlis Speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani and ad interim Friday imam, at Tehran University--recorded]

[Excerpts] In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Greetings to all the Muslim brothers and sisters in the world. The issue of oil and OPEC, during the past 2 weeks, can be a lesson for the Islamic oil-producing countries and a way to realize the nature of the capitalist world and its plots. We can benefit from this simple experience in order to serve the interests of the Third World in its confrontation with the imperialist powers.

What is important in this experience is that all participated in the plan of the East and the West in order to plunder the wealth of the Third World with the intent to defeat them through the channels that we possess.

[sentence as heard] Sometime ago the Russians began to reduce the price of their exported oil without any reason. Afterward, the Western owners of North Sea oil also reduced the price of their oil by \$1.50 per barrel.

A short review of this issue will show the subservience of those who call for a price reduction and the service they render to the enemies who are plundering our oil wealth. All of us understand the significance of the service which has been rendered by the Islamic revolution in Iran which has strived to increase oil prices from \$12 to \$35 per barrel, a point which is considered the reason for the hostility of imperialism to Islam and to the Islamic revolution. They often claim that poor countries cannot buy oil at high prices, they trying to deceive simple people.

In fact, OPEC cannot--by offering aid--compensate for this sum of money cost by the poor countries. However, these countries consume a very small amount of oil. Industrialized countries are the main and biggest consumers. It is often deduced that the drop in oil prices will lead to a drop in the prices of industrialized products, which are exported to the Third World, and to a drop in the inflation level. However, we saw in the past that industrialized countries did not decrease the prices of their products nor did the price of oil sold to consumers in industrialized countries drop. The result was that imperialist countries and oil companies reaped big profits from the drop in oil prices.

At any rate, it is pleasing that this time most of the OPEC countries cooperated to fight the conspiracy and maintain prices by decreasing production by 1.5 million barrels per day. This awareness is worthy of appreciation. Here I name Saudi Arabia before anyone else because it is playing an important role in this regard. We are not yet satisfied with this. We suggested that prices should be increased by (?perseverance) and resistance because we are convinced that if we sell less oil, we will have big profits despite the small production. Furthermore, we can prevent the unlimited consumption of this valuable material which is being used as a cheap source of energy by maintaining the real price of oil then, this courageous initiative will serve humanity and we will conserve the right of future generations in our countries and keep for them the right to profit from this material.

At the same time, we will be able to use a portion of oil revenues as aid to the poor Muslim countries and the Third World countries which are often harmed as a result of the price increase. "In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Say he is God, the one, God the independent and besought of all, he who begets not, nor is begotten and there is none like unto him" [Koranic verse] God's peace and mercy be upon you.

CSO: 4604/15

INDIA, IRAN CONSIDERING TRADE EXPANSION IN NEW CONTRACT

Tehran BURS in Persian 10 Sep 84 pp 8,2

[Article entitled: "Commercial Relations Between Iran and India Are Expanding Daily"]

[Text] Iran is considered one of India's important commercial partners in Asia and Oceania. Over the past years, commercial transactions have increased appreciably. Trade in the year 1982-83 amounted to 8,567,000 rupees; and in the first half of 1983-84 to 5,103,000 rupees.

India's imports from Iran in the year 1980-81 amounted to an unprecedented 13,889,000 rupees, whereas in the year 1981-82 the amount was 12,982,000 rupees; in 1982-83, 7,826,000 rupees and in the first 6 months of 1983-84 the amount was 4,512,000 rupees. Iran's exports to India consist of oil, crude oil, oil byproducts, unprocessed fertilizer, mineral and vegetable matter. India's exports to Iran in 1975-76 reached their highest level of 2,720,000 rupees. In 1981-82, Indian exports amounted to 1,250,000 rupees; in 1982-83, to 7,410,000 rupees; and in the first half of 1983-84, to 591,000,000 rupees. In spite of fluctuations in the level of exports, Iran with a population of 35 to 40 millions, is the largest of the oil-producing countries of the Middle East and still a potential market for Indian products. Major Indian exports to Iran consist of machinery, means of transportation, yarn for textiles, textiles, manufactured goods, tea, rice, meat, spices, chemicals, leather, leather goods as well as iron and steel products. New articles added to the list of Indian exports consist of Jeeps and spare parts, diesel motors, road graders, aluminum, electrical transmission lines, railway lines and accessories, crankshafts, athletic equipment, etc. It is to be noted that engineering products form the major portion of Indian exports to Iran. From 1966-1968, Indian exports of engineering products amounted to approximately 325 million rupees and in the year 1982 reached 550 million rupees. It is expected that in the current year, these exports will exceed 700 million rupees.

In addition to commercial transactions, Iran and India undertake joint industrial projects as well. The Indo-Iranian Shipping Company has played an important part in facilitating commercial matters between the two countries. An agreement has been signed between Toolie Part and Escort Limited Company of India for the construction of factories to aid production. The Iranian company is also in contact with the Machinery Manufacturing Company of India

for the completion of an agreement regarding the supply of needed machinery for certain projects. The National Petrochemical Company of Iran has signed an agreement with the Indian Engineers Company for technical cooperation and the dispatch of experts with the objective of expanding the refinery project of Shiraz. The Iranian company has also asked the India Engineers Company to cooperate in providing advisory help in regard to the lead smelting project in Zanjan. The Kamani Company of India has started work on a project in northern Iran and has proposed the establishment in Avanagan of a factory for the construction of electric transmission towers. The same company is at present supplying needed items such as transmission towers, wind barriers, etc. to a project in the province of Khorassan. Under a recent agreement, the company will supply transmission towers, barriers and other needed items to a project underway in Azerbaijan. The (Metro) Exporting Company of India has signed an agreement with the Iran Rekab Company for building a bicycle manufacturing company in Esfahan. The (Bajaj) Company of India has submitted to the Bank for Industrial and Mine Development a proposal for the production and assembling of scooters by the (Tizru) Company of Iran. In addition, the Engineering Advisors' Company of (Tata) and the Best Crumpton Company are active in Iran in connection with providing services for projects underway in Iran.

According to the directives of the meeting held in New Delhi in Ordibehesht [21 April-21 May] of this year following fruitful commercial talks, trade relations, industrial cooperation and technological advances between the two countries aimed at joint progress and development were further strengthened. Iran and India agreed to study the possibility of increasing nonoil exports from Iran; the two countries agreed as well on the possibility of exporting to Iran various agricultural produce, engineering products, chemicals, drugs, dye, leather and textiles. The Iranians expressed their interest in expanding nonoil exports and chose as imports red oxide, dried fruits, pine nuts, marble, dates, medicinal herbs and melamine manufacturing machinery. In regard to heavy industry, the two countries decided that greater opportunity for cooperation exists in the field of the transfer of technology in various industries as was proposed earlier and in other areas as well; this includes cooperation with Mahindra and Mahindra Company; the Bharat Heavy Electrical Industries; the (Krilo Sakar) and the (Bajaj) Company for the production of Jeeps, electric transmission lines, machinery, scooters and auxiliary parts. In regard to textile industries, the two sides agreed to work jointly to reconstruct and activate certain textile factories in Iran and also to cooperate concerning the exchange of technology pertaining to certain acceptable textile machinery trademarks, technical aid and the exchange of technicians and the training of Iranian personnel in India or Iran. In regard to small-scale industries, Iran and India are of the view that a vast potential for increasing cooperation and the exchange of technical knowledge and experience exists concerning the planning and construction of industrial parks, cottage industries in rural areas, the transfer of technology and cooperation in the manufacture of agricultural implements in rural areas, the carrying out of industrial and agricultural projects, advisory services and the training and exchange of technicians. In regard to railways, both sides agreed to cooperate in various fields; and the Government Railways of Iran and the Ministry of Heavy Industry are to work in cooperation with Indian companies such as the Railway Construction Company of India, Technical and Economic Services Company of the Indian Railways, and the Planning and Equipment Company.

At present, trade relations between India and Iran are based on the commercial agreement signed on 31 August 1974. The two countries agreed to replace this agreement with another which is under study. Until a new agreement is finalized, the present agreement will remain in force. The establishment of a joint Indo-Iranian commission in Tir 1362 [22 June-22 July 1983] is regarded as opening a fresh chapter in the economic and commercial relations between the two countries. The Joint Commission for developing industrial and technical co-operation between India and Iran has drawn up the organizational framework. Recently, the Government of Iran requested Indian authorities to approve the establishment of a commercial office in India. The matter has been approved in principle and the Government of Iran will be presenting a detailed proposal in this regard to the Government of India. The two governments have also decided to facilitate travel by businessmen.

India's participation in the Ninth International Exhibition in Tehran in the months of Shahrivar [23 August-22 September] and Tir 1362, provided a good opportunity to Indian businessmen to see Iran and study conditions there. Indian companies that took part in the exhibition were able to negotiate valuable contracts with Iranian companies.

This year, India is taking part in the international exhibition in Tehran on a much greater scale. More than 60 progressive government and private companies will display their extensive array of industrial and commercial products in an exhibition area covering 1,237 square meters. The products on display will range over a wide category and include compressors, generators, diesel motors, refrigerators, machinery, grading machinery, dumpers, tractors, agricultural machinery, various kinds of balers, water purification plants, textile machinery, wheelchair bases, automated segments, batteries, bicycles and bicycle parts, castiron pipes, electrical connectors, hand tools, metal utensils, chemicals, plastic and leather goods, various kinds of watches, lamps, flasks, pumps, disinfectants, soaps, lined and decorated glass, cotton textiles, yarn, silk and synthetic cloth, clothing, books, spectacle cases, etc.

India's participation in this exhibition points to the ever-increasing industrial and technical potentialities as well as the vast array of Indian exports covering various fields.

It is also expected that India's participation in the exhibition will prove beneficial in solidifying economic and commercial matters between the two countries in regard to reconstruction and development.

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SPECIAL REPORT ON INTERNAL AFFAIRS, WAR, OPPOSITION, SUCCESSION

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 395, 15 Sep 84 pp 29-33

[Article by As'ad Haydar]

[Text] A strange calm has enveloped Tehran this summer of 1984. The Tehran that we knew several years ago is no longer a boiling caldron of revolution. It is like a soldier who has performed his duty to the flag and returned home where he is concerned with his private affairs and worries because floodwaters poured into his house during his absence.

This calm seems odd to officials, spiritual leaders, and observers who wonder whether it is the calm before a storm or the relaxation of the warrior or the indifference of the miserable.

Everyone has the same answer: "Everything is calm here because the real boiling is at the front with the Iraq. The caldron of war has consumed everything. Mobilization, battle, and death are there, while here the struggle is of a different kind. It goes on day after day but inside halls and rooms bare of everything except rugs which are stepped on only by bare feet."

However normal and calm the signs of life in Tehran may be, the war that is taking place a thousand kilometers from here has penetrated the skin of every citizen and every single dwelling.

The first effects of the war appear closely in the daily lives of the Tehranis. Even if we cannot distinguish the routine details of their lives, a knowledge of the price of the dollar in the black market provides a clear picture of something. While the dollar jumps a few centimes every day elsewhere in the world, in Tehran it flies several riyals at a time.

The official exchange rate is 990 tomans for \$100. In the black market, however, it jumps to 5,400 tomans for \$100. After 15 days of stability, it was worth 6,200 tomans, that is, a difference of 800 tomans. This is all reflected day after day in the prices of goods, for, despite the efforts made to improve agriculture, which sank very low because of the so-called "white revolution" in the time of the shah whom the revolution overthrew, the young republic is still importing from abroad its food requirements in large quantities, naturally at the official dollar price. The state is trying to lighten the burden of this inflation on the citizens through cooperatives, but desires are one thing and long lines are another.

Tehran is calm but its behavior and habits have changed. It no longer seems to be the Tehran I once knew; and daily Islamic fanaticism which I knew tangibly and to my shame at the beginning of the revolution has become a "chador" enveloping the entire city. Dressing up is forbidden for people everywhere. Islamic garb is compulsory for women. Women wear the Islamic garb (it covers the entire head without permitting a lock of hair to show). It is also long and covers the body. Women are not allowed to enter any official building or even a public place. In a word, they are forbidden to walk in the streets of the capital. As for the chador, until further notice a woman still has the choice of whether to wear it or not. This strictness is tied to a number of religious and political stands, which will be discussed later.

The prohibition against ornamentation of buildings has been extended to the magnificent shops that Tehran once boasted of that are either closed or half-open.

Even the names of the streets in the capital have been changed on occasions. For example, Mosaddeq Street recently became Vali al-'Asr Street. As for the restaurants, some are closed or offer only the familiar Iranian dishes and you will no longer find dishes made with alcohol. All of this suggests a large social class or section has receded or pulled back into its shell and you look for another class that has taken its place but don't find it; for the change that has taken place in Tehran was not on the basis of removing one social section in the interest of some other one but rather on the basis of what this change imposes according to the bases of a society resting on a fundamentalist Islamic ideology.

Tehran streets too are quiet and the "demonstrations by millions of people" who used to walk in them are absent. The loud cries of "Allah is great, Khomeyni is our leader" and "the Islamic republic is neither Eastern nor Western," etc. have become slogans written in a wide and beautiful Farsi or occasionally Arabic handwriting on every wall in Tehran. From time to time there are demonstrations of a new kind. Tehran is still able to contrive new forms of expression, for example, demonstrations by motorcycle riders. Suddenly a street is filled with hundreds of motorcycle riders shouting the well-known cries. They stop only to warn some man or woman who is violating the basic principles of the revolution with respect to clothing, action, or practice. You ask those who know them whether the revolution has lost its ability to organize "demonstrations by millions of people," some, not many, will answer yes, while others will say to you: "Why on earth should there be demonstrations by millions of people?" The revolution no longer needs to voice what it wants. A word from Imam Khomeyni and the thing is done. The true demonstrations are at the front, in the villages and cities whose houses are open to tens of thousands of fighters. The motorcycle demonstrations are something else again. They are important in another connection.

In Tehran, there is no military presence. It is as though the war were taking place in other countries. There is no mobilization, no activities, no trucks or tanks. Even the military barracks that used to surround the capital have begun to disappear. The revolution and the army are opponents who do not agree and instead of soldiers in the army who had absolute and unlimited power, you find the men of the Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) have become, as was to

be expected, the army of the revolution. They are everywhere. They are responsible for the day-to-day protection of the revolution inside the country and at the front. But the war in Tehran is in the souls (of the people). It is boiling in officials and citizens. It is the site of a critical struggle, the war creates a clear daily bottleneck.

The war is a bottleneck, everyone knows that. The more talk there is of the expected offensive and the preparations being made for it, the more evident it is how big a bottleneck the war has become. The military offensive at the front, is translated in Tehran, as the exit from war. The war has destroyed everything, consuming the lives of tens of thousands of youths who fell-- regardless of the differences of opinion concerning the meaning of the war-- by their own desire and in full awareness of what they were getting into under the slogan of "martyrdom." To find a way out of the war by military or diplomatic means is difficult, for it is not an easy matter as the regime is finding out before a situation in which more than half a million fighting men have massed for many months under a broiling sun with an air temperature of over 50°C in many places along the front and it is unable to make a decision. All of this came about because after the first shots, the war turned into a central issue whose consequences will decide the future of the revolution and of the parties involved. As a diplomat who spent many years in Tehran says: "The war has turned into a domestic political game increasing in confusion going beyond the entanglements and the 'ins and outs' of a critical situation. The struggle over the war has recently become as much ideological as military and political. Ideological in the sense that those who want to stop this war argue that defense is legitimate and necessary. Now that the Iraqis have been driven out of Iranian territory, there is no need to continue the war. Those who want the war to go on say it is neither aggressive nor defensive, it is for the sake of Islam. Hence, attack and defense here are equal. Imam Khomeyni decided in a speech that the matter is ideological, thereby favoring the second group. Another legal battle then broke out. It is of ancient origin but has resurfaced. Every time hundreds of youth fell seeking death (for example, when crossing mine fields to explode them), they did so of their own accord. Martyrdom is a duty but the manner of achieving it is the pivot of the debate. The Great Ayatollah Montazeri, the expected successor to Imam Khomeyni, said: "Imam Hoseyn did not go to Karbala' to die as a martyr. Rather, he went to fight and when martyrdom beckoned him, he welcomed and accepted it, ready and content. This conclusion conflicts with the other view and says Imam Hoseyn went to Karbala' to die as a martyr, and he died as a martyr. The interpretation of this legal dispute about the battlefield is that Ayatollah Montazeri rejects voluntary martyrdom, for example, by crossing mine fields, and he demands fighting first and martyrdom second, while the second group favors the other tactic. Will the issue be resolved and in whose favor? It appears that in his last statement Imam Khomeyni accepted the first view militarily but not legally in the sense that he did not agree with the legal explanation of the martyrdom of Imam Hoseyn, but he accepted the statement that "It is up to the military leaders to change their previous military tactics" in any future battle.

As for the military, it is no longer a secret that the Iranian Army commanders have refused and clearly objected to any offensive in the light of the present

realities. At the beginning of summer, Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani, the strong man in Iran and a representative of the imam on the military defense committee, met with a delegation from the Iranian command. They spoke very frankly to Rafsanjani, laying out before him, naturally with figures, the military situation, possibilities of victory and defeat, and number of potential casualties, which they estimated would be very high. At the end of the meeting, they asked that the political leaders assume the responsibility--and in writing--for issuing any order for a military offensive. In turn, they would do their utmost to carry it out. As a result of this meeting and other developments, the awaited major offensive was postponed month after month.

Politically, for many months the Iranian leadership has clearly sensed the trend of the international will has started to turn. This leadership has become aware that Iran will be prevented from achieving victory in any war with Iraq just as it will be saved from defeat. The reason is that an Iranian victory would expose the Gulf region to foreseeable and unforeseeable possibilities, some of them a source of danger to the map of the Middle East while others go beyond that to include the seizure of other parts of the world. An Iranian defeat is also to be prevented because it would be interpreted not only as a collapse of the Islamic revolution but also as a fragmentation of Iran and its partition, which would extend the reach of the Soviet Union and give it a portion of the country. That is why officials in their remarks and addresses talk about the "international plot."

What is the way out of this impasse?

No ready "scenario" is available because there has been no definitive word on the subject. Every party is fearful of its position and does not want to bear the responsibility and consequences of the decision, whatever its form. The one who has to decide, Imam Khomeyni, looks out from his residence at the contending forces and doesn't want his decision to favor one side over the other. From his vantage point as "guide" of the revolution, he does not intervene except to provide guidance. He does so only when the balance tips to one side or the other, specifically, when he finds the "clock has struck." However, this does not preclude the existence of a form of "scenario" that reflects the current developments. It is subject to shaping at least. This "scenario" is already being followed in some respects on the political, foreign, and domestic levels.

On the foreign level, after long preparation Iranian diplomacy, which was focused inwardly and governed by the catchword "the West and East are both satans" who do not wish the revolution well, has become active. The reception given West German Foreign Minister Genscher and the resulting "opening of a new chapter in bilateral relations" and the earlier dispatching of Sadeq Tabataba'i (Ahmad Khomeyni is married to his sister and he is also a son of Imam Musa al-Sadr's sister) to Paris and his meeting with French President Mitterrand's chief advisors in early summer are merely manifestations of the opening abroad in order to lessen the rigors of the war directed at the Islamic revolution in Tehran. They also opened up the possibilities of cooperation after the economic blockade of the country was tightened.

In the domestic sphere, a clear signal was given 3 months ago that paved the way for additional indicators. For the first time there was talk of the material losses produced by the war and the acknowledgment of them created a big commotion in all Iranian circles. The material losses amounted to \$162 billion during the war years. This unreal sum becomes truly fabulous when it is set within the framework of economic operation. That is, it represents direct losses. But if one adds to the economic calculations the interest lost by the Iranian economy had the money been invested, the same amount would be multiplied several times in every place damaged. The destroyed villages and uprooted gardens require twice the amount spent years ago when one takes into account the current international and Iranian inflation, not to mention the many long years of human effort. Add to all this the loss of human lives estimated by Western authorities at about 400,000 killed, although the directors of the Boniad-e Shahid (an institution charged with caring for the families of the dead and wounded) maintain that no more than 150,000 were killed. In any case, even if the second figure were correct, it would not diminish the magnitude of the tragedy that has befallen Iranian society. The foundation of blood in al-Zahra' cemetery perhaps epitomizes the magnitude of the tragedy and its melancholy.

When one adds to this daily talk of the losses, among the details of the scenario, talk of an "international plot" as an obstacle to victory, the lines of the scenario become clear. They are preparing Iranian public opinion for their decision at least to freeze the war because it is almost impossible to issue an order to end it without a military gain because it would necessarily have political consequences for the decision-making centers at that time. This scenario can be enacted in only one place, that is, Parliament, of which Rafsanjani is president. When that occurs, the matter will be determined by the course of internal events, which can be done by granting Rafsanjani greater political power and clear protection against the issue being raised in Parliament.

The question arises of why doesn't Rafsanjani make this decision while waiting for a suitable opportunity, especially since he is the strong man now?

The question brings us to a survey of political power and its pyramidal structure.

An observer who has been following the internal situation in Iran for many years says: "There is no longer in Iran a strong political party or organization. Even the Islamic Republic Party has become merely an ineffectual framework since it lost its leaders in the well-known bombing of the party's headquarters in which Ayatollah Beheshti was one of the most prominent victims. The result was that some individuals were transformed into power centers and each of them became a "fortress" whose strength lies in the number of individuals, the power it controls, and the support it receives. The mightiest of the "fortresses" now is undoubtedly Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani, president of Parliament. Then come some religious and political dignitaries." This convincing explanation sums up one aspect of the decision-making centers in Iran. The other aspects can be discovered by searching for the threads of power.

True, an effective party did not survive nor is there effective organized political power. The Republic Party is scattered all over. The Hojjatiyeh organization has disappeared at least from the surface of Iranian politics. The Mojahedin-e Engelab-e Islami organization led by Behzad Nabavi, which was active and effective, has shrunk in size largely because of factional differences and its leader has become simply one of the ministers. The Iranian Liberat-on movement led by Behdi Bazargan, first prime minister of the Islamic republic, has lost its role and even its leaders were not nominated as candidates in the parliamentary elections. The most prominent among them work as construction engineers. Who then remains?

Imam Khomeyni is on top of the pyramid. He makes all the decisions. Any talk of his position being weak is pure delusion or wishful thinking. He is the "guide," he is the "faqih." A word from him settles months-old disputes. All draw their strength from him. Whenever a "fortress" moves a step closer to his, the more numerous are the steps that it has to climb up the ladder of political decision.

He is amazingly skillful in controlling the struggle. He knows when to bring some one close to him and when to keep another away. He knows when to decide in order to restore the balance between the contending forces. If the decision is in favor of one "fortress" over another, it is made only for political or ideological reasons. But if the struggle was over power and decision-making, the balance must be kept.

After the imam you have to count far until you come to No 2 because there is no real No 2 in final and absolute authority. Even Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is close to the imam and is called No 2, is sometimes found far behind this number. However, this is not to deny that Rafsanjani is currently the strongest of the fortresses because he controls through Parliament legislative matters and speaks with executive authority. He is very skilled in the tactics of dominating the decision-making centers. For example, he purposely chose (he is the majority leader in Parliament) Ahmad 'Azizi, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in Parliament, which places the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under his control legislatively. When we discover that 'Azizi resigned as deputy foreign minister because he clashed with Foreign Minister Velayati, we know that Rafsanjani chose the right man in the right place to control the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When the president of the republic together with the prime minister is forced to ask Parliament for a vote of confidence, Rafsanjani also becomes a decision-maker to such a degree that the Tehranis have come to apply the following unusual phrase to the ministry: "The ministry of those considered weak has been transformed into the ministry of the weak." Moreover, Rafsanjani has the decision-making power in the defense committee. While President Khamene'i is the chairman of the committee, Rafsanjani is the imam's representative, that is, he has the right to "veto," a sharp sword over the chairman's decisions. Besides Parliament there is the council that supervises the constitution. It consists of 12 individuals, half of them religious dignitaries and the other half laymen. This body is a semiconstitutional entity because it has the right to veto legislative acts of Parliament if they are found to be in violation of the Sharia. Put another way, this council exists to block Rafsanjani's actions if it should become necessary to do so.

The religious bloc, which Imam Khomeyni himself recently criticized, largely distributes the sources of power and their locations through its many organizations and positions. The religious seminaries in Tehran and Qom have their status and locations. The rallies of religious leaders like the (Rally of the Fighting Religious Leaders), an early rally for the revolution and it fought for it, an effective rally, and the Friday prayer leaders in the cities and villages (it is worth noting that several religious dignitaries share the imamate) also carry weight. Imam Khomeyni's representatives in the ministries and institutions (as well as in the Revolutionary Guard) have their palce and individually and collectively they form a political "fortress" within the power centers. Alongside them stands the Revolutionary Guard, a large and firmly established "fortress" from which the politicians draw strength through alliances with them (among them is Rafsanjani), for the Guard is officially the "right arm of the Velayat-e Faqih." It has almost become an organized army with bases and tough military and ideological officers. Its members are forbidden to belong to any organizational or political party, active or inactive, in Iran (Mohsen Reza'i, leader of the Revolutionary Guard, resigned as a member of the Mojahedin-e Enqelab-e Islami before he assumed the leadership of the Guard). It was and still is divided into two factions--religious and civilian, the former being the more powerful.

But in general it is an arm of the revolutionary movement in Iran. It became sufficiently powerful to have a special ministry, namely, the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard (it has no connection with the Ministry of Defense). It is directed by al-Haj Rafiq-Dust, one of its founders. He held the post of director of supply when the Guard was founded.

Finally, there is the "bazaar," the merchants, a financial and political "fortress" whose power is known to all. Imam Khomeyni understands this very well. He takes the fortress" into account in his decisions, for it finances the religious leaders through the khoms [a tax to aid widows, orphans, and beggars] and the alms tax for authority. Their alliance with Imam Khomeyni and the famous 4-months strike contributed greatly to the downfall of the shah. Imam Khomeyni's decision to ease government control on foreign trade was just to satisfy the bazaar which lost its strong representative 'Asqhar Owladi who was once proposed as prime minister.

After this extensive survey of power in Iran, a question still remains: Where does the Grand Ayatollah Hoseyn Montazeri, the likely successor to Khomeyni, stand on all of this?

A well-informed observer in Tehran says: "The Great Ayatollah Montazeri resides in Qom and Qom is a city of religious dignitaries. Those around him hold the reins of the "religious establishment" (if this term is correct). He is as far from the details of the daily decision-making as he is close to the details of the major decisions. While he has no number in the ladder of decision-makers today, he would become No 1 if Imam Khomeyni were out of the picture. It is true that he does not have the mark of leadership that Imam Khomeyni has, but he does have great influence as far as legal issues and people are concerned. Moreover, he has always been committed to the revolutionary movement while keeping aloof from government affairs.

In the light of this analysis of Montazeri's position, an Iranian intellectual who was involved in Iran projecting the revolution and still is, says: "To talk about Iran in Western or Marxist terms continues to be a mistake that leads to faulty conclusions. The trend called 'progressive' (in the Western or Marxist sense) is not 'progressive' in all spheres. It is like the teeth of a saw. You see it take mostly 'progressive' stands on some occasions and mostly 'reactionary' stands on others. And vice versa. For example, the motorcycle demonstrations that took place at the end of July when dozens of people were injured during scuffles over veils and ornamentation were staged not by the stern religious groups, as one might have thought at first, but by the liberal bazaar merchants who used the veil to conceal their basic demand for economic and political liberation. They have toughened their position internally to greatly strengthen their demands on foreign matters." The Iranian intellectual adds: "There is still a struggle going on in the Islamic revolution in Iran between the government and the revolutionary elements, that is, between those concerned with Iranian internal problems after the downfall of the shah and the rise of the republic and those who want to export the revolution abroad. It is common knowledge that Ayatollah Montazeri is the leader of the revolutionary elements." And in a reference to what he said earlier, he added: "Our survey reflects a peculiarly Iranian quality. For example, the revolutionary elements, contrary to the general belief, want to stop the war, not continue it. How come? Because Montazeri found that the war is being waged at the expense of the revolutionary elements who owing to their enthusiasm and commitment make up most of the casualties, while the other elements take part from afar and when they do take direct part, they do so with a calculation and knowledge of some of the repercussions. Suffice it to say that Rafsanjani acquired his power not only by the excellent tactics he uses in his alliances but from his understanding of the mechanics of this struggle and keeping a firm hold at the middle of all the currents so that he appears to be a government man who is opening to the West. Thus, he welcomes West German Foreign Minister Genscher and speaks to him about a special understanding regarding export of the revolution and about his lack of 'desire to invade Iraqi territory because it is not worth killing a Muslim for it.' He himself is allied with Montazeri and calls for a permanent Islamic revolution."

This is the Iran of power. But where is the opposition in this survey? Looking at Iran from within is not (the same as) looking at it from without. The opposition makes a lot of noise abroad. As for its presence in the country, it is nonexistent or at least invisible. In either case, it means that it is ineffectual. The activity of the Mojaheddin-e Sha'b, which is the strongest and fiercest of the resistance forces to such an extent that they were called the "hypocrites" and are even not referred to by name, vanished after their opposition was dealt with by arms. This resulted from the heavy and painful flows dealt by the authorities to its individual members either by direct confrontation or by executions. Whether and how they will move depends on their activity now. Whatever their size and influence, they have to work underground and in absolute secrecy because the price of discovery is death.

As for the royalists, they are nonexistent and their support by opponents of the religious leaders, such as it is, has not reached the point of a commitment to them. The discovery of three attempts at a coup, including the one known as the Nujeh coup, was a severe blow to them, especially since 300 of their leaders were executed, Revolutionary Guard sources say. An attempted coup by army officers, particularly officers of the Royal Guard, resulted in their suffering heavy losses. The third coup was directed by General Oveysi in behalf of the shah's son (the general was killed last March). The Ranjbaran Party (the Kadihun), a rightist group, also was destroyed following the arrest and trial of about 60 of its leaders.

The resistance forces, rightist and leftist, have all been crushed like the royalists. The leftist parties such as the Bikareh organization was crushed with 246 members killed out of 382 arrested. In addition, 70 of its new members were recently arrested. The Ashraf Dehqani group, which split off from the Feda'iyeh Sha'b has also suffered--83 out of 143 arrested were executed. It was not long before the Feda'iyeh Sha'b itself, which supported the revolution in the beginning, was similarly dealt with. Finally, the Arman-e Mostaz'efin too was hit and 30 of its leaders (who admitted cooperating with the Mojadhedin-e Khalq) were arrested.

Does this mean that the Islamic Republic regime meets with no opposition?

To accept this would be a faulty oversimplification. However, it is fair to say that the revolution in Iran succeeded in strengthening the roots of the Islamic republic by force after it was able to deal hard and sometimes crushing blows, that the sphere of action by the opposition, rightist and leftist, is at least underground, and that the time has not yet arrived for the birth of an opposition capable of counteraction.

Tehran, Summer of 1984, Calm

The sudden absence of Imam Khomeyni (the day it was announced in the West that the imam was very sick, he met for a long time with an Arab ambassador) or a decision to end the war will again place Iran over a blazing hot caldron. The outlines of its consequence are still far from clear-cut.

5214

CSO: 4604/5

CLANDESTINE RADIO REPORTS ON TABRIZ, MASHHAD EXPLOSIONS

GF111814 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 GMT 11 Nov 84

[Text] Armed strugglers seeking to establish national sovereignty damaged two banks in explosions in Tabriz last night as a form of ultimatum to the regime of the Islamic Republic. The first explosion was at the Tejarat Bank on Shams-e Tabrizi Avenue, while the second occurred at the Mellat Bank in Mansuri Crossing.

The armed strugglers announced that these were solely a warning to the regime of the Islamic Republic to let them know that Tabriz is a heroic city and a forerunner of freedom and that the first flames of national uprising and all out struggle will come from Tabriz. The nationalist strugglers announced that the explosions occurred when the banks were empty of all employees. They stressed that the explosions in Tabriz last night are the start of an expanded battle against the dictatorial and [word indistinct] regime of the Islamic Republic.

Following an attack against Mashhad airport by armed strugglers, all flights to the city's airport have been canceled. Our correspondent reports that a group of armed strugglers in a clandestine attack against Mashhad airport annihilated a number of the guards of Khomeyni's regime and caused some damage to the airport. Following this event, the details of which are not clear, the National Iranian Airlines in a statement issued today canceled all flights from Shiraz, Esfahan, Bandar 'abbas, Yazd, Zahedan, Bushehr, and Kerman to Mashhad. The announcement attributed the cancelation to technical reasons stating that there would be no more flights to Mashhad until further notice. The statement explained the reason as repair of the airport's runway and did not make any mention of the attack against the city's airport.

CSO: 4640/115

OPPOSITION PAPER: THEFT OF RECONSTRUCTION FUNDS

GF310858 London KEYHAN in Persian 25 Oct 84 p 1

[Text] According to a spokesman for the Ahvaz prosecutor's office, the acting head, deputy, and accountant of the headquarters for the reconstruction and development of the Islamic revolution housing foundation of Susangerd have been arrested and temporarily imprisoned for embezzlement of millions of tumans belonging to the headquarters. The arrested individuals have claimed that they opened an account with the help of the managing director of Bonyan-e Eslami Company around 2 years ago and by juggling the books managed to embezzle millions of tumans from the budget for reconstruction of the city. Ayatollah [title as published] 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Majlis speaker, is one of the major shareholders of the referent construction company, which was registered on 1 May 1982, according to official publications of the country. According to the spokesman for the prosecutor's officer, "judicial reasons" are the cause for not announcing the names of those arrested. Tehran KEYHAN was also forced to delete the names moments before it went to print on 17 October.

According to observers in Tehran, the revelation of embezzlement in Susangerd may be the start of new investigations on the way the budget for reconstruction of war-stricken areas is being spent. There are many rumors about extensive mismanagement in this field but it is the first time that a group of people have been imprisoned for this.

CSO: 4640/107

## POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN REGIME ASSESSED BY IRANIAN ACADEMIC

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT &amp; MEMO in English No 26, 15 Oct 84 pp 3-6

[Article by F. Farnik: "In Iran, the Power Struggle Continues"]

## [Text]

Most observers of the Iranian revolution of 1979 see it as an event with many novelties. Perhaps the most important was that it involved levels of mass participation that have had few parallels. Ironically, despite, or perhaps because of, its overtly participatory nature, it also gave rise, in a very short period, to glaring disparities between the expectations of its supporters and the results. Among sectors of society like the national ethnic minorities (Kurds, Turkmans), secular women or intellectuals, the reality of revolution came immediately as the new regime started to curtail their rights.

The reasons for such rapid disillusionment can, of course, be found in the mosaic nature of the social movement that overthrew the Pahlavi Dynasty. Like most revolutionary movements, it was made up of a wide-ranging alliance of social groups, drawing its support from dissident sections of the civil service and trading communities, and from much of the poor urban population. Their cooperation was relatively easy given the common enemy they found in the dictatorial political regime of the Shah. However, once the common enemy was gone, a power struggle broke out among the divergent interests involved, that led to the well-known ascendancy of fundamentalist clergy — and the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) — to power.

The human costs of this power struggle were very high. The massive political repression that ensued effectively disintegrated or forced into exile middle-of-the-road political forces such as the National Front and the Freedom Movement (*Nehzat-e Azadi*), headed by the former prime minister, Mehdi Bazar-gan. It even forced into exile the first president of the Islamic Republic, Bani Sadr, and his supporters. More brutal has been the way the regime has dealt

with national and ethnic minorities (such as the Kurds) and leftist (both secular and Islamic) organisations, such as the *Mujahedin* (Islamic dissidents from the left), who lost thousands of militants in a bloody wave of killings.

What is important to note is that the regime has been able, through brute repression, to subdue and demoralise resistance from most organised groupings in Iranian society. The most obvious manifestation of this submission has been the fact that the regime has been able to dismantle the resistance inside Iran and force most opposition leaders and their active supporters into exile.

**Three strands of opposition**

Essentially, the exiled opposition can be divided into three distinct groupings — although at times some of them have tried to coalesce to form a more united force. The royalist opposition clearly aspires to the return of the monarchy. If they have any support inside Iran, it comes from the top ten per cent of the income scale. The bankruptcy of the royalist position is most apparent in its acceptance of amazing conspiracy theories about why the revolution succeeded and why the US wanted to overthrow the Shah's regime. In short, their position boils down to a long-standing belief, quite common among many middle and upper-class circles, that the revolution, like other political events in Iran, was caused by foreigners for one reason or another, and that only foreigners will overthrow Khomeini's regime.

The lack of analysis of internal events and the lack of understanding of the importance of Islam in the revolutionary process are the source of their isolation from the majority of the Iranian population.

This is despite the fact that the deceased Shah may have become slightly more popular in the last year or so, as the repressive tactics of Khomeini's regime have continued. Walking around the streets of Tehran in recent months, one has heard many discussions about "him" — the Shah is still never mentioned by name. These references to the Shah, usually coupled with invocations to God "to save his soul", are striking in their praise of a man who, until recently, was generally reviled.

The second opposition grouping is composed of those current and individual politicians who originally considered themselves part of the post-revolutionary alliance but were subsequently driven out. Inside Iran they are mostly known to have liberal tendencies (both secular or Islamic). While they have not cooperated with each other in an effective manner, they all see themselves essentially to have been betrayed by the fundamentalist and repressive turn that was instigated by the Islamic Republican Party. Out of this group, Bazargan is still in Iran. He has been allowed to circulate leaflets discussing the excesses of the Islamic regime. However, his prestige has been badly tarnished inside Iran, as many of his original supporters consider him to be responsible for opening the door for the religious zealots to take over.

Many argue that the compromises Bazargan made with the IRP when he was the prime minister of the interim government legitimised the political role of the Islamic clergy. Many secular people would have rejected these compromises, without the leadership of such people as Bazargan and Sanjabi (another prominent National Front leader who cooperated with the regime in the early stages by becoming the Iranian ambassador to Washington).

Bani Sadr — the first president of the Republic, now exiled in Paris — has an even more tarnished reputation inside Iran since he personally contributed to the perpetuation of the Islamic regime. He even tried to justify some of the strict Islamic dress codes for women that were being suggested during his time in office. Bani Sadr has become increasingly isolated since his attempted coalition with the leftist Mujahedin started to fall apart because of political disagreements.

The person that has created some interest among liberal circles in Iran has been Admiral Madani — commander of the Iranian navy during the early post-revolutionary period. He is one of the few leaders whose association with the Islamic regime has not discredited him among his original supporters; although he has a very bad reputation among leftists who credit him with the bombing of Khoramshahr Harbour to still opposition in the early post-revolutionary period.

In a recent interview with the BBC, Madani claimed to have been contacted by influential sources within the regime to return to Iran. These influential sources reportedly include important merchants from Tehran's Bazaar — the financial backbone of the revolutionary movement. This has made many of Madani's supporters inside Iran quite apprehensive. They think that the regime might be scheming to use Madani to legitimise its own monopoly of state power — the same way Bazargan was used.

On the whole, the royalist and liberal exiled opposition do not seem to enjoy widespread support in Iran even among the upper strata of society. Their petty bickerings and disagreements are seen as yet another example of how removed they are from the realities of post-revolutionary Iranian society.

The third grouping among opposition forces — the left — has had better luck in maintaining a foothold inside Iran. This is due to the Mujahedin — an Islamic organisation with strong egalitarian and socialist tendencies. Unlike the other two groupings, the support for the Mujahedin comes from the same classes that support the clergy — the working and lower middle classes, especially bazaar families. The Mujahedin under the leadership of Massoud Rajavi, who is also living in Paris, see themselves as involved in an armed action against the repressive apparatus of the regime.

This is considered to be the second phase of their general resistance to the regime. The first revealed the dictatorial nature of the regime, while the third will consist of popular resistance in the form of strikes and other civil action. The Mujahedin claim to have killed over a 1,000 members of the state security forces in the latter part of 1982 alone — 27 of which were commanders of the Revolutionary Guards' units. According to Rajavi, the organisation assassinated over 2,000 top political and religious leaders of the regime between June 1981, when they went underground completely, and October 1982.

Despite their relative success, the toll the Mujahedin have paid in terms of lives lost has been extremely high. The estimates run into thousands. Rajavi himself has estimated that up to 20,000 members and sympathisers have been killed since June 1981. This is apart from another 40,000 who have faced appalling conditions in prison.

The brutality with which the regime has reacted to the Mujahedin's activities has been one of the reasons for their decline inside Iran (although they are far from disappearing yet). The exiled Mujahedin leadership has also engaged in certain actions which have provoked controversy within the Iranian opposition as a whole. They justified, for example, the meeting between Rajavi and the Iraqi prime minister, Tariq Aziz (January 1983), on the basis of their

desire for peace. Nevertheless, they were criticised widely. The criticism has become more severe since the Iraqis reportedly abandoned their initial promise to the Mujahedin to halt attacks on civilian targets inside Iran once the war flared up again in February 1983.

### **Opposition abroad seen as weak**

Inside Iran, one can sense a general feeling of the weakness of the opposition abroad and the problem of finding support for the opposition at home. The reactions to different exiled opposition groupings vary among different social strata of the society.

Not surprisingly, the middle and upper echelons have a negative view of the Mujahedin and other leftist groups (especially the Tudeh Party — the Iranian communist party). They perceive them as responsible for most of the early excesses of the Islamic regime. Arguments like: "It was the influence of the Mujahedin and Tudeh Party members within government organs that led to many brutal executions", are quite common among middle-class circles. On the other hand, there is no one royalist or National Front leader who commands respect, even among their natural following — the middle class. This is despite the fact, that their ideas may be espoused by many.

In fact, there is a very curious situation in Iran. Despite the fact that the opposition is very weak organisationally, the government has had to rule by suppression. It continues to shut down newspapers, break up rival political meetings and imprison and execute people who are even remotely associated with the opposition. This is perhaps because the ruling clergy realises that, while not a single opposition group is strong, there is a kind of general feeling of opposition, which is vague and undefined, but prevalent. The leadership may feel that any kind of political opening would allow these undefined grievances to become transformed into political organisation.

The organisational weakness of opposition groupings does not connote a total lack of opposition activities however. Interestingly, many opposition viewpoints are reflected in the power struggle that has been going on within the government and the ruling party (IRP). Despite the desires of its founder, Ayatollah Beheshti, the IRP has not turned out to be a highly structured and disciplined party. In actuality, the IRP is quite loosely organised, containing many diverse elements.

While there are many variations within the party, two opposing views of Islam have dominated the conflicts within the IRP. On the one hand, there is a group, generally categorised under the title of *Hojjativeh*, who are quite moderate or perhaps even conservative on economic issues. While this group is for

vast changes in legal-cultural areas (like the judicial system), it opposes land reform and nationalisation of foreign trade on the grounds that Islam protects the rights of private property. On the other hand, there is another group, best represented by people like Behzad Nabavi, the minister of industry, whose members are eager to carry through a social revolution without alienating the clerics surrounding Khomeini. They are not as concerned with legal-cultural problems. They can be considered as radical in so far as they advocate land reform, the nationalisation of foreign trade, redistribution of wealth and stringent controls on the bazaar.

Most Iranian observers agree that, at least so far, the IRP moderates/conservatives have recorded a clear victory. They point to the way the question of land ownership was handled by the regime. Originally, despite attempts to ignore the question, pressures from outside the government (mainly the left) forced the government to deal with the question of land. After land seizures in several areas, the government had to announce its own land reform. However, after eliminating the leftist groups the government started to erode the stipulated limitations on land ownership. Khomeini's position has always been in support of private property, declaring that all confiscated land should be returned to its original owners.

The strength of the moderate/conservative position is best made clear by the actions of *Shura-yi Negahban* (Council of Guardians), a clerical body, which can veto parliamentary legislation. The reforming land tenure bill as well as bills dealing with trade nationalisation and confiscation of goods belonging to exiled Iranians, were blocked by the *Shura*.

However, the victory of the moderates so far should not be interpreted as representing the total demise of the radicals. It must be realised that while the radical faction is led predominantly by laymen and does not enjoy the support of the majority of high-ranking clerics, it carries considerable weight within the ruling circles because it is well organised, and its technocrats control many of the important ministries. It is also quite strong in the *Pasdaran* (Revolutionary Guards) who are armed and the *Jahad-e Sazandeghi* (Crusade for Constructiveness) and other revolutionary organisations. While they have been suppressed by the moderates/conservatives, these elements could take the upper hand after Khomeini's departure.

### **Regime has controlled the military**

Interestingly, the military has yet to play an important role in the power struggle that is going on in Iran. This is despite a number of reported mutinies. On the whole, the regime has effectively controlled

the military through the countervailing pressure of the irregular forces of the *Pasdaran* and the *Basij-i Mostazafin* (The Mobilisation of the Oppressed), as well as an intelligence system that permeates the entire armed forces. Most key positions are held by officers promoted after the revolution. While the opposition forces have their sympathisers within the military, this has not led to effective organisation and direction. Most Iranian observers argue that the dissatisfaction within the military is bound to increase as the inability to deal with the Iraqi war in a swift and face-saving manner becomes more apparent. However, the probability of a military coup is quite remote while the military is entangled with the war.

While the fight over economic issues intensifies due to Khomeini's health and deteriorating economic conditions, caused by the burdens of the Iran-Iraq war, corruption and the lack of effective management, the regime has also had to face pressures from outside the government on political issues. Not surprisingly, most recent pressure has come not from the organised opposition forces outlined here. Rather, it has come from within Islamic circles.

Many of the grand ayatollahs, like Shariatmadari, Marashi Najafi and Gulpaygani who did not actively support the IRP line, continue to enjoy a large following. Shariatmadari's ability, despite virtual house arrest since December 1979, to remain a *Marja' al-Taqlid* (Source of emulation) for broad sectors of the population, especially in Azarbayjan and Khurasan, is perhaps an omen for the future. The conferring of rights on the Islamic clergy to determine how people should behave (supposedly, derived strictly from the Koran) on every aspect of life has been the core of the disagreement. On the more fundamental level, it has been its repressive nature that has pushed many to reject the regime but not Islam.

Opponents of the regime who continue to be devout Muslims come from the Shia community, as well as the now sizeable Sunni community (10 mil-

lion people) in Iran. They consider the anti-democratic nature of Khomeini's regime to be anti-Islamic. Islam, they argue, is a religion that respects diversity of opinion and action. Furthermore, the conversion to the Islamic code of conduct should come through persuasion and not terror. The position of Islamic reformers is quite different from the royalist and secular liberal positions that tend to blame Islam in general for all the post-revolutionary problems in Iran.

They argue for reform within the context of Islam. And, in this sense, the Islamic reformers are much more in tune with current Iranian politics and the way they are likely to develop in the years to come. Political differentiation and changes of allegiance in Iran have occurred and will continue to occur within the Islamic framework. The realisation of this is fundamental for the successful operation of any opposition group. The middle class may have learned to abhor Islam after the revolution, but the rest of the population has pinned its hopes on Islam and is ready to experiment with different versions of it.

How the regime will respond to these competing claims only the future can tell. Given the intense disagreements over socio-economic, political and cultural issues within the IRP, as well as the Islamic community as a whole, it is unlikely that the regime will be able to consolidate itself totally. However, it will continue to survive, at least for a while, since there is no organisation capable of destroying it. It is no wonder that the regime feels obliged to respond to any kind of opposition immediately and with vengeance. It seems determined not to make the same mistake the Shah made. Loosening its tight political control may allow organisational build-up and possible uprisings against the regime.

*The writer is an Iranian academic currently living in the United States. She has recently returned from Iran.*

CSO: 4600/77

## BRIEFS

**LARGE SUMS SPENT ON ARMS**--Saudi Arabia earmarks \$2,400 of the annual per capita income of its population for military purposes. It has the highest per capita military budget in the world. According to a report by IRNA quoting PTI, the UAE has allotted \$2,100 of the per capita income of its population for military purposes or one-third of its total budget. The same report adds that the motive for such huge expenditures is that these countries think that by buying the most sophisticated and complicated arms they can defend themselves without foreign intervention. PTI adds that the Arab countries in the region will buy in the coming years missiles and complicated air defense networks from the United States, England, and France and they will set up a joint defense under a joint command in the (Persian) Gulf. [Text] [Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 24 Oct 84 p 20]

**EMBEZZLEMENT, OTHER CRIMES COMMITTED**--In the education sector 7 of Tehran's more than 5 million Tuman have been embezzled and misappropriated. According to our correspondent, recently one of the self-sold persons of the regime, Najamabadi by name, who was chief of financial affairs and administration of Tehran's education sector seven, stole millions of Tuman from that department and fled. Investigations show that the pilfered sums may be even more than suspected. The Free Voice correspondent reports misappropriation, theft, and embezzlement is growing every day in all organs of the Islamic Republic regime. [Text] [(Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 GMT 6 Nov 84]

**SUPPRESSION OF WORKERS**--According to a report by the Free Voice of Iran correspondent, workers at the Karaj (?textile) factory recently conducted a protest to press for their demands. However, the managing director of this factory, Hoseyn Zolfaqari, who is a croney of Lajvardi, immediately began to suppress the workers. Fifteen workers were arrested by the revolution guards and sent to Evin prison. As a follow-up to this action, Motahari, a regime mercenary, went to the factory and threatened the other workers and said whoever engaged in such actions will receive nothing but execution, prison, and lashes. Two days after the incident, Zolfaqari, together with revolution guards, and armed with an order from Lajverdi, went to the factory and arrested an additional number of workers. [Text] [(Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 GMT 6 Nov 84]

USSR ENVOY'S SPEECH--Political observers feel that there is a link between the appearance on the mullahs' television by the Soviet ambassador to Tehran and the beginning of the trial of the Tudeh party leaders in Iran. The Soviet envoy in Tehran appeared on the Khomeyni regime's television for the first time last night and made a speech expressing the hope that ties between Tehran and Moscow would increase. According to political observers, it seems that the so-called Islamic regime intends to either release or exile the Tudeh leaders after a sham trial. By permitting the Soviet envoy to appear on the screen of the occupationist Iranian television, the regime believes it has prepared the grounds and the minds of the public for doing so. [Text] [(Clandestine) Radio Nejat-e Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 9 Nov 84]

TRESPASSERS TO BE SENTENCED--Washington, 7 Nov, IRNA--A Washington court is to hold a session Thursday to decide on punishment of some 32 Muslims who are charged with illegal entry into the Washington mosque last 'Id al-Fitr (Muslim feat marking the end of fasting month) last year. The Washington prosecutor has dismissed one of the jurors on the grounds that he believed the group was innocent. Following the three-month trial of the group, the court in complete animosity with the Muslims ruled that they were guilty. The lawyer defending the Muslims protested against the attitude of the prosecutor. However, the judge has confirmed the court's ruling that the Muslims are guilty. During the last 'Id al-Fitr, the Washington police upon instigation of certain ambassadors of the reactionary Middle East governments of the region, who claim to be the owners of the Washington mosque, broke into the mosque and arrested 50 Muslims. Out of those arrested, 18 were found innocent. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1534 GMT 7 Nov 84 LD]

CSO: 4600/76

## POLITICAL ASPIRANTS, VIEWS REGARDING ELECTIONS REVIEWED

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 10 Oct 84 p 3

/Hafiz Abdul Khaliq's "Lahore Diary"/

/Excerpt/ The government's arguments in favor of nonparty elections have led us to expect nonparty elections, but we are still at sea as to how all this is going to happen. The MRD and other political parties expected that there will be no elections at all. Even those who believed in the president's promise say that there is only a 60-percent chance of elections taking place. The defunct Jamaat-e Islami and Muslim League Pagara Group have decided to take part in the nonparty elections. They are even preparing lists of the names of the candidates they expect to take part in the elections. Khawaja Mohammad Safdar, chairman of the Majlis-e Shoora, is engaged in a survey of the political clout of those members of the Shoora who want to take part in the elections. During his recent visit to Lahore, he spent all of his time visiting members of the Shoora and asking them to tell him without any exaggeration the extent of their popularity in their several political circles. The members of the Shoora think that the government wants to help them, but those who know the inside story tell us that the regime is only trying to eliminate the names of those candidates whose chances of success are not bright. If any candidate of the Shoora is defeated, it will give the impression that the regime is not popular. Hence the government is not taking any chances. The regime is backing other influential persons in the constituencies where members of the Shoora are not likely to win. The government will not say so in so many words, but the public will come to know which members are progovernment. The government is backing as many as three candidates from each constituency.

During his stay in Lahore, Khawaja Safdar tried to persuade Pir Pagara to let members of the Shoora run for election as Muslim League candidates. But there are no Shoora members among the candidates whose names have been chosen by the district councils of the Pagara Group of the Punjab Muslim League. The presidents of these district councils have specified that no Shoora members are to be included in the Pagara Group candidates because, if they are successful, they will leave the League and join the government. Pir Pagara has not given any promise to Khawaja Safdar but has appointed a parliamentary board to make decisions on all such matters. Now the Shoora members are being ignored, and they are not being invited to any meetings of the Pagara Muslim League.

Efforts are being made to persuade all political parties to adopt the same attitude toward nonparty elections. All parties included in the MRD are definitely against nonparty elections, though they have not yet announced their decision. Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani used all his eloquence to oppose nonparty elections. As a matter of fact, his party started a campaign to persuade all political parties to present a unanimous united front on this matter. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Shah Ahmad Noorani had useful dialogues with the leaders of the Pagara Group on this issue. The plan for the elections prepared by Prof Shah Faridul Haq will be acceptable to both the MRD and the Jamiat /Presumably Jamiatul Ulema-e Pakistan (JUP)/ Maulana Noorani will be able to join hands with the MRD without joining that party, and Abdusattar Niazi, general secretary of the JUP, will have no objection to that.

Our military men rule the country when they are in the service, but their desire to rule does not leave them even when they have retired from military service. While in service, they keep defaming the politicians, but as soon they are retired they start trying to join a political party. We find that the military officers (who were always mocking politics and politicians) are busy playing the game of politics after their retirement. Many former military men in the provincial capital are preparing to join the ranks of the politicians. One is Brig (rtd) Inamul Haq, and the other is Major General (rtd) Ansari. General Ansari has been the director general of the Lahore Development Authority /LDA/ but recent receptions given in his honor as the head of the LDA aimed not only at making him acquainted with the problems of the public but at preparing the bases for his entry into politics. Since retiring from LDA, he has become active in politics. He had a meeting with Maulana Noorani when the latter visited Lahore. There is a general impression that he will soon join the Jamiat. In this way the JUP will have two generals in its ranks. When Gen (rtd) (the Lt Gen) Sawar Khan was governor of Punjab, Brig (rtd) Inamul Haw was MLO /Martial Law Officer, i.e., Martial Law Administrator/ of Punjab. He has now started his political life by giving a dinner in honor of Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan at his residence in Gulberg. This dinner was attended by the leaders of the MRD and also by the dissident members of the Pagara Muslim League. Political thinkers are wondering how these leopards have changed their spots.

The success of film stars in politics has encouraged our film stars to take part in politics. In India, film star Rama Rao's success against Indira Gandhi has further inspired the film stars. Now actor Kamal and Inayat Hussain Bhatti has announced their intention of joining politics. Many other film stars have announced similar intentions. Not only that, even cricket stars are joining in in politics. Sarfraz Nawaz, the crickereer has announced his intention of running for the provincial assembly from the Mozang constituency. In a way, Sarfraz is connected with the film industry, too. His wife, Rani, is a film star, and he himself has been invited to work in a film.

The schedule for the elections has not yet been announced but there are rumors that Hanif Ramay, leader of the defunct Musawat Party, or Nawab Sadiq Hussain Quraishi, will be the future chief minister of Punjab. Friends of Ramay claim that the matter was settled between Hanif Ramay and the president when the latter met him on his visit to America. Allusions are made to their family

relations, too. Hanif Ramay intends to run for the provincial assembly. He is a champion of Punjab's leadership and is trying to cooperate with the defunct Pakistan National Party /PNP/. Political observers think that he wants to make the Musawat Party strong in Punjab by joining hands with the PNP. In Baluchistan, the PNP would be successful. This cooperation would make it easier to run governments in different provinces.

Those who are with Nawab Sadiq Hussain Quraishi think that he will be successful. He is consolidating his power in the Multan region, and with the help of former federal minister Sayed Fakhar Imamhe has brought together all the influential people of the region and invited them to his house. Fakhar Imam did not gain anything from this move but Sadiq Hussain has gained much political power through it. Talking of former ministers has just reminded me of my meeting with a former minister (who was in the cabinets of both Ayub Khan and Bhutto). I asked him why he was taking part in a nonparty election when his party, the PPP, was against it. He said he was joining the election anyway. "But why?" I asked him. "Well," he answered, "Seven years is long enough to be without a portfolio."

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